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The current issue of Argumenta opens with a Special Issue devoted to a top-
ic that has been gaining an increasing appeal within the philosophical and non-
philosophical audience—the philosophy of food. The Special Issue is entitled 
Metaphysics at the Table and is edited by three scholars who have in the recent 
past contributed in many ways to the analysis of the topic—Andrea Borghini, 
Donatella Donati and Nicola Piras. 
As the three guest editors explain in the Introduction, philosophers have 
been approaching the subject of food from several disciplinary points of views— 
ethics, bioethics, political philosophy, epistemology, and aesthetics—but no col-
lections of papers has been devoted so far to the investigation of food and its 
consumption from the perspective of analytic metaphysics. The Special Issue the 
reader will find in the following pages represents an important contribution to 
remedy this. 
Together with the Special Issue comes an article by Brentyn J. Ramm enti-
tled Experiments in Visual Perspective: Size Experience. Ramm’s is a brilliant attempt 
to shed light on the long-standing debate between objectivist and subjectivists 
accounts of visual experiences. One of the merits of his article is that of discuss-
ing the question in light of a series of first-person experiments aimed at investi-
gating size experience.  
Finally, the section of Book Reviews rounds off the number. In this section, 
readers will find a careful assessment of three very interesting recent books— 
Political Self-Deception by Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, Remembering from the Outside: 
Editorial 174 
Personal Memory and the Perspectival Mind by Christopher J. McCarroll, and The 
Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality by Angela Mendelovici. 
In publishing this second issue of the fifth volume, it is my pleasure to 
thank the colleagues who have acted as external referees, the Assistant Editors, 
and the Editor of the Book Reviews.  
All the articles appearing in Argumenta are freely accessible and freely 
downloadable, therefore it only remains to wish you:  
Buona lettura! 
 
      Massimo Dell’Utri 
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Metaphysics at the Table: 
Introduction 
 
Andrea Borghini* Donatella Donati** Nicola Piras* 
*University of Milan 





Contemporary philosophers have studied food and its consumption from several 
disciplinary perspectives, including normative ethics, bioethics, environmental 
ethics, political philosophy, epistemology, and aesthetics. Many questions remain, 
however, underexplored or unaddressed. It is in the spirit of contributing to fill in 
these scholarly gaps that we designed the current issue, which represents the first 
collection of papers dedicated to food from a perspective of analytic metaphysics. 
Before presenting the five papers published in this issue, we shall briefly 
frame the current research on food linked to analytic metaphysics and point out 
future directions of research in this area. We begin with the most basic interroga-
tive, namely What is food?, and then offer three illustrations of more specific re-
search questions. We hope these examples suffice to demonstrate that food is a 
fertile terrain of inquiry for analytic metaphysics and that it deserves to be devel-
oped.  
 
1. Overarching Research Question: What Is Food? 
Food is so ingrained in our ordinary worldview that the question What is food? 
may seem a trivial one with a straightforward answer. Well, it isn’t. When you 
start taking it seriously, the question opens a canister of tricky sub-questions. Here 
are some examples. Why is a banana a food while a raw olive is not? Are common 
medicines, such as aspirin pills, a food? Are chewing gums to be regarded as food, 
even though they are not ingested? Are beverages types of foods or is there a pro-
found metaphysical distinction between foods and beverages? 
Interrogatives like these multiply quickly. Jointly taken, they flag the exist-
ence of underlying theoretical issues that deserve investigation, as pointed out in 
some recent literature.1 Metaphysics seems especially well-positioned to address 
them and provide a full framework of the nature of food insofar as it studies the 
nature of things and their mutual relations. To do so, we suggest, metaphysicians 
should draw on parallel attempts to study specific “regions” of reality, as for in-
stance in the ongoing debates on race and gender (Ásta 2018), species (Slater 
2013), or social entities (Haslanger 2012).  
 
1 See especially Kaplan 2019: 19-27, and Borghini & Piras 2020. 
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As a way of illustration, in this introduction we shall point out two important 
sub-questions descending from What is food?:  
(1) Is food a natural kind term? 
(2) Which ontological category best captures the nature of food—concrete par-
ticular, sortal, predicate, process, or something else still? 
We shall briefly present both questions. 
(1) Generally speaking, it seems that, in order to be a food, an entity should 
have several natural properties apt to nourish a certain kind of being—in the case 
we are considering here, nourish humans. This suggests a naturalistic conception of 
food according to which being food is to be nourishment for a certain kind of living 
being. However, having this property is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condi-
tion for being food. It is not sufficient because there are plenty of things that could 
nourish a human being and that are, nevertheless, not regarded as foods in most 
contexts, such as human flesh, pets, insects, or disgusting items to eat (DeFoliart 
1999). Moreover, having the property of nourishing human beings is not necessary 
for being food because human beings have been eating a large and assorted array of 
food during their history that do not seem nourishing, such as indigestible entities, 
e.g., many vegetal fibres (Lunn & Buttriss 2007), or chewing gums, or spices.  
At this point, one may think that being nourishing for human beings is not the 
right sort of natural property that can prove that food is a natural kind. If so, which 
natural properties, if any, can fix the identity of human food qua natural kind? 
Should we rather think of food as a social or an institutional kind? This is the chal-
lenge that we wish to put on the table, leaving its analysis for another occasion.  
(2) Which ontological category best captures the nature of food? To answer 
this question, we may begin by looking at specific food items. Going by our ordi-
nary language, we may surmise that specific foods are concrete particulars. A 
rocket salad, a chocolate chip cookie, a piece of sourdough bread, a glass of Chi-
anti all seem to be concoctions of edible stuff bearing specific properties (calories, 
nutrients, aesthetic qualities, site-specific links, etc.). Yet, one may rebut that any 
edible has a (not presumed, but effective) expiration date, past which it is no 
longer a food even though the stuff still continues to exist. This may suggest that 
food terms may function as some sort of predicates. Thus, for instance, “rocket 
salad” and “chocolate chip” may be regarded as sortal terms, while other food 
terms such as “salt” or “tomato” may be regarded as natural kind terms, and oth-
ers still as generic predicates (e.g. “cocktail” or “carpaccio”). Alternative theoret-
ical options may seem viable too, however. For instance, fermented foods like 
wine or yoghurt may be regarded as processes because they are dynamic complex 
systems. A process view would go well also with the complex manners in which 
foods are digested by our bodies, for one might argue that food lingers through 
the entire process, from tasting to nourishing.  
Stepping back from the specificities of the dispute, we may wonder whether 
all food items should belong to one and the same ontological category. If they do, 
then food would presumably be identified with that category; if they do not, then 
what to do of the generic food category? These and cognate questions have been 
discussed (Borghini & Piras 2020), but more research still awaits to be done. 
 
2. Three Specific Research Questions 
Moving to specific food items, in this section we showcase three areas of research 
where analytic metaphysics contributes to food scholarship.  
Metaphysics at the Table 
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Hunger. Humans need to eat to survive. The first physiological and psycho-
logical state which signals this need is generically referred to as “hunger.” This 
state is far more shaped by psychological, social, and cultural conditions than one 
might think (Borghini 2014). If so, then, what kind of state is hunger? Is it a purely 
physiological state? Is it a mental state? Is it a feeling or an emotion? The way we 
address these and cognate questions has a bearing also on how we understand 
eating disorders and how we clinically and legally frame them (Giordano 2005). 
More broadly, a theory of hunger has a bearing for how we assess the politics of 
dieting and obesity (Borghini & Serpico 2020).   
Identity of specific foods. Analytic metaphysics can help address questions of 
identity for specific foods. Such questions may be grouped into different clusters 
based on the types of food products under consideration. As a way of illustration, 
consider geographical indications, namely those products (foods, but not only) 
that bear their identity to an essential link with a geographical region. Why does 
Champagne hold a superb reputation? The standard refrain calls on a specific ter-
roir—a mixture of soil, rainfall, climate, and human tender uniquely characteriz-
ing the grapes. Yet, as Earth’s climate is rapidly changing, it is arguably the case 
that terroir is also changing. Is the identity of Champagne wines shifting too? If 
climate would force a thorough rethinking of grapevine production in Cham-
pagne, is the identity of Champagne going to be compromised? A thorough met-
aphysical study can help point out the most sound answers to these and related 
questions, by investigating what makes the content of a bottle an authentic in-
stance of a wine (Todd 2010, Smith 2016).  
Besides geographical indications, analytic metaphysics can help address 
questions of identity for many other food items, such as recipes (Borghini Piras 
2020a), genetically modified foods (Andrée 2008), or specific food categories—
e.g. local food, organic food, natural food (Siipi 2015).  
Food and language. Language plays a central role in human relation to food. 
The list of examples is too long to be exhausted here and we shall only point at a 
few of them. First, experimental studies in computational linguistics on food show 
that the descriptors of a food, including its price, can make it more or less attrac-
tive (Jurafsky 2014, Spence 2017). Second, naming enters into the identity of rec-
ipes too: are pasta and noodle the same? Third, Adams (1990) amply demon-
strates that the ways in which we talk about meat—such as the use of the neutral 
pronoun “it”—is crucial in shaping the sexual politics of meat.  
As the latter example attests, research in this area can fruitfully be conjoined 
with the growing scholarship on the ethics and politics of language to foster mul-
ticulturalism, inclusivity, and diversity when it comes to (medical and institu-
tional) dietary advice, marketing, and more broadly food communication. 
As we hope these notes demonstrate, much work awaits to be done by ana-
lytic metaphysicians in the study of food. This issue can be fruitful in two direc-
tions: first, it contributes to complexify metaphysical theories of identity, persis-
tence, properties, causation, and composition. It is also a fruitful angle to study 
the interplay between the ontology of natural and social entities. Besides, such a 
work would be beneficial not only to the field, but most importantly it would serve 
to provide a much needed grounding to food scholarship and to debates surround-
ing food in the public sphere (Bonotti & Barnhill 2019). Broadly speaking an an-
alytic perspective on food brings new insights into the relationship between lan-
guage, perceptions, and reality.  
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3. The Current Special Issue 
Finally, we shall briefly present the five articles collected in this special issue, 
which nicely complement the existing literature. They address a well-assorted va-
riety of topics in metaphysics: aesthetics properties; mereology and food systems; 
local food; recipes and the authenticity of dishes; “normal” food vs. food substi-
tutes and supplements. Papers also come from scholars at different stages of their 
careers and specializing in diverse camps of philosophy. In the remaining, we 
outline the contribution of each paper. 
Sara Bernstein’s paper “Can Unmodified Food Be Culinary Art?” explores 
an original question regarding the aesthetic of food. Bernstein wonders whether, 
in some circumstances, unmodified food, that is food that has not undergone any 
kind of alteration or enhancement, can be considered to be culinary art. Her an-
swer is positive. Throughout the paper she constructs parallelisms between un-
modified food and visual art objects (especially, readymades) and shows that there 
are several similarities between the two. According to Bernstein, in order to es-
tablish whether some unmodified food can count as culinary art there has to be 
an interplay between the artistic intentions of a chef, the attitude of the consumer, 
who must have certain expectations and pay careful attention to the culinary ex-
perience (this what Bernstein calls “aesthetic trust”). Bernstein argues that aes-
thetic trust is neither necessary nor sufficient for culinary art, nonetheless it plays 
a central role. What counts most in determining whether some unmodified food 
can count as culinary art are culinary settings and institutions. As well as in the 
artistic world museums, art critics, art magazines determine whether an object 
can count as art, the place where such food is being served, group of food critics, 
culinary magazines, and social media are influential in conferring culinary artistic 
status. Bernstein argues that what makes something culinary art is a matter of 
receiving attention from the right sort of institutions, embracing an institutionalist 
theory of art. 
Shane Epting’s paper “Unjust Food Systems and Applied Mereology” pro-
poses to employ an applied-mereological approach to solve some of the issues that 
originate from the complexity of conventional food systems. Such systems are 
composed of a huge number of parts located all around the globe, but an overa-
bundance of these components generates what Epting calls “globalized opacity.” 
This opacity does not allow us to see how all these parts interact and, as a conse-
quence, to understand how the entire system works. Not knowing the interactions 
between these components makes it difficult to identify the sources of problems 
connected to the system, especially when it comes to social injustices. In order to 
reduce such issues and improve food justice, Epting argues that it is necessary to 
investigate the relations among the parts that compose the system by adopting an 
“applied-mereological” method. This method not only can help to understand 
how to lower the number of parts (and so to reduce globalized opacity), but also 
how to replace those parts that generate injustices with alternative ones. In the 
last section of his paper, Epting identifies some areas which deserve further re-
search (e.g., production, distribution, and consumption) and suggests that this re-
search should be interdisciplinary. 
In her paper “Local Food as Social Change: Food Sovereignty as a Radical 
New Ontology,” Samantha Noll discusses the importance of ontology in the anal-
yses of local food movements. These analyses are usually made from an ethical 
or social and political perspective, giving the structure and the strategies of local 
Metaphysics at the Table 
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food projects. Noll argues that also an ontological analysis is fundamental in order 
to provide a good analysis of local food: ontology could provide valuable insights 
into the principles that guide local food movements, and it could help to under-
stand the “revolutionary promise” of such movements. Noll then focuses on two 
different kinds of local food projects: food security (guided by distributive justice) 
and food sovereignty (guided by a more expansive justice). She provides an over-
view of the justice frameworks and ontological commitments that govern these 
two projects. Noll concludes by claiming that food sovereignty projects are “rev-
olutionary,” since they could change industrial food practices, but also, since they 
are built on a new political ontology and a “co-constitutive food-focused orienta-
tion,” these projects could lead to the construction of new social and political 
structures. 
In his paper “Towards a Particularist Metaphysics of Recipes,” Giulio Sciacca 
develops a novel metaphysical account of recipes and investigates the concept of 
authenticity of dishes in relation to recipes. Sciacca’s paper is structured in two 
main parts. In the first part, he argues against a Platonist account of recipes, re-
jecting the thesis that recipes are universals instantiated by dishes, and claiming 
that there are some grounding relations between recipes and dishes that are not 
those of instantiation. In the second part of the paper, by developing some aspects 
of Borghini (2015) constructivist account of recipes, Sciacca advances his novel 
account according to which recipes are “abstract cultural artifacts” that are traced 
through their “history and recordings”. In Sciacca’s view, which takes a cue from 
Kaplan’s theory of words, in order to preserve the authenticity of dishes, the men-
tal or written stages through which recipes are handed to future generations must 
be appropriately connected to what he calls “the introductory stage” of the recipe 
and the dish they encode. 
Helena Siipi’s aim in her paper “Food, Food Substitutes and Food Supple-
ments” is to understand what is food by exploring its relation with food substitutes 
and food supplements, and she explores such relations by focusing on their func-
tions. She argues that food substitutes (such as almond milk instead of dairy milk) 
and food supplements (such as proteins or multivitamin) can fulfill some but not 
all the functions fulfilled by what she calls “real food.” Indeed, in her view, “real 
food” has social, cultural, aesthetic, culinary, nutritional and other functions that 
food substitutes and supplements lack. Siipi then raises an interesting issue regard-
ing some kinds of food substitutes, such as in vitro meat, that apparently share 
most of real food’s functions. According to Siipi, some distinctions between real 
food and food substitutes are determined only by social customs and habits. Food 
substitutes, which could instead be seen just as alternatives, are considered to be 
novel and uncustomary, only because of individuals’ experiences (what comes 
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Can Unmodified Food Be Culinary Art? 
 
Sara Bernstein  






You are sitting in a fancy restaurant. After an extensively prepared, multi-course 
meal, out comes the dessert course: an unmodified but perfectly juicy, fresh 
peach. Many restaurants serve such unmodified or barely-modified foods, intend-
ing them to count as culinary art. This paper takes up the question of whether 
such unmodified foods, served in the relevant institutional settings, do count as 
culinary art. Drawing on debates about the metaphysics of art, I compare and 
contrast the case of unmodified food to Duchamp’s “Fountain” (1917), pointing 
out relevant similarities and differences between the cases. I propose that there is 
a distinctive form of aesthetic trust involved in formal culinary settings, and it 
plays a central role in many instances of culinary art. Culinary institutions sum-
mon aesthetic trust, which helps to explain why a dish of unmodified food served 
in an appropriate institutional setting can count as culinary art. 
 






You are sitting in Chez Panisse, Alice Waters’ acclaimed restaurant in Berkeley, 
California. After an extensively prepared, multi-course meal, out comes the des-
sert course: an unmodified but perfectly juicy, fresh peach. Many chefs serve 
such unmodified or barely-modified foods with the intention that they count as 
culinary art. This paper takes up the question of whether unmodified foods, 
served in the relevant institutional settings, can count as culinary art.1  
Here’s the plan. In section 1, I propose and discuss the idea that at least 
some food counts as culinary art. Along the way, I address some underattended-
to questions about the nature of culinary art more generally, and I reveal some 
of its distinguishing features. In section 2, I analyze what it is for a food to be 
unmodified, and distinguish modification from several nearby concepts such as 
preparation and selection. I use sashimi as a case study for these categories. I 
compare and contrast the case of unmodified food to Duchamp’s “Fountain” 
(1917), highlighting relevant similarities between the cases. In Section 3, I pro-
pose that there is a distinctive form of aesthetic trust involved in formal culinary 
settings, and it plays a central role in many instances of culinary art. Culinary 
 




institutions summon aesthetic trust, which helps to explain why a dish of un-
modified food served in an appropriate institutional setting can count as culi-
nary art. 
 
1. Culinary Art 
My argument will depend on the premise that food can be art. Culinary art, rough-
ly, art composed of food with taste as the primary sensory modality,2 is an under-
explored topic in philosophical aesthetics and philosophy of art.3 I cannot do jus-
tice to the entire topic of culinary art here. But I will propose that culinary art is in 
fact a form of art, by way of drawing illuminating parallels between culinary art 
and other forms of art. Ontological questions about the nature of visual art objects 
have fruitful parallels in culinary art. Just as we might ask what makes a particular 
object count as an art object, we might ask what makes a certain food or grouping 
of foods count as culinary art.  
Lest one doubt that there can be culinary art (in the strongest possible sense 
of “art”), consider that aesthetic values of visual art have direct analogues in cul-
inary art. Just as we might ask what makes a certain piece of visual art beautiful, 
and in what beauty consists, we might ask what makes a culinary experience 
gustatorily valuable, and in what gustatory value consists. Just as a quality 
painting has aesthetic values such as balance, complexity, unity, and harmony, 
an artful meal or dish can possess the same aesthetic values.  
A meal can be a vehicle for artistic intention. Just as a visual artist intends 
to portray a scene with a particular feeling, mood, or memory, a chef might in-
tend to portray a particular feeling, mood, or memory in her food. As Michel-
angelo intended to portray David’s strength and determination, a chef might in-
tend to portray cheerfulness or aggression in a particular dish. Chefs intend cer-
tain combinations of flavors to be gustatorily aggressive like visual artists intend 
combinations of colors to be visually aggressive: a dish of house-cured salami 
and mustard is a forceful set of flavors like Rothko’s red and black “Composi-
tion” (1959) is visually forceful. A scene from Monet’s waterlilies can be serene 
just as a particular combination of flavors such as lavender and vanilla can be 
calming and delicate. And a painting can be composed in faded tones in order to 
evoke memory just as a dish can be composed to evoke the idea of familiar child-
hood foods. (“Elevated comfort cooking”, the tradition of elaborate restaurant-
created versions of American home-served classics like grilled cheese and Sunday 
casserole, is a ubiquitous example of the focus on nostalgic culinary memory.)4  
As visual art has representational power, food also has representational 
power. The Impossible Burger, a vegan burger made out of genetically modified 
soy, gustatorily represents cow-derived burger meat; sesame is sometimes used 
in dishes to gustatorily represent the taste of peanut. With both visual and culi-
nary art, representation runs the gamut from direct to indirect. Van Gogh’s self-
portrait impressionistically represents his visage but doesn’t exactly capture it; 
the Impossible Burger represents real meat, but doesn’t precisely duplicate it. A 
 
2 Much culinary art has more than one sensory modality, including smell and vision. 
Though my discussion will focus on taste, these other aspects of food arguably contribute 
to culinary artistic status. 
3 Exceptions include Plakias 2018, Kaplan 2012, Furrow 2016, Sweeney 2017, Andina 
and Barbero 2018 and Telfer 1996. 
4 https://www.newsweek.com/cutting-edge-chefs-serve-food-tells-story-249512 
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famous dessert at Le Bernardin called “Deconstructed Pineapple” consists of a 
hollowed-out real pineapple, impressively reconstituted as three different flavor 
profiles of the original pineapple. Like Van Gogh’s self-portrait and other im-
pressionistic art, the artfulness lies in the difference between the representation 
and reality.5 
Culinary art, like visual art, can also be symbolic: a common offering in Aus-
tralian restaurants is an attempt at the American burger and fries (so labeled and 
explicitly conceived), intended not just to mimic the original version, but to repre-
sent American flavors, values, and generous quantities. Dishes and meals often 
symbolize an entire food culture, tradition, and history, like Rome’s famous cacio e 
pepe. And there are meal homages to other famous meals, like NeXT chef Grant 
Achatz’ homages to famous dishes from French Laundry and El Bulli.6  
Culinary art, like visual art, is also open to interpretation. As we sometimes 
sense that there is a point to a piece of visual art, but we cannot immediately dis-
cern what it is, we sometimes sense that there is a point to a certain dish, and 
are charged with its interpretation. As we are left to decipher the Mona Lisa’s 
mysterious expression, for example, we are sometimes charged with interpreting 
a creatively composed combination of flavors, like chef Janos Wilder’s choco-
late jalapeño ice cream. Food, like visual art, can be a conceptual challenge. 
Some art works, particularly musical works, are repeatable. Generally, 
meals are also repeatable art works: prominent chefs frequently serve different 
tokens of the same type of meal. Recipes are to meals like orchestral composi-
tions are to performed symphonies.7 Nonrepeatable culinary art works do exist, 
however: arguably, pop-up meal collaborations and one-off creative culinary 
experiments amount to nonrepeatable culinary art.  
Some works of visual art are individually complete, whereas others are to 
be evaluated in the context of an entire show or series. Similarly, some individ-
ual dishes are considered complete works by chefs, whereas others work in the 
medium of the full twelve-course meal. Though I intend my foregoing discus-
sion to apply to instances of unmodified food served in a particular dish, some 
of my remarks will apply to instances of unmodified food served in the context 
of a full meal. 
Both visual and culinary art stem from a process of artistic labor and crea-
tion. Visual artists paint and sculpt; chefs prepare a recipe or a menu, prepare 
the ingredients, and cook. The process of artistic creation distinguishes art from 
naturally occurring visual and culinary beauty, like a beautiful mountain vista or 
a delicious wild berry. Consumption of art by viewers or eaters also plays a cen-
tral role in establishing status as an art object.  
Culinary art is subject to what Wollheim (1980: 43) called the bricoleur prob-
lem: “why certain apparently arbitrarily identified stuffs or processes should be 
the vehicles of art”, while others are not. Most theories of art draw a distinction 
between a scribble drawn by a toddler displayed on Dad’s refrigerator and a 
 
5 Whether these examples count as representation rather than, e.g., mere reference or re-
semblance is a matter of debate. Thanks to two referees for drawing my attention to this 
point. See Korsmeyer (2002: 128-31) for the view that food can be referential via property 
exemplification. 
6 NeXT, French Laundry, El Bulli, and Le Barnardin are prominent, widely acclaimed 
contemporary restaurants to which I will periodically refer throughout the paper. 




scribble drawn by a major artist displayed in the Metropolitan Museum of Art. 
Similarly, a theory of culinary art might draw a distinction between a grilled 
cheese sandwich prepared for a quick take-away lunch and a grilled cheese 
sandwich served as the fourth movement of a multicourse high-concept meal at 
Alinea.8 As museums and marketplaces play a role in influencing what counts 
as art and particularly as “high art”, restaurants and culinary marketplaces play 
a role in influencing what counts as high culinary art.9  
This list of parallels is not exhaustive. Where we look for parallels between 
culinary art and other forms of art, we will find them. At the very least, the nu-
merous parallels between culinary art and other well-established forms of art 
give culinary art a seat at the table (as it were): some food can be art. 
Now, assuming that food can count as art, it is natural to wonder where the 
boundaries are between artistic and non-artistic food objects. It cannot be the 
case that everything we eat counts as culinary art, from our daily multivitamins 
to our hastily-consumed packaged granola bars. I turn now to a specific question 
about such boundaries: whether unmodified food, such as the perfectly juicy 
peach, can count as culinary art. Just as we might wonder whether and why an 
otherwise unmodified object placed in a renowned museum counts as art (“Hey, 
I could have done that!”), we might also wonder whether and why an unmodi-
fied food object is a candidate for counting as culinary art. 
The investigation will reveal interesting insights into the nature of culinary 
art more generally. I will suggest that, along with the distinguishing features in 
the previous discussion, culinary art often involves a complex interplay between 
the artistic intentions of the chef, the attitudes of the eaters, and the influence of 
culinary institutions. Such a view accords with our intuitions about the bounda-
ries between culinary art and non-art. 
  
2. Unmodified Food 
To begin, it will be helpful to understand what sort of food counts as unmodi-
fied.  
I take modification to involve changing food with the purpose of altering or 
enhancing its flavor, smell, or texture. Heating and all forms of cooking (includ-
ing braising, roasting, frying, grilling, steaming, and sous vide treatment) count 
as modification. The addition of spices or flavors counts as modification, as 
does curing or pickling. Combining foods with other foods counts as modifica-
tion, as when a fresh fruit salad is composed by chopping various fruits together. 
Modification is different than preparation. Preparation includes slicing, cut-
ting, dividing, or washing. Unmodified food might nonetheless be prepared, as 
in some cases involving uncooked fish and meat (frozen for food safety reasons, 
then sliced), fresh fruit (washed), or fresh vegetables (chopped).  
Modification is also different than selection. A chef might carefully source 
and select perfectly juicy raspberries as the crowning grace of a meal. Or she 
might select the best raw fish directly from a seafood market, deciding that it 
among all the fresh fish will produce the most complex flavor. Selecting a fresh 
fruit or vegetable at exactly the right time of ripening, or the perfect fresh fish 
 
8 For further discussion of this problem, see Lopes 2014. 
9 Low concept culinary art, including well-executed food served from food trucks, also 
deserves consideration as a form of culinary art. 
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from a market, are both skills of culinary artistic discernment. But they do not 
count as canonical physical modification. (Both preparation and selection, I will 
suggest, do contribute to the aesthetic values of a particular dish or meal.) 
For the purposes of this investigation, creation counts as a form of modifi-
cation. Many chefs grow, and thus create, their own vegetables and fruit. The 
food resulting from this labor does not count as unmodified, since a chef might 
manipulate conditions in order to change the taste of the vegetables and fruit. 
(That a food is created by a chef does not detract at all from its artistic merit—
quite the contrary—but it does put these instances out of the domain of my cen-
tral question of interest.) Food selected from a carefully chosen farmer, howev-
er, does count as unmodified: the chef neither creates it nor changes it, but 
merely sources and selects it.  
The distinction between unmodified and modified food is best understood 
as an intuitive distinction rather than a stable metaphysical one, for several rea-
sons. First, there is a difference in significance between sorts of changes in tem-
perature: intuitively, heating counts as modification whereas freezing counts as 
mere preparation or preservation. Second, there are incidental causal changes in 
food preparation (loss of particles, demoisturization, and so on) that do not gen-
erally count as intentional, substantive modification. Incidental changes might 
nonetheless be intentional, as when a chef leaves cheese out of the fridge for a 
certain amount of time in order to achieve the desired softness, letting natural 
environmental factors do the job of modification for her.  
Third, artistic intention plays a key intuitive role in what foods count as 
modified. Here I will remain as neutral as possible on how big a role artistic in-
tention plays in categorizing a particular culinary intervention as modification, 
because I do not think the role is straightforward. One might be tempted by the 
simple view: “if the chef intends to influence the taste of the food by x-ing, then 
x counts as modification, whereas if she does not intend to influence the food by 
x-ing, then x does not count as modification.” But a perfectly juicy peach can be 
imbued with artistic intent and meaning without being physically modified, and 
a heavily manipulated dish might not be the product of careful artistic intention. 
Artistic intention is not sufficient for a particular activity to count as modifica-
tion, though it is clearly important to the concept of culinary art more generally.  
Fourth, some preparation counts as modification, if the preparation is in-
tended to alter the flavor. Sashimi, a category of food that I take to encompass 
fresh raw fish, crustaceans, and shellfish served in a variety of culinary settings, 
is a paradigm case of this overlap in categories. One might think that sashimi 
counts as an unmodified food: it is neither heated nor cooked. No spices are 
added to it for the purpose of adjusting its flavor. It is not combined with other 
food for a combination of flavors. And it is not substantively changed from its 
original form before being served.  
But sashimi is carefully and artfully prepared insofar as it is sliced and 
served in ways conducive to bringing out its texture and taste. In serious culi-
nary settings, it is also served at exactly the right temperature in order to manip-
ulate its flavor. Fresh fish is carefully selected for the potential flavor it will pro-
duce when sliced as sashimi. On the skills of selection and preparation required 
for serving high-quality sashimi, sushi chef Kaz Matsune writes: 
 
Each fish tastes different. Male salmon tastes different from female salmon. […] 




1inch for sashimi. When cut into paper thin, tuna loses its flavor. However when 
it comes to Toro/Tuna Belly, you need to cut it thin due to its fat content. If you 
cut Toro into 2cm thickness, it may be too overwhelming, thus killing the deli-
cate flavor the belly meat has. 
[How] you cut determines how the sashimi tastes. You need to be able to de-
termine just by looking at the fish. This takes years of experience—looking at fish 
every day for many years. Let's just say even if you mastered sashimi knife skills 
but you know nothing about fish, then you are unable to make the great tasting 
sashimi because you have no idea how to slice it for great taste.10 
 
Paradigmatically unmodified food, in contrast, is not sliced, cut, or changed in 
order to alter its taste. 
Fifth, some selection might also count as modification. Consider a chef 
who places one raspberry with four cranberries rather than four cranberries with 
one raspberry. (Suppose that she prefers the dessert to be tart rather than sweet, 
and uses the contrast between the berry flavors to achieve this effect.) In select-
ing one balance of berries over another, the chef intentionally modifies the over-
all taste of the dish, as well as the gustatory contrast between the berries. Even 
though the chef merely chooses the combination of berries, this sort of selection 
meets some criteria for modification, since it is performed with the goal of ma-
nipulating the taste of the dish.  
Even if the distinction between unmodified and modified food is largely in-
tuitive, it is a useful framework for understanding the role of physical interven-
tion in the creation of culinary art. It is fruitful, for example, to view chef-
composed dishes as existing on a continuum from unmodified to modified, with 
the untouched peach on one end and a highly manipulated coq au vin on the 
other. This framework can help us to understand why we might count both 
dishes as culinary art, despite their differences. I turn now to this topic. 
 
3. Unmodified Food as Culinary Art 
Thus far, I have highlighted the parallels between culinary art and other forms 
of art, and discussed what counts as unmodified food. In order to bring these 
threads together—to begin exploring the circumstances under which unmodified 
food can count as culinary art—it will be helpful to have a general idea of the 
distinguishing features of culinary art more generally. Instances of culinary art, I 
will suggest, generally involve a complex interplay between the artistic inten-
tions of the chef, the attitude of the eater, and the influence of culinary artistic 
culture. Since some unmodified foods involve these aspects as well, they can 
count as culinary art. 
Reconsider the perfectly juicy peach served at the end of a long, well-
thought-out restaurant meal. Note that the peach has many of the hallmarks of 
art noted in section 1. A peach can have aesthetic values like complexity and 
balance. A peach can be a vehicle for sophisticated culinary artistic intention: it 
might serve as a fresh palate-cleanser after a particularly heavy or spicy dish, or 
might have intrinsic qualities that the chef wishes to share with the consumer. It 
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ly-themed meal to represent the freshness of spring. A peach can be a product of 
artistic labor and skill, as when a chef chooses one at precisely the right stage of 
freshness to serve. And a fresh peach can be served in formal contexts such as 
restaurants, and thus be recognized by the culinary marketplace as an object 
worthy of artistic praise.  
Culinary art often involves a chef who wishes to impart a particular sort of 
culinary experience to an eater.11 While this is paradigmatically done through 
complex combinations of foods and flavors, it can also presumably be done 
through a single piece of unmodified food. Combining or changing food isn’t 
necessary for imparting sophisticated artistic intention. Sometimes a chef simply 
wishes to call attention to certain aspects of the food that might otherwise go 
unnoticed.12 Alice Waters serves the peach for dessert at Chez Panisse because 
she takes it to be “perfect and impossible to improve upon”.13  
Artistic intention alone cannot be sufficient for creating culinary art, how-
ever. If the artistic intentions of the chef are enough to create culinary art, the 
ontological powers of the chef are too great. As Zimmerman (2002) notes about 
such a theory of visual art:  
 
Baker thinks we sometimes bring things into existence by thinking about them—
at least, this follows from her view if objects can become artifacts (tools and 
works of art and monuments, for instance) simply by our thinking of them as 
such. A piece of conveniently shaped driftwood becomes a coffee table by being 
brushed off and brought into the house, a urinal becomes a sculpture when hung 
on a wall in a museum and given a title [...] But do we really believe that any-
thing new comes into existence when we do such things? (2002: 333). 
 
If mere artistic intention were enough to create art, then an artist could create a 
piece of art merely by thinking certain thoughts about it. Similarly with culinary 
art: if artistic intentions were enough to change a piece food from non-art to art, 
then many more things would count as culinary art than are intuitively so.14 
 In addition to the artist’s intentions, art paradigmatically involves interac-
tion between artist and viewer. One distinguishing feature of art is that it is often 
interpreted as such by the viewer. In a museum, the viewer interprets the paint-
ings, but not the lit up exit sign, as art. When one enters a museum, one is 
primed to view certain objects as art in addition to viewing them as mere ob-
 
11 Barbero (2018) holds that food can be a “semantic vehicle” for a chef. In the case of a 
well-created Bloody Mary, for example, the drink functions “as a vehicle for the mental 
representations of the person making the Bloody Mary and for the appreciation of those 
who drink it” (358).  
12 For more relevant discussion of artistic intent, see Irvin’s (2005) discussion of artistic 
sanctions. Sanctions, roughly, are acts and communications by the artist that are intend-
ed to draw attention to features of the work. Sanctions can be part of the process of crea-
tion, or they can be extra-procedural (e.g. discussing the work in an interview or giving 
the work a title). According to Irvin, sanctions are to be taken into consideration in the 
interpretation of artwork. 
13 https://www.washingtonian.com/2012/01/31/a-qa-with-alice-waters/ 
14 There is a background issue about the metaphysics of art objects to which I cannot do 
justice in this paper: what metaphysical relationship the art object bears to the material 
that makes it up. A special version of this issue arises for readymades and unmodified 




jects. This propensity to view certain objects as art upon entering a museum 
points to a more general phenomenon: aesthetic trust.  
This sort of trust engenders a type of hopeful expectation about a particular 
aesthetic situation. As Jones writes of trust more generally, “Trust is optimism 
about the goodwill and competence of another” (1996: 7). Aesthetic trust is a 
positive attitude borne from an artistic consumer to a particular aesthetic experi-
ence that disposes her to see certain objects as art. Trust also involves the belief 
that thought and sophistication have gone into the creation of a particular aes-
thetic experience. Examples of aesthetic trust abound across aesthetic categories. 
We are often inclined to view the objects we see in museums as art. We are in-
clined to view the music we hear at a concert as aural art. And we are disposed 
to identify perfume as a kind of olfactory art. Viewing something as art produces 
an inclination to give it a close sort of aesthetic attention—to be open to its aes-
thetic qualities, and to more closely and thoughtfully examine them than we 
otherwise might.  
There is a distinctive form of aesthetic trust adopted by those who eat in 
certain formal culinary settings. Trust involves a hopeful expectation had by an 
eater, directed towards a particular culinary experience. The attitude is based on 
optimism about the experience that the food will generate, and a disposition to 
attend to food in a particularly close way. In the case of the peach at Chez 
Panisse, one is inclined to pay particularly close attention to the flavors and sub-
tleties of the fruit because one believes the chef is intending to communicate 
something through it.15 As the placement of a painting in the right sort of muse-
um disposes it to be attended to as art, so, too does the serving of a dish in a res-
taurant dispose it to be evaluated and attended to as a form of culinary art. 
When one enters a restaurant, one places a certain amount of trust in the chef’s 
vision, and the culinary experience resulting from that vision. One is inclined to 
treat the peach as culinary art, I suggest, because one has a sort of artistic faith 
in the chef and in the restaurant.16 Aesthetic trust also encompasses a kind of in-
terpretive charity about what a chef is trying to accomplish. The presence or ab-
sence of aesthetic trust helps to explain why food served in restaurants is often 
treated and attended-to differently than food served at book clubs in private 
homes—even great food.17 
Aesthetic trust does not create culinary art on its own. Aesthetic trust is nei-
ther necessary nor sufficient for a particular dish to count as art. A meal can be 
 
15 My main example involves a prominent high-concept restaurant, but it need not: many 
eaters exhibit similar forms of aesthetic trust in diners, food trucks, and even Starbucks. 
The trust creates an expectation that what one is about to experience is the product of an 
artistic vision from some sort of culinary artist, whether that be a highly praised expert in 
molecular gastronomy, a long-serving chef at a greasy spoon diner, or a corporate scien-
tist designing a highly replicable cup of coffee. 
16 There are at least two possible explananda in the peach case: the aesthetic qualities of 
the peach itself, and the aesthetic qualities of the peach-in-relation-to-other-dishes, e.g., as 
a palate cleanser. My discussion of aesthetic trust is intended to target the former, though 
some of my remarks apply to the latter case as well. 
17 Lopes (2014: 138-39) proposes a two-pronged approach to explain why some instances 
of artistic media count as art, while others do not. Particular kinds of art have different 
“medium profiles”, or processes by which objects are transformed into art objects via ar-
tistic intentions. Medium profiles have associated “appreciative practices”, or contexts 
that ground aesthetic norms and values ascribed to various artistic media. 
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culinary art even with a distrustful eater. One can imagine a particularly 
grumpy, distrustful food critic with low expectations who is nonetheless blown 
away by an outstanding meal. A meal can fail to count as culinary art even with 
a trusting eater: trust can be violated by a particularly poor meal. Many foodies 
have had the unfortunate experience of paying for an expensive meal for which 
one has high expectations, only to be disappointed by the result. In these ways, 
culinary aesthetic trust mirrors other forms of misplaced aesthetic expectations, 
such as the dashed hopes after a poor musical concert, or the surprisingly beauti-
ful and sophisticated sculpture created by the seven-year-old. Aesthetic expecta-
tions often exceed or fall short of expectations, but it is the presence of expecta-
tions that are the evidence of aesthetic trust in the first place. 
 Though aesthetic trust is neither necessary nor sufficient for culinary art, it 
plays an important role in the art/ non-art distinction. We have many excellent 
culinary experiences that do not, intuitively, count as art. The spot-hitting cold 
beer on a hot day, the juicy hamburger after avoiding meat for a stretch, and the 
(otherwise undistinguished) glass of wine with dinner are all extremely pleasur-
able gustatory experiences. But these sorts of experiences are not paradigmati-
cally accompanied by the sort of careful attention that is the hallmark of aesthet-
ic trust. Aesthetic trust is an attitude held in certain situations that disposes the 
eater to pay careful attention to the qualities of the experience and the artistic in-
tention behind it, rather than just its pleasantness.  
Aesthetic trust is explanatorily important because it helps distinguish un-
modified food objects that count as art from those that do not. Think, for exam-
ple, of all of the peaches growing on the tree that a farmer will eventually pluck 
in order to hand over to Alice Waters. At time t, they are on the tree. At time 
t+1, they are washed and placed on plates in order to be served to customers. At 
time t+2, the courses appear on tables in Chez Panisse. At what times do the 
peaches count as culinary art? Intuitively, not all of the times: they are not culi-
nary art when they are on the tree. Nor are they culinary art, arguably, when 
they are simply sitting in the restaurant kitchen on plates ready to serve, after 
having been given the go-ahead by the chef. Rather, they become culinary art 
when they are served to customers who have culinary expectations about the 
food—when they are objects of culinary attention. The chef intends to convey 
artistic meaning through the food, and the customers expect to discern this 
meaning. Customers in Chez Panisse, for example, expect a particular sort of 
culinary experience backed by sophisticated artistic intention. They are primed 
to give the juicy peach a particular sort of aesthetic attention that they would not 
otherwise give fruit at home—even the very best fruit.  
Now, what else makes the juicy peach at Chez Panisse different from a sim-
ilarly perfect peach served in other settings? Suppose that a friend hosting a book 
group at her home dispenses some similarly perfect peaches as a mid-discussion 
snack. Not much, if anything, distinguishes the Chez Panisse peach from the 
book group peach. Their tastes and textures may be almost identical. Perhaps 
the book group host even procures the peach from the same farmer as the pro-
fessional chef. Similarly with a perfect peach served as a sample at a farmer’s 
market booth. Here, too, the peaches are not intrinsically different.  
Rather, extrinsic differences make the peaches importantly unlike each oth-
er. They are different because they are served in dissimilar culinary settings, each 
with different extrinsic relations and culinary expectations. There are the surface 




ers, and the chef’s kitchen differ from the environs of the book discussion group 
or the farmer’s market. There are the economic and transactional differences in-
volving the peach: one pays for a restaurant meal, whereas one does not usually 
pay for a book group. There are institutional differences: a restaurant is a differ-
ent sort of social entity than a book group. There are differences in quantity and 
type of media attention: Chez Panisse is bound to garner the attention of food 
critics, whereas book groups and farmer’s market booths generally do not. A 
book group, a farmer’s market booth, and a restaurant are all treated very differ-
ently by culinary marketplaces and food critics. 
 Exactly how much of a role culinary marketplaces and critics play in de-
termining what counts as culinary art is an important question for our purposes. 
As museums and galleries play a large role in determining what conventionally 
counts as art, so, too, do chefs, professional restaurants, and food critics.  
Defining their exact roles in the creation of culinary art, however, is tricky. 
Being served in a restaurant isn’t a sufficient condition for being culinary art, 
since not every meal in a restaurant should count as such. An Egg McMuffin 
served in a run-of-the-mill McDonald’s probably doesn’t count as a work of cul-
inary art. Nor does every dish or meal in a high-concept restaurant count as art, 
due to the possibility of failed art.18 Perhaps the otherwise extremely skilled sous 
chef burns the rice in a way that deviates from the head chef’s intention for the 
dish, or the meal is flat-out disgusting. Or perhaps an avant garde restaurant 
chef serves human fecal matter on a plate, so labeled, so that no one can or will 
eat it. Culinary art requires more than being served in a restaurant: the sur-
roundings do not alone make the art.  
Nor is it the restaurant’s existence qua restaurant that makes food count as 
art. One can imagine a famous restaurant that undergoes extensive flood dam-
age, after which its chef decides to serve meals in an open-air preschool play-
ground rather than waste the food and squander the audience.19 Here, the inten-
tions of the chef play a role in communicating culinary artistic content, and a 
more central role in demarcating the food as art. What counts as a restaurant is 
also not as straightforward as it seems. In 2015, a Columbia University under-
graduate operated a one-table “restaurant” called Pith out of his dorm room, 
garnering widespread culinary acclaim. He denied that what he was doing 
counted as a restaurant.20  
Even if restaurants influence what counts as culinary art in many of the 
same ways that museums influence what counts as visual art, the boundaries of 
such influence are easily interrogated. A famous boundary-testing example is 
Duchamp’s (1917) “Fountain”, an unmodified21 mass-manufactured urinal cho-
sen by Duchamp to be displayed in several prominent museums. As such, 
“Fountain” is widely considered to be one of the most influential visual art ob-
jects of the twentieth century. Obvious issues raised by Fountain include wheth-
er something becomes art just because it is displayed in a museum, the extent to 
which attention from art critics plays a role in its being considered art, and how 
 
18 For a theory of failed art, see Mag Uidher 2010. 
19 Korman (2019) argues that restaurants can exist without being constituted by anything.  
20 https://www.grubstreet.com/2015/10/columbia-tasting-restaurant.html 
21 Here I set aside the fact that “Fountain” is slightly modified by the addition of the sig-
nature “R. Mutt 1917”. 
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important artistic intent is to the meaning and interpretation of the final crea-
tion.  
 There are some key differences between “Fountain” and a chef’s juicy 
peach. “Fountain” involves an object that commonly elicits a reaction of repel-
lence or disgust, and Duchamp’s other “readymades” were similarly selected 
because they were not beautiful or pleasing. (“Aesthetic delectation is the dan-
ger to be avoided,” Duchamp claimed.) Consumption of a juicy peach, in con-
trast, is intended to be a gustatorily pleasant experience. Alice Waters presuma-
bly intended to draw our attention to the purity of the ingredient and the taste, 
whereas Duchamp did not intend to draw our attention to aesthetic purity of the 
urinal. Duchamp chose objects that were already ordinary artifacts presented as 
artworks, whereas Waters presented the peach as art from the outset.22 Du-
champ is widely considered to have intended provocation with his choice of ob-
ject to place in the exhibition, whereas a chef usually does not have such an ide-
ological agenda behind a dish.  
There are, of course, exceptions to the latter point: it has become quite 
trendy to push the bounds of what is paradigmatically edible within and across 
culinary cultures. Prominent Noma chef Rene Redzepi commonly serves live 
ants, mold, and moss in his dishes, for example. Alice Waters serves her peach 
partly because she wishes to prove a point about the gustatory bounty that na-
ture has to offer without heavy modification and manipulation of flavors. But 
chefs generally do not intend a cooking ideology to supersede the gustatory 
pleasure of the meal. I do not know of any chef who wants her meal to be gross, 
even if she wants it to be very interesting or to push the consumer’s gustatory 
boundaries. Even Rene Redzepi, the ant-and-mold-utilizing chef, takes his pri-
mary artistic goal to be the creation of deliciousness.23 
The similarities between “Fountain” and the juicy peach are also illuminat-
ing. Neither object is created by its artist, though each is selected by the artist as 
the final product. Both the urinal and the peach are functionally interchangeable 
with suitably similar copies. Any other similar urinal from the production line 
would have had nearly identical artistic influence; any other similarly juicy 
peach would have had nearly the same culinary effect. Each is granted a sort of 
artistic credibility in virtue of its selection. Each provokes reflection about the 
fundamental nature of art more generally. On “Fountain”, an anonymous edito-
rial commented: 
 
Whether Mr Mutt with his own hands made the fountain has no importance. He 
CHOSE it. He took an ordinary article of life, placed it so that its useful signifi-
cance disappeared under the new title and point of view—created a new thought 
for that object (Anon., “The Richard Mutt Case”, Blind Man, New York, no.2, 
May 1917: 5). 
 
Unmodified food and unmodified everyday art objects both call on us to consid-
er why the particular work counts as art. In both cases, artistic intent, plus a par-
ticular sort of formal artistic setting, play roles in their apparent status as art ob-
jects. Chefs who serve unmodified food objects in formal restaurant settings im-
 





bue those objects with culinary meaning in much the same way that Duchamp 
imbues the urinal with meaning.  
It is not just each artist’s intention that imbues the objects with meaning, 
however. In both cases, there is a wider social phenomenon at work in treating 
the object as art. Danto (1964) famously identified the network of critics, pro-
ducers, marketers, distributors, and consumers of art as “the artworld”. Rough-
ly, the artworld is the artistic cultural milieu that creates social conventions 
which designate objects as art. Certain objects count as art at least partially in 
virtue of their belonging to the artworld. On this sort of view, part of what 
makes something an object of art is that it is treated as such by an artistic com-
munity. Theories of art and the history of art play a large role in what the art-
world takes to be art. Dickie’s (1969) expansion of the theory takes artistic insti-
tutions to be central to artistic status, with institutions conferring artistic status 
on objects worthy of artistic appreciation. An institutionalist view easily ex-
plains why Duchamp’s urinal counts as art: it is treated as art by the relevant 
cultural institutions. Dickie wrote, “I am not claiming that Duchamp and 
friends invented the conferring of the status of art; they simply used an existing 
institutional device in an unusual way” (Dickie 1974: 33). 
There is an equivalent view to be developed about culinary art. Call “the 
foodworld” the network of critics, producers, farmers, marketers, distributors, and 
consumers of food in formal culinary settings.24 The foodworld clearly plays a sig-
nificant role in what is to be considered culinary art. Institutions such as groups of 
food critics, culinary magazines, and more recently, social media, are influential 
in conferring culinary artistic status. The foodworld also connects and intertwines 
culinary culture to its own theory and history, so that they inform what counts as 
culinary art. According to an institutionalist theory of culinary art, what makes 
something culinary art is a matter of receiving attention from the right sort of insti-
tutions. A particular dish or food is culinary art because the right food critics say it 
is, or because it is served in the right sort of restaurant, or it has the right sort of 
foodie following, or some combination thereof. This view captures the extension 
of things considered to be culinary art by the foodworld, a sociological fact 
Skidelsky (2007) notes about visual art. There is a further question about whether 
it is the correct metaphysical account of culinary art.  
Institutionalist theories provide indispensable theoretical resources for ac-
counting for differences between culinary art and non-art. In appealing to the 
explanatory power of culinary institutions in the art/ non-art distinction, one 
need not endorse all of the claims of institutionalism about art. If what we seek 
is a descriptive rather than a revisionary metaphysics of culinary art, the food-
world clearly plays some sort of key role in deciding what counts as art. The 
foodworld need not play the only role in this designation, but omitting the role 
of the foodworld would result in a loss of significant predictive and explanatory 
power with respect to the art/ non-art distinction. It is an intuitive data point, 
for example, that a bowl of berries served at home for a mid-afternoon snack is 
somehow different than a bowl of berries served as a palate-cleanser at El Bulli. 
Aesthetic trust explains some of these differences, but culinary institutions often 
play a central role in generating the trust in the first place. 
What is most important for our purposes is that the foodworld clearly does 
treat a perfect peach served at an appropriate restaurant as art. The foodworld 
 
24 Plakias (2018: 44) also discusses parallels between the foodworld and the artworld. 
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influences what counts as art in the case of the peach like the museum influ-
ences what counts as art in the case of the urinal. Even if normal consumers and 
food critics alike are induced to ask themselves why and whether the peach 
counts as culinary art, the discussion itself is an indication that the food is the 
subject of serious consideration as a form of art. The peach has the hallmarks of 
culinary art: it is a vehicle for artistic intention, it is the object of aesthetic trust 
of the eater in an appropriate culinary setting; and it is treated as art by the art-
world. Similar examples of unmodified food will yield similar results.  
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper has argued that unmodified food can, in some circumstances, count 
as culinary art. Culinary art, I have suggested, constitutes a robust category of 
art, and it has many parallels in canonical forms of visual art. Culinary art can 
be philosophically interrogated in similar ways. As Duchamp’s readymades 
pose questions about the nature and boundaries of art, so, too, do instances of 
unmodified food served in the right culinary settings. The example of unmodi-
fied food teaches important lessons about the boundaries of culinary art more 
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Conventional food systems are highly complex entities with numerous components 
that span the globe. Having an overabundance of parts creates ‘globalized opacity’, 
a condition wherein the sheer number of parts makes it incredibly challenging to 
see how these parts fit together. In turn, people cannot see how these systems help 
create and perpetuate social injustices in select instances. With this notion in mind, 
it should be no surprise that numerous issues require mitigation. Gaining a clear 
view of the nature of such problems could improve how food-justice researchers 
understand the complexity involved in the issues that plague food systems, which 
could alleviate harm. One way to assist in such efforts is to employ an applied-
mereological approach to identify ways to reduce the number of parts and replace 
parts that are commonly associated with injustices. This paper moves in that direc-
tion, revealing how an applied-mereological approach can help us address these 
issues and support alternative parts that could help produce desired outcomes. 
 







Although a worldwide network connects multiple parts of conventional food sys-
tems to facilitate international commerce, this process produces ‘globalized opac-
ity’. This term means that there is an overabundance of components and that there 
are often long distances between many of them. Due to this situation, most people 
are unable to fully see and know about the composition of a conventional food 
system. Somewhat paradoxically, the parts that make it feasible for these compo-
nents to be noticeably disconnected, namely transportation and logistics—are 
also pieces of the food-system puzzle. 
Moreover, these parts are indispensable for today’s food systems. Yet, when 
it comes to traditional views of farming, these elements remain mostly unknown. 
This condition makes it exceedingly difficult to know about many of the issues 
connected to conventional food systems, which is paramount when considering 




could help us see such issues more clearly, which would bolster efforts to under-
stand the part-to-part and part-to-whole relations within a food system.  
Gaining a clear view of the nature of this issue could improve how food-
justice researchers understand the intricacy involved in these affairs, which could 
assist struggles to alleviate harm. One way to support their efforts is to employ an 
‘applied-mereological’ approach, a method that helps us examine the relations of 
a food system’s parts, locating the parts that we cannot readily know about. This 
kind of investigation provides a new measure that can help us understand how 
conventional food systems are problematic. In turn, the purpose of this paper is 
to move in that direction. The goal is to identify part-to-part relations that favor 
social and environmental justice, and a significant step to advance that goal is to 
show how the problem of globalized opacity plays a role in such affairs.  
To make this case, I begin by reviewing how we can employ the basic struc-
ture or idea behind mereology to help us understand the composition of conven-
tional food systems. Specifically, I argue that we can better understand that food 
systems adhere to ‘unrestricted mereological composition’, meaning that any kind 
of part, concrete or abstract, can qualify as a part of a food system.1 After estab-
lishing this view, I examine the broad scope of such parts, zeroing in on the prob-
lem of globalized opacity that is associated with such arrangements. Through em-
ploying this term as a theoretical device, we gain a novel technique for conceptu-
alizing a specific condition that we find with these systems. With an understand-
ing of the magnitude of their effects, I explore some of the reasons why activists, 
philosophers, and food scholars challenge and want to change the status quo, ad-
vocating for alternatives that have fewer parts and less globalized opacity. In clos-
ing, I identify some vital areas that would benefit from additional study. 
 
2. The Benefit of ‘Applied Mereology’ for Understanding Con-
ventional Food Systems 
In a basic sense of the theory and its study, mereology deals with the interplay of 
parts, along with how parts relate to wholes (Varzi 2015). Within the traditional 
literature, philosophers who engage in this research address highly abstract rela-
tions of parts (Hovda 2009). While the nature of these undertakings might not 
interest scholars outside of this field, this view is shortsighted. That is, one benefit 
of employing this approach is that it helps us understand how objects that are 
composed of smaller and frequently overlapping parts fit together, forming a co-
hesive unit (Paul 2002). Due to the composition of food systems that involve nu-
merous parts, interdisciplinary researchers can benefit from mereology, and the 
study of the conventional food system supports this claim.2  
From the outset, one could argue that the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for thinking about a food system’s parts in such a manner requires that for parts, 
they must be parts in and of themselves, and they must also be a part of the food 
system. One notion that complicates matters even further is that some parts are 
 
1 To gain an in-depth look at some of the issues pertaining to the thesis behind unrestricted 
mereological composition that are beyond the scope of this paper, see McCarthy 2015.  
2 Frederique de Vignemont et al. (2005) exhibit how we can use mereology to account for 
how we experience parts of our bodies, and they stack this account against how we expe-
rience the body itself. For more information, see de Vignemont, Tsakiris and Haggard 
2005. Peter Simons examines mereology of engineering and AI. See Simons 2013.  
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parts of themselves, while also being parts of greater wholes, which are also parts 
of food systems. Consider this brief example. Land, farm equipment, and people 
are parts themselves. They help to compose a farm, and that farm is part of a food 
system. However, considering that I am denying any restrictions on composition, 
I will not offer the necessary and sufficient conditions for how parts come together 
to make a food system. Instead, I will discuss part-to-part and part-to-whole rela-
tions to help guide how we think about food systems, for instance as they are 
expressed in the illustration above.3 
For example, highly detailed illustrated maps show how the numerous parts 
of a conventional food system fit together and interact with each other, revealing 
the dynamic character of how food supplies crisscross the globe.4 Although these 
maps appear stable, Jo Goossens, the person who created one of the most intricate 
map to date that lays out the vital exchanges within global food systems, points out 
that micro-level aspects of the food trade remain in constant flux (Cereals & Grains 
Association 2020). This notion suggests that literal parts of conventional food sys-
tems are continuously adapting to abstract parts such as market forces and labor, 
along with other literal parts such as new technologies, advances in logistics, and 
the nature of business (Regmi and Gehlhar 2005). These systems are historically 
situated, meaning that entities such as the multinational food conglomerates that 
control conventional food systems are entrenched deeply in the processes and ex-
changes that produce most of the world’s food supply (Howard 2016). In turn, go-
ing from the farm to the table is not a simple matter, and accounting for and ex-
plaining the process is not much easier. Further, it should not come as a surprise 
that most consumers in countries such as the United States have only a vague idea 
of the direct origins of their food (Blatt 2011). While this notion might sound trivial, 
it should be significant, considering that people can shape food systems through 
supporting legislative efforts (Mars and Ball 2016). Consider, for instance, that the 
outline of a food system is quite encompassing, consisting of numerous concrete 
parts, often crossing national and cultural boundaries (Metcalfe 2019). At present, 
ten companies control over half of the food supply in the United States, extending 
to about fifteen percent of the global market (Stuckler and Nestle 2012; Lyson and 
Raymer 2000).5 Considering that the worldwide food exchange accounts for ten 
percent of the world’s total economy, estimates show that the global food supply is 
worth at least 8 trillion dollars annually (Van Nieuwkoop 2019). Although, as indi-
cated above, the parts change due to several considerations and the control of the 
parts remains competitive, extending into numerous areas such as economics and 
international political affairs. Due to such conditions, when considering food sys-
tems and the kind of parts that they can have, this reason shows why it is imperative 
 
3 While there are other issues with unrestricted mereological composition, I am only ap-
plying it to the context of food systems in this paper. 
4 For a highly detailed food map of the global food system, see “Jo Goossens and the shiftN 
Global Food Systems Map”, available online: https://www.cerealsgrains.org/publica-
tions/cfw/2019/jan-feb/Pages/CFW-64-1-0010.aspx  
5 Due to the influence of multinational food companies that now have significant control 
in all aspects of food production, I am going to use the terms ‘conventional food system’ 
and ‘global food system’ interchangeably, even though one could argue that they are not 
entirely mutually exclusive. Yet, they share enough common ground that substituting one 
for the other does not obfuscate anything and preserves the meaning of the message that I 




to think about food systems as having an unrestricted mereological composition.6 
In turn, the way that a food system is presented here is one wherein some parts are 
strict, while others are metaphoric, yielding an idealization with different concrete 
instantiations.7  
To illustrate the ramifications of conventional food systems with these no-
tions in mind, we must consider the range of their inventory and the scope of their 
impact as elements that require highlighting due to the array of effects that they 
produce in concert. The point here worth underscoring is that any change in a 
food system’s parts must bring financial realities into view. While it is evident that 
such alterations have epistemic values, one could hold that they also have a meta-
physical correlate. That is, if such changes stem from financial realities, then fi-
nances, as abstract parts, can dictate a principle of composition for a food system.  
Here is an example. If a nation were to accept a loan from an international 
bank, on the condition that it was to produce tea instead of soybeans, then the 
abstract part of financial pressure would alter the composition of the food system 
by forcing concrete parts such as seeds and the necessary agricultural equipment 
to change. In such instances, parts are stuck together due to economic considera-
tions. In turn, differing economic reasons can generate different principles of com-
position. This notion suggests that the ontology of such systems requires that re-
searchers who examine its parts should pay attention to their backstories (Howard 
2016). The reason to emphasize this idea is that it is unreasonable to weigh the 
relationships between parts without bringing these vital dimensions into view, es-
pecially considering that numerous components require investigation. 
This area is one that would benefit from thinking about food systems in terms 
of unrestricted mereological composition. For instance, we can break their inven-
tory down into several categories of non-overlapping or disjoint parts, meaning 
the part is not counted more than once when accounting for them in the whole 
food system (Varzi 2000; Varzi 2014; Lando 2017). These parts include but are 
not limited to concrete parts such as land, water, natural resources for production, 
petroleum resources, and chemical fertilizers. Yet, they also include abstract parts 
such as labor forces, federal, state, and municipal regulations. There are also com-
munication networks to facilitate the logistics and distribution, which include 
parts such as transportation systems and storage facilities, marketplaces, and res-
taurants (Ruben, Verhagen, and Plaisier 2019; Pitt and Jones 2016; Morley and 
Marsden 2014; Goodman, DuPuis, Goodman, 2012; Erikson 2008). Considered 
together, these parts (along with several other parts if that is the case) can compose 
a greater part, which then becomes part of the larger whole—a food system. For 
example, parts such as a farmer, her land, the water, and various agricultural 
products can compose a farm. This farm can be a part of a food system. Depend-
ing on the character of the ‘farm’, (e.g., small, organic family farm or massive 
conventional agricultural operation) can have significant real-world impacts. By 
 
6 It is worth mentioning that making such identity claims could be controversial if one 
holds that such an identity is impossible. However, engaging in this discussion is beyond 
the scope of this paper. For more information, see McCarthy 2015. 
7 Some philosophers, such as Giorgio Lando, maintain that it is incredibly challenging at 
times to differentiate literal and metaphorical parts. Due to this condition, the claims in 
this paper avoid engaging in such detailed discussion for the most part. This notion entails 
that, unless explicitly stated, I am talking about strict parts. For more information, see 
Lando 2017. 
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putting these aspects into real numbers, we see the requirements and impacts of 
conventional food systems. For instance, Gladek et al. hold: 
 
Agriculture now occupies roughly half of the plant-habitable surface of the planet, 
uses 69% of extracted fresh water and, together with the rest of the food system, is 
responsible for 25-30% of greenhouse gas emissions. The expansion of industrial 
fishing fleets and a higher demand for seafood globally have led to the collapse or 
total exploitation of over 90% of the world’s marine fisheries. A growing demand 
for land-based animal products is the primary driver of tropical deforestation. 
Through its direct and intermediate impacts, the food system is the largest contrib-
utor to the depletion of biodiversity (Gladek et al. 2017: 4).  
 
While this passage exhibits the scope of the impacts that conventional food sys-
tems have on the planet, they also reveal the effects that some people might not 
consider, such as how food systems affect marine ecology. One could argue that 
the view of the oceans often remains secondary when stacked against land-based 
concerns, bearing in mind that most people do not have experiences with those 
environments. For instance, Paul Wolf (2003) argues that because most people do 
not typically engage with oceans, they do not have the necessary perspective to 
grasp their complex character. Yet, when examining the numbers above, the accu-
mulating effects on aquatic systems remind us that considering humankind’s in-
volvement with food systems remains paramount.8 Due to this condition, we can-
not dismiss the reality that such environs are significant macro-parts of the food 
system, which include numerous smaller parts that compose the fishing industry.  
This notion reveals that, in addition to how specific parts of the food system 
affect the non-human world, they also play a dominant role in the socioeconomic 
parts of food systems. For instance, continuing with the insights from Eva Gladek 
et al. (2017: 4) above, such considerations contribute to a panorama of conven-
tional food systems, exhibiting the significance of such dimensions: 
 
The agri-food sector is the world’s largest economic sector and is therefore deeply 
entwined with poverty. Half the global workforce is employed in agriculture. A 
majority of the world’s poorest people are subsistence farmers and fishermen. 
Small farmers and fishers around the world are caught in cycles of poverty, with-
out access to education, employment, economic and social infrastructure, and po-
litical representation. Many do not receive adequate compensation, work in unac-
ceptable conditions, or do not have access to sufficient, affordable, or proper-qual-
ity food. Poverty is the largest threat to producers of food globally and the largest 
driver of food insecurity. 
 
The passage above shows that while we can separate concerns about food systems 
from considerations for other social systems, food systems require additional 
study due to numerous kinds of effects that they can help produce. Philosophers 
of food and interdisciplinary scholars have documented these outcomes, analyz-
ing the many ways that conventional food systems affect farmers and indigenous 
people on almost every continent by focusing heavily on the concept of ‘food sov-
ereignty’ (Jarosz 2014; Navin 2014; Menser 2014; Werkheiser and Noll 2014; 
Grey and Patel 2015; Epting 2018). Viewing the food sovereignty literature as a 
 
8 This claim does not imply the oceans are merely food systems. However, the intention is 




compilation, the theme that emerges shows that numerous people in the agricul-
tural industry seek to gain control over the parts that impact their lives, a notion 
that pushes against the multinational food conglomerates, as mentioned earlier. 
In turn, if they were able to control the parts, then they would gain more control 
over the sum, a notion that appears to be consistent with the stated aims of some 
of the people who champion food sovereignty.  
A recent embodiment of this sentiment has emerged from the labor force that 
works in food production, La Vía Campesina. This organization of farmers spans 
the globe, consisting of almost two hundred smaller organizations from over 
eighty countries in Asia, Africa, the Americas, and Europe (La Vía Campesina 
2007). Their concerted efforts promote smaller family farming practices, geared 
toward agricultural sustainability and justice. This group employs the term ‘food 
sovereignty’ as a central tenet to their approach to address how groups express 
autonomy over their involvement with all aspects of the food trade. They use it 
in a manner that brings numerous related concerns into view, including but not 
limited to social justice, safety, control, and human rights. 
One can argue that within their conception of the term, ‘food sovereignty’, 
they illustrate that several concerns are indirectly connected to conventional food 
systems. Yet, many of these issues are not directly linked to the food industry, 
such as concern for future people (La Vía Campesina 2007). The scope of this 
conception challenges the totality of the effects that conventions food systems 
help produce. In turn, La Vía Campesina positions itself against the status quo, 
advocating for a means of agricultural production that can remedy the ill effects 
of globalized agriculture.  
For example, during the world’s first conference on food sovereignty, they 
formulated the “Declaration of Nye ́le ́ni” (La Vía Campesina 2007). It is a com-
prehensive statement that provides a panorama of the kinds of issues that we find 
in conventional food systems, along with several indirect concerns that also re-
quire attention: 
 
Food sovereignty is the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food 
produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to 
define their own food and agriculture systems. It puts the aspirations and needs of 
those who produce, distribute and consume food at the heart of food systems and 
policies rather than the demands of markets and corporations. It defends the inter-
ests and inclusion of the next generation. It offers a strategy to resist and dismantle 
the current corporate trade and food regime, and directions for food, farming, pas-
toral and fisheries systems determined by local producers and users. Food sover-
eignty prioritises local and national economies and markets and empowers peas-
ant and family farmer-driven agriculture, artisanal-fishing, pastoralist-led grazing, 
and food production, distribution and consumption based on environmental, so-
cial and economic sustainability. 
 
The image that emerges from bringing the above dimensions into view is 
daunting in the best case, and overwhelming in the worst case. They mention 
several points of concern, bringing current issues such as production and distribu-
tion into view. They also extend into future-oriented matters that involve future 
generations within a sustainability matrix. If we keep in mind that such areas in-
volve numerous parts that serve as ‘actors’, it is challenging to know the limits as 
to what counts as a part. One could argue that the description above reveals how 
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the condition of globalized opacity that comes from the composition of conven-
tional food systems can manifest through the felt impacts on the people who have 
been treated as only ‘parts’, in the same manner as if they were another piece of 
farm equipment, a mere means to an end.9 It could be the case that the declaration 
above exhibits that food workers do not feel respected in several ways. Bearing 
this point in mind, one could hold that they are responding accordingly, striving 
for measures that would rearrange or exchange parts so that they could control 
them, expressed as a call for food sovereignty. Considering that they would gain 
control over more parts, this power would show that they are not merely parts 
such as farming equipment, which, of course, cannot control other parts.10 
Although the declaration above draws attention to injustices that arise due 
to ‘Big Food’ having power over the parts, such situations remain challenging to 
identify—due to the problem of globalized opacity. That is, people are unaware 
that the parts of conventional food systems are arranged and managed in a fashion 
that makes it exceedingly difficult to know. For instance, it is common for people 
in countries such as the United States to lack basic knowledge about food produc-
tion (Flatt 2008). If they lack this essential knowledge, then it seems plausible to 
hold that they also do not know about injustices that emerge from it, a situation 
that feeds globalized opacity. One could easily object to the condition above. One 
could hold that there is an overabundance of parts and farmers and food workers 
on the frontlines experience problems, but there is no way to prove that such is-
sues are a result of lacking this essential knowledge. While this concern is formi-
dable, we should have at least two reservations about it. One, the primary claim 
in this paper holds that a mereologically-informed approach aims to improve the 
situation so that we can see all of the parts to analyze them adequately. If there is 
no connection, as the objection above maintains, then employing this approach 
would be unsound. If the opposite view emerges, then we gain a method for de-
veloping a solution to such problems.  
When examining these choices, it does seem entirely plausible that the over-
abundance of parts, spread across the globe, makes it incredibly challenging to 
know about the parts and how they are part of a food system, which creates pos-
sibilities for harm and injustice. If we take this condition and consider it alongside 
the claims that people do not know about their food, and the reality that food 
workers want to change food systems, then the claim above makes sense. Yet, 
even though we cannot locate the ‘smoking gun’, there is a substantial reason why 
this condition does not matter significantly.  
That is, the idea of ‘disparate impacts’ holds that, for dealing with issues that 
concern historically marginalized groups (e.g., members of La Vía Campesina), 
they are often victims of systemic discrimination. This notion entails that issues 
such as intentionality do not weigh heavily in such affairs.11 This condition holds 
that we do not need to find a direct link. The outcome wherein they are subject 
to harmful treatment is sufficient. The task then becomes to identify precisely how 
 
9 This point raises numerous ethical issues that are beyond the aim of this paper. However, 
for more information, see Kant 2002. 
10 This point introduces the idea that changing or rearranging parts could produce a new 
food system or help the old food system become more just. Although this point is extremely 
relevant, giving it the attention that it deserves falls outside of this paper’s limits.  
11 The United States Supreme Court introduced the term ‘disparate impacts’ in Griggs v. 




the system creates injustice. For the case of conventional food systems and ap-
plied mereology, that endeavor is the motivation that underpins this exploration, 
to deliver a way to identify how the relations between food parts and the whole 
food system yields bad fruits. 
Without tending to the epistemological conditions for knowing about food in-
justices, one could argue that the projected reality for the future for food justice re-
mains grim, offering little hope for creating a meaningful alternative that can remedy 
the situation described earlier. This notion implies that motivation for further identi-
fying the interplay between parts will require advanced study. The goal of such an 
undertaking is to determine appropriate actions to rearrange them, hopefully leading 
to outcomes that are consistent with the people who are arguably treated as merely 
and only as ‘parts’ by the multinational food conglomerates that own and or control 
the majority of the parts that belong to conventional food systems. 
Within various geopolitical regions, along with traditionally grown foods, 
the scope of such a call would require specific and or hyperspecialized concrete 
and abstract parts, including but not limited to safety regulations, farm equip-
ment, and distribution schemes that could redistribute parts justly. In both the 
broad view and the site-specific instances mentioned above, the numerous parts 
have a role in the unjust outcomes that scholars criticize. The question here is not 
to ask about how to find the link between ‘parts A-Z’ and ‘outcome X’. The idea 
is that because numerous parts remain in play, determining how different parts 
relate is possible, but the daunting nature of such a task is a significant deterrent. 
In turn, the condition of having numerous parts facilitates globalized opacity. In 
the section below, I examine the roots and status of the situation, followed by an 
investigation into alternate models that inherently avoid globalized opacity. Alt-
hough more work needs to be done on this front, mereologically as well as prac-
tically, addressing such dimensions can better position that problem so that we 
can better grasp several of its troubling intricacies.  
 
3. The Problem of Globalized Opacity  
Globalized opacity of conventional food systems is not a condition that simply 
comes from only having multifaceted operations. It arises from such processes 
due to an overabundance of parts that come from scattered locations, primarily 
connected through advanced logistics and transport. Framing this issue in such a 
manner reveals why using a mereologically informed approach is beneficial for 
gaining a clearer understanding of the relations that pertain to how the parts of a 
food system are part of the composite object, ‘food system’. It also shows why 
developing mitigatory steps to food issues remains challenging. It focuses on the 
relations between parts, along with how the parts of a food system impact the 
food system itself. That is to say, as food scholars such as Metcalfe (2019) exhibit, 
the conventional food industry is inherently global, suggesting that the very na-
ture of food requires an encompassing lens to see its expansive character. In turn, 
the ways that we think about today’s food are complicated from the outset, yet 
we must develop conceptual devices that are highly efficient without producing 
superfluous information.  
For instance, when talking about the globalized opacity of conventional food 
systems, each word is itself a smaller ‘part’ of a more extensive theoretical device—
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the ‘globalized opacity of conventional food systems’.12 Each word in this phrase, 
as a conceptual device, plays a role in how we understand the reality of the situa-
tion, the conditions that come from having an overabundance of concrete and ab-
stract parts. The precise nature of the mechanics of the phrase, as a theoretical de-
vice, reveals the pattern that we are ultimately addressing. If we have too few words 
(or theoretical parts that make up the larger theoretical device), then we would not 
be properly emphasizing the exact area of study. 
For instance, if we were to say that we are only dealing with ‘food system 
complexity’, then we would only be highlighting the notion that the food system 
has a relationship status that reads: ‘it is complicated’. Yet, such a scenario does 
not show that it is convoluted because there are simply too many parts involved 
in a multifaceted process. Being highly sophisticated is a separate issue from hav-
ing an overabundance of parts. Although there are similarities between ‘food sys-
tem complexity’ and ‘globalized opacity of conventional food systems’—as theo-
retical devices that help us understand the issues that they represent—the primary 
difference is that each tool does different tasks. The former focuses heavily on the 
processes as they affect the interrelations between parts. The former pays much 
more attention to parts in terms of how they affect others as components of the 
food system and the food system itself.  
Consider, for instance, that Gonzalo Gamboa et al. (2016: 2-3) in their re-
search on the complexity of food systems make this notion appear:  
 
Owing to the many domains involved and the different scales on which different 
processes take place (from households to the global market), food systems are in-
herently highly complex systems: That is, their relevant aspects cannot be captured 
from a single perspective, and therefore different stakeholders may have different 
perceptions of what a food system is and how it performs.  
 
When examining the passage above, we see that the operational relations that 
pertain to food systems are at the forefront of their approach, revealing the prom-
inent position that processes have in food systems. Namely, within the short de-
scription above, two instances show action. The first exhibits that it is the processes 
of scale that help define a food system’s complexity. The second notion concerns 
how we cannot rely on a single perspective of a food system’s definition and per-
formance. While the passage above does not represent all accounts that address 
food-system complexity, one could argue that it is typical of such approaches.  
This point does not discount the notion that parts interact in specific and 
numerous ways, as such approaches can illustrate. Still, it exclusively highlights 
the inventory that pertains to the problems that we find with conventional food 
systems, highlighting the role of parts only in a limited capacity. While one can 
use different tools for the same task, say a crescent wrench or a socket wrench, 
specialized tools provide a way to handle specific tasks more efficiently and or 
effectively. For dealing with an overabundance of parts, a mereologically-inspired 
theoretical device helps us frame the issue in a way that reveals globalized opacity 
and its problems, a condition associated with having too many abstract and con-
crete parts.  
 
12 To avoid confusion, it is worth mentioning that in the use of the term ‘part’ in this sen-
tence, I am not making a mereological claim per se, but I am dealing with the term in a 




During the outset, I mentioned that appealing to mereology can benefit how 
we deal with such concerns. This manner of focusing on part-to-part and part-to-
whole relations is a quality that is inherent to the mereological enterprise. It is one 
that thinking in terms of complexity cannot deliver due to lacking mereology’s 
unique orientation. By examining the composition of food systems through em-
ploying a mereological approach, we can exhibit that conventional food systems 
require expansive infrastructures to exist in their current states. In turn, we can 
connect this view with other disciplines to advance our knowledge of food sys-
tems.13 
Consider, for instance, that ‘food narratives’ exist to show the elaborate path 
for foods (and food-like products) to reach consumers. In her intense study of food 
system routes in, Food Routes: Growing Bananas in Iceland and Other Tales from the 
Logistics of Eating, Robyn Metcalfe (2019), explores the numerous parts and their 
geographical confluence that delivers foods to us. Using a slice of New York Pizza 
as an example, she exhibits the highly involved process that brings all of the in-
gredients together to that are required to produce a single slice (Metcalfe 2019).  
While this dish is only one item, Metcalfe’s (ibid.) research shows that to-
day’s foods are the results of a highly sophisticated distribution system, one that 
demands intense study to understand (which underscores the importance of her 
book and other works in the field of food studies). Along with her examination, 
Metcalfe (ibid.) acknowledges that ethical issues emerge that require a separate 
area of investigation. Yet, with so many parts from across the globe, we cannot 
see exactly where the problems arise. Due to these conditions, globalized opacity 
becomes an issue, making it challenging to see the connection between foods and 
injustice. To gain a better perspective on how this situation manifests, in the fol-
lowing section, I examine how alternative food systems inherently reduce the 
number of parts that food activists argue is necessary for alleviating food-related 
harms and injustice. 
 
4. Alternative Food Systems: Towards Reducing Globalized 
Opacity 
In the last few decades, alternatives to conventional food systems have emerged 
and progressed, which are viewed as a means to transform food production, dis-
tribution, and consumption. Philosophers and scholars have examined several 
completing and complementary models, making strong cases for how such sys-
tems can mitigate the harms mentioned earlier (Werkheiser and Noll 2014; Epting 
2016). Although advocating for particular approaches is beyond this paper’s 
scope, the shared grounds often include smaller-scale operations that eliminate 
several of the actors between the food producers and food consumers.14 While it 
would be overly ambitious to argue that these alternative systems could replace 
 
13 This notion gestures towards Carlo Cellucci’s concept of a ‘heuristic view’, which seeks 
to establish criteria for what counts as a fruitful enterprise in philosophy. Namely, to fit 
such a description, philosophy must be continuous with the sciences, making use of the 
results that come from scientific discovery, and striving to obtain a perspective that is 
global. For more information, see Cellucci 2014. 
14 This point does not suggest that removing ‘food miles’ is a solution. It only indicates that 
reducing the number of actors within a food system could reduce globalized opacity. These 
issues are connected, but they are not mutually exclusive. Addressing such affairs is far 
beyond the scope of this paper. For more information, see McWilliams 2009.  
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conventional models entirely in the immediate future, supporting such measures 
count as steps in that direction in terms of dealing with the problem of globalized 
opacity.15  
In a more realistic sense, utilizing alternative systems exhibits how possibili-
ties exist to eliminate some of the global parts of conventional food systems, along 
with the extreme distances that help yield globalized opacity.16 Although each 
replacement part will require advanced study and remain site-specific, examples 
include food outlets such as farmers’ markets (Vignali et al. 2006). They also in-
clude community sustainable agriculture initiatives (Vasquez et al. 2017). Com-
munity and shared gardens also qualify as smaller cases (Barron 2017). For places 
that face seasonal and weather-related challenges, vertical agriculture holds prom-
ise (Epting 2016). In addition to these measures, researchers show how aquaponic 
operations can ease the demands of marine ecosystems (Goddek 2019). Culinary-
challenged individuals can visit farm-to-table restaurants. Although none of these 
approaches can eliminate dependence on conventional food systems, if consum-
ers were to access them in concert, they would be able to learn how their food 
systems fit together, one part at a time. 
 By bringing the parts of a food system closer together, we can eliminate com-
ponents such as storage, refrigeration, and long-distance transport, which are in-
herent to conventional food systems. One could argue that alternative food sys-
tems reduce the need for several such parts, which are also the components that 
consumers lack knowledge of their existence and how they fit into food systems. 
The point here is that while consumers are probably aware that foods require 
transportation, they could be unaware of the expansive transport network needed 
to move food vast distances, one that is increasingly becoming more global (Ahu-
mada and Villalobos 2009).  
This condition suggests that replacing them with local actors such as com-
munity farmers means that the parts are knowable, a condition that increases food 
transparency. For instance, Harvey Blatt (2008: vii) argues:  
 
Most urban shoppers know that food is produced on farms. But most of them do 
not know what farms, or what kind of farms, or where the farms are, what 
knowledge or skills are needed in farming, or how farming today bears little re-
semblance to farming as practiced a hundred years ago.  
 
Through subtracting unknowable and inaccessible parts while adding parts 
wherein people can learn about the intimate details of food production and distri-
bution, concerns about globalized opacity diminish. Bearing this point in mind, 
one can argue that improved transparency could yield more knowledge about the 
 
15 While the primary concern here rests with globalized opacity, this situation raises con-
cerns about the identity and morality of a food system. That is, would it have a new whole 
food system or a food system with new parts? While either response requires significant 
dedication to provide a robust answer, neither of them does away with globalized opacity, 
meaning that this topic must be dealt with at another time. Secondly, one could argue that 
eliminating certain actors in the world of global food production might not be fair, consid-
ering that doing so could discount the importance of food exportation for developing na-
tions. For more information on this topic, see Navin 2014. 
16 This point does dismiss the possibility that local actors could engage in harmful practices, 




social and environmental justice issues that turn people against conventional food 
systems.  
Aside from this issue, one could argue that when consumers substitute dis-
tant parts with local parts, aiming to develop an alternative system, they are 
merely replacing parts that will not have a significant impact on conventional 
food systems. This notion implies that such changes are only ‘cosmetic’ and that 
meaningful improvements will require steps such as working with the system and 
advocating change through policy initiatives. Over time, such measures will im-
prove consumer knowledge of food systems, inherently reducing the problem of 
globalized opacity. 
This challenge is formidable. The problem with such an objection is that it 
does not consider the possibility that replacing parts, even by using a piece-meal 
approach over an extended duration, could have a cumulating impact on conven-
tional foods systems. This aspect suggests that changing a food system is possible, 
even though undertaking such a task could take several decades, and there are 
elements of power and control, as mentioned earlier. 
Although the approaches above merely sketch a possible avenue for reducing 
globalized opacity, they do exhibit that eliminating parts or replacing opaque 
parts—with ones that we could know—could make food systems align with calls 
for food justice under the appropriate conditions. However, considering that al-
ternative food systems remain embryonic, further research is required. Such ef-
forts not only include the disciplines that could facilitate such realities such as 
engineering, design, architecture, and policy, philosophical undertakings, and 
‘applied mereology’ in particular, also deserve additional study to determine the 
appropriate pathways forward for such systems. In the section below, I examine 
some of the immediate areas that would benefit from further research. 
 
5. Areas for Future Research  
While the exposition above reveals the problematic nature that results from the 
globalized opacity of conventional food systems, the next steps coming from ap-
plied mereology should be to narrow the focus. This idea includes paying atten-
tion to specific part-to-part relations, especially in terms of interactions that affect 
entire food systems. Developing particular research strands is one direction that 
such efforts could follow. For instance, specific relationships could benefit from 
further investigation, focusing on significant areas such as production, distribu-
tion, and consumption.  
 On the one hand, issues that pertain to how parts interact with other parts in 
these three areas deserve attention. Regarding production, we could examine how 
agricultural technologies, as parts within the sphere of food production, work with 
other parts that could lead to outcomes that do not raise concerns for social and 
environmental justice. For example, studying how energy usage plays a role in ag-
riculture could lead to improvements that have outcomes that result in less anthro-
pogenic environmental degradation, an issue that has a history of causing harm. 
On the other hand, there is a need to investigate how parts within areas such 
a production impact distribution could benefit from additional exploration. The 
problem of ‘food miles’ is an exemplar. That is to say, proponents of local food 
frequently champion the consumption and production of food that share proximity, 
holding that long-range distribution is the primary area of concern (McWilliams 
2009). However, researchers argue that growing food in certain regions requires 
Unjust Food Systems and Applied Mereology 
 
211 
more energy, suggesting that local food preferences would exacerbate climate 
change (ibid.). Yet, by analyzing these macro-parts (production) to macro-parts 
(distribution) to macro-part (consumption) relationships, researchers can identify 
how they relate to whole food systems. In turn, they can determine which rela-
tionships will yield socially and environmentally just outputs.  
This point suggests that considering the practical nature of this work, philos-
ophers will have to engage in interdisciplinary research or work with researchers 
who are external to the discipline. For instance, philosophers could join research-
ers from outside their training to assess how food systems fit together ontologi-
cally. In this regard, we see the benefits of how philosophers working in areas 
such as analytic metaphysics could employ the skills of the trade to provide new 
avenues for exploring the realities behind foods, which is a branch of inquiry that 
remains neglected. However, as the articles in this special issue exhibit, that trend 
could end soon. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper shows how globalized opacity makes it difficult to comprehend the 
full scope and impacts of conventional food systems, considering that people can-
not readily see the sheer number of parts that are involved. Due to this situation, 
people cannot understand how food systems play a role in several kinds of social 
and environmental injustices. Although this situation is problematic, by using an 
applied mereological approach, we can analyze conventional food systems to 
identify ways to reduce the number of parts that obscure our view of their com-
position. In turn, researchers searching for ways to eliminate or minimize global-
ized opacity can work towards developing alternative parts that provide ‘food 
transparency’. 
Although this approach helps us see some of the problematic elements asso-
ciated with how food systems fit together, numerous areas of research on the pro-
duction, distribution, and consumption of food will require attention. Bearing in 
mind that the nature of this work is inherently interdisciplinary, philosophers 
should collaborate with other scholars and activists, revealing how the tools of 
the philosophic enterprise can provide insights into these affairs. Although such 
concerted efforts show that issues of food systems demand practical solutions, 
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Local food projects are steadily becoming a part of contemporary food systems 
and take on many forms. They are typically analyzed using an ethical, or socio-
political, lens. Food focused initiatives can be understood as strategies to achieve 
ethical change in food systems and, as such, ethics play a guiding role. But local 
food is also a social movement and, thus social and political theories provide 
unique insights during analysis. This paper begins with the position that ontology 
should play a more prominent part in the analysis of local food movements, as 
this lens could provide unique insights into basic commitments guiding such initi-
atives. The paper presents the argument that ontological analyses are imperative 
for fully understanding local food movements. It then provides an overview of the 
justice frameworks and ontological orientations that guide two dominant types of 
initiatives: Those committed to increasing food security and those committed to 
food sovereignty. The paper ends with the argument that food sovereignty pro-
jects are revolutionary, not only because they challenge us to change industrial 
food practices, but also because they are built on a radical new political ontology, 
and co-constitutive food-focused orientation, that forms the foundation for alter-
native social and political structures. 
 







Local food initiatives are steadily becoming a part of contemporary food sys-
tems and take on many forms, from school gardens to farmers markets (Holt-
Gimenez et al. 2011; DeLind 2011; Martinez et al. 2010). This flexibility is due 
in part to the fact that local food projects can differ from region to region, as 
communities have a multiplicity of needs, food cultures vary, and environmen-
tal factors (such as climates, soil types, etc.) fluctuate. However, most research-
ers accept the following broad understanding of what constitutes local food: Lo-
cal food is the attempt to minimize the distance between production, processing, 
and consumption of products in food systems, especially in relation to current 
industrial agricultural systems (Brain 2012; Peters et al. 2008).There are several 
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reasons to shorten the distance between food production and consumption, from 
increasing the range of food products available to reducing the environmental 
impacts of agriculture (Jungbluth et al. 2012). In addition, the push to limit dis-
tance is often accompanied by related goals, such as providing consumers with 
fresh produce, improving food security of the region, and increasing the food 
sovereignty of local populations (DeLind 2011). Within this broader local food 
landscape, a) justice frameworks (Noll and Murdock 2020) and b) conceptions 
of people, place, and food (Werkheiser and Noll 2014) play key roles in guiding 
local food strategies. 
This paper begins by placing scholarship on local food in context, arguing 
that ontological analyses are imperative for fully understanding the revolution-
ary promise of these movements. It then provides an overview of the justice 
frameworks and ontological orientations that guide two dominant types of local 
food projects. Specifically, food security focused projects are guided by distribu-
tive justice frameworks, while food sovereignty groups accept more expansive 
justice frameworks. In addition, each of these justice frameworks are guided by 
specific ontological presuppositions. The paper ends with the argument that 
food sovereignty movements are revolutionary, not only because they challenge 
us to change industrial food practices, but because they are built on a radical 
new a) political ontology and b) food-focused orientation that forms the founda-
tion for alternative social and political structures. In short, they push us to re-
think our very relationship with food, society, and ourselves. 
This paper adds to the literature on local food movements, as it highlights 
the importance that ontological commitments play guiding both food security 
and food sovereignty paradigms; separates these commitments for analytical 
clarity; and highlights potential strengths and weaknesses of each. Ontological 
analyses are not well represented in the philosophy of food literature but, as will 
be discussed, provide key insights. It should also be noted that this paper is not 
meant to be read as an endorsement of food sovereignty projects over food secu-
rity initiatives, as both pursue important food-related goals, but to illustrate the 
strengths of each orientation. However, food sovereignty is given a more de-
tailed analysis to highlight the transformative potential of its ontological frame-
work. With this being said, this paper begins by situating the project in the wider 
food focused literature, as drawing connections between work in ethics, social 
and political philosophy, and ontology is important for the argument.1 
 
2.Why Ontology Is Important 
Local food movements are typically analyzed from an ethical or a social and po-
litical standpoint. This focus is largely due to the structure and strategies of these 
initiatives. As DeLind (2011: 273) argues, “[local food] is at once a social 
movement, a diet, and an economic strategy—a popular solution—to a global 
 
1 Concerning terminology, this paper uses local food “movements,” “sub-movements,” 
“initiatives,” and “projects” throughout the paper to discuss different understandings of 
the local food phenomena. This is due to the fact that local food can be understood as a 
moment (DeLind 2011), a set of sub-movements (Werkheiser and Noll 2014), a type of 
project or operation (Gray 2014), a food-system sector (Clendenning et al. 2016), and an 
ethical strategy (Gray 2014; Singer and Mason 2007), etc. For this reason, I struggled to 
determine the best terminology to use and ultimately decided on a set of signifiers that 
attempt to capture the diverse manifestations of local food.  
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food system in great distress”. Ethical frameworks help researchers tease out the 
various normative concerns guiding the development and goals of these organi-
zations, as well as a person’s choice to eat locally. Food-focused actors (be they 
individuals or groups) are often committed to addressing some perceived wrong, 
such as the animal welfare (Rollin 1990; Singer and Mason 2007) and environ-
mental harms associated with the industrial production of meat and dairy prod-
ucts (DeLind 2011; Thompson 2010). Additionally, ethicists have spilled a large 
amount of ink developing arguments that are designed to persuade eaters to 
adopt a more local or less ethically problematic diet (Gray 2014; Singer and Ma-
son 2007). 
But local food is more than an ethically motivated strategy. It is also a so-
cial movement and, as such, social and political theory play an important role in 
the analysis of these projects. Individuals who opt into eating locally, as well as 
movements, more generally, are often guided by wider socially focused concerns 
and goals. For example, programs aimed at improving food security in commu-
nities tend to accept a limited concept of justice, grounded in distributive justice 
(Noll and Murdock 2020). Here justice can be broadly understood as “what we 
owe to each other” (Miller 2017; Scanlon 1998) and distributive justice concerns 
focus on rectifying some wrong associated with the distribution of benefits (such 
as access to foodstuffs) and harms (such as the placement of industrial facilities 
near neighborhoods) at a societal level. In contrast, food sovereignty movements 
are driven by a more holistic justice framework that acknowledges the im-
portance of recognition, participation, and restorative justice concerns (DeLind 
2011; Noll and Murdock 2020). As illustrated, social and political analyses help 
researchers better understand the structure, social and political components of 
these projects, and the justice claims that guide their goals (Bernstein 2014; 
Schanbacher 2010). 
Metaphysics and ontology also play an important role in the analysis of lo-
cal food, as these fields help to clarify concepts (Noll 2015; Werkheiser and Noll 
2014) and descriptors (Griffiths et al. 2016); determine what food is and how to 
distinguish between artificial and “natural” foodstuffs (Kaplan 2012); and to ex-
plore if types of modifications of seeds and breeds negatively impact “what it is” 
to be that being (Rollin 2015). While the term “ontology” will be primarily used 
in this paper, it is important to note that ontology is an incredibly rich sub-field 
of metaphysics.2 Historically metaphysics was understood as a science that ex-
 
2 It should be noted here that metaphysics, as a discipline, includes a rich and robust lit-
erature, with important contributions dating back to the birth of philosophy and continu-
ing throughout the history of the discipline. Diverse philosophers, from René Descartes 
to Martin Heidegger, grapple with metaphysical questions that increasingly transcend 
ridged philosophical boundaries. The richness of contemporary literature is difficult to 
communicate. In recent feminist literature, for example, work in metaphysics has been 
expanding since Simone de Beauvoir’s classic work The Second Sex (Beauvoir 1949). Su-
san Bordo and Iris Marion Young offer analyses of the mind and body, Judith Butler fo-
cuses on concepts of sex and sexuality, Donna Haraway and Karen Warren push back 
against ridged concepts of nature, while Maria Lugones and Linda Alcoff tarry with con-
cepts of identity (Haslanger & Asta 2018). Due to the expansive nature of metaphysics, 
this paper intentionally utilizes a limited notion of metaphysics to ground the paper. This 
was intentionally done, as the essay’s aim is to illustrate how metaphysics and ontology 
can provide key insights in philosophy of food. As such, the essay is meant to be the be-
ginning of a robust metaphysical conversation on food movements.  
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amined “the first causes of things” or “things that do not change” (Van Inwagen 
and Sullivan 2020). It also grappled with explaining the world through “tran-
scendental features” (Rose 2004) but, more recently, the field turned its atten-
tion to identifying basic conceptions of what something “is,” delineating “cate-
gories of being,” exploring how the mind is structured, and determining the rela-
tionship between concepts (van Inwagen and Sullivan 2020; Noll 2015). Similar-
ly, ontology can roughly be understood as a branch of philosophy “which deals 
with the nature and structure of ‘reality’ […] or the study of attributes that be-
long to things” (Guarino et al. 2009: 1). Later thinkers, such as Pettit (2005) and 
Rawls (1999) expanded this analysis to social and political structures, agents, 
and the social and political sphere. As such, ontology and metaphysics are deep-
ly intertwined, with Quine arguing that “ontology is concerned with the ques-
tion of what entities exist (a task that is often identified with that of drafting a 
‘complete inventory’ of the universe) whereas metaphysics seeks to explain, of 
those entities, what they are” (Varzi 2011: 407). Drawing from the above defini-
tions, the work presented in this paper falls within the realm of both ontology 
and metaphysics, as it identifies basic presuppositions or governing features of 
social life (Rose 2004), or specifically local food movements, and explains what 
those entities are. For clarity, however, this paper will be using the term “ontol-
ogy” to signify both projects, as this terminology is currently accepted in the 
wider social and political literature (Pettit 2005; Rosenthal 2019; Rose 2014).  
When compared to the monumental amount of work done in ethics and 
social and political philosophy, ontological analyses are currently under-
represented in the literature on food movements. While the ontological void is 
being addressed in contemporary journals, historically, this lack could be at-
tributed to the deep divide concerning the role that ontology should play in po-
litical philosophy (Rosenthal 2019). The political theorist John Rawls famously 
contributed to this disagreement when he supported the position that “ontologi-
cal claims, that is, presuppositions about the constitution of agents and the so-
cial world, need to be avoided in political thought” (Rosenthal 2019: 238). If 
one holds this view, then theoretical work concerning the workings of the polis 
and analyses of political and/or social institutions should not appeal to ontolog-
ical claims. However, several theorists pushed back against this view, arguing 
that the ontological claims help to develop alternative “orientations” (Marchart 
2007; Rosenthal 2019; White 2000), or alternative notions of social roles, the 
goals of systems, and the ends of our institutions, that form the foundation for 
radical change. As Rosenthal (2019) so eloquently writes, “the purpose of the 
‘ontological turn’ is not to separate political thinking [or social movements] 
from ontological controversies altogether, but, rather, to develop alternative on-
tologies to more conventional political ontologies” (239). When applied to local 
food, as a social movement, the expanded ontological frameworks employed by 
a portion of these movements (Werkheiser and Noll 2014) gain increasing im-
portance, as they could supply alternative ontological orientations—Ontologies 
that could forma foundation from which to build alternative food systems.  
It is important to note here that the “ontological turn” in political thought 
also pushes back against the assumed separation between social change and on-
tological commitments, such as meanings that we ascribe to features of the 
world around us. Peoples’ desire to bring about change is often guided by lived 
experience and specific perspectives concerning features of this lived experience 
(Frye 1983; Hartsock 1983; Hill-Collins 2002). For example, according to Rose 
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(2014: 253), “the lived experiences of individuals facing homelessness [pushed 
these individuals] to explicitly and empirically question meanings of ‘nature’ 
and the regularly unquestioned systems of knowledge that produce(d) these 
meanings”. Feminist thinkers have also recognized the importance that stand-
points play in helping traditionally marginalized communities gain knowledge 
of the social structures that enforce their marginalization and/or recognize fea-
tures of these structures that are hidden from the privileged (Hill-Collins 2002; 
Hartsock 1983). 
In this vein, environmental justice advocates have long recognized the con-
nection between individual’s concepts of what constitutes personal identity, a 
community, a zoning ordinance or legal regulation, a state, a corporation and 
the relationships between these entities, and that these connections form a key 
component of justice claims (Taylor 2014; Walker 2012). To put it more suc-
cinctly, particular ontologies, developed through daily interactions, help to criti-
cally align social justice movements (Rose 2014). It is only by recognizing the 
inter-connections of these components, and the resulting impacts (such as sys-
temic poverty, exclusion from decision-making, lack of access to social goods, 
etc.), that we can begin to formulate larger normative arguments concerning 
these interconnections. 
Thus, movements working to bring about change, such as local food move-
ments, rely on particular ontologies to support their justice claims and to align 
their goals. However, while these are connected, ontological commitments need 
to be separated from justice claims for analytical clarity. The next section of this 
paper focuses on this task. Specifically, it consists of a brief overview of the jus-
tice frameworks and ontological commitments that guide food security focused 
initiatives and food sovereignty projects. If food issues are framed as a distribu-
tive justice problem, then these projects are guided by a conventional political 
ontology and b) a narrow food-focused orientation. Those that accept an expan-
sive justice framework, however, are guided by more inclusive political ontolo-
gies and food-focused orientations. The final section highlights the radical po-
tential of these alternative ontological orientations and the role that they can 
play revolutionizing food systems.  
 
3. Local Food as Food Security 
While local food projects are guided by various goals, two distinct justice para-
digms have been identified in the current literature: a) distributive justice and b) 
food sovereignty, which includes a holistic or expanded justice framework (Noll 
and Murdock 2020). Initiatives aimed at increasing food security are largely 
guided by distributive justice frameworks, or those that support the claim that 
we have a duty to address problematic distributions of foodstuffs. Conversely, 
food sovereignty pushes for local control over food-systems and accepts a more 
holistic framework that connects food systems to a wide range of social goals, 
from supporting local farmers to mitigating the environmental impacts of food 
production. Additionally, it should be noted here that food sovereignty frame-
works developed at least partially as a critique of industrial food-systems and 
thus tend to be committed to alternative methods of food production and pro-
cessing (DeLind 2011; Dalhberg 1993; Schanbacher 2010). In contrast, focusing 
on improving the distribution of foodstuffs may push movements to make use of 
highly industrialized food systems, as local production systems are often less ef-
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ficient than conventional large-scale agriculture. Local food programs guided by 
distributive justice do not push back against current industrial practices or, at 
least, do not support them. Each of these justice orientations will be discussed 
below. 
With approximately 793 million people undernourished worldwide (Food 
and Agriculture Organization 2015), it is easy to understand how increasing 
food security became a priority for some local food projects. Community gar-
dens and CSAs (community supported agriculture) typically focus on increasing 
local access to healthy and nutritious foodstuffs (Ostrom 2008). It is this focus 
that provides justification for the claim that some local food movements are 
guided by distributive justice commitments. The term “food security” was 
coined after World War II and originally signified the ability of nations to pro-
vide adequate food reserves and/or access to food related resource bundles (Sen 
1987), though this term now also signifies reserves/access at the local communi-
ty level, as well (Schanbacher 2010). According to the Food Agricultural Organ-
ization (FAO), a nation is food secure when “all people, at all times, have phys-
ical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their die-
tary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (Food and Agri-
culture Organization 1996: n.p.). More generally, food security is often used as 
an umbrella term to describe the international push to eliminate malnutrition 
and hunger worldwide—a push partially justified by the recognition of a norma-
tive duty to help those in need, irrespective of distance (Singer 1972).  
According to Noll and Murdock (2020: 3), “the initial push to create and 
run food security programs is guided by egalitarian conceptions of justice, or 
basic human rights claims where individuals are recognized to have what is of-
ten called a ‘positive right’ to food (or an entitlement strong enough to compel 
others to act on one’s behalf)”. The recognition of this positive right to food-
stuffs is clearly supported by the FAO definition above. As such, food security 
related projects are driven by the goal of increasing access, as well as a host of 
other social goals designed to remove various distribution barriers, such as im-
proving infrastructure, increasing public and private investments, and the crea-
tion of stable environments (Collier 2008; Sachs 2006). Similarly, three of the 
four determinate factors of food security, used by WHO (the World Health Or-
ganization) and UNICEF (United Nations International Children’s Emergency 
Fund), concern access, while the forth concerns increasing supply through the 
better utilization of foodstuffs. These factors or “pillars” of food security in-
clude: The pillar of economic access, food availability, stability of supply, and 
food utilization (Food and Agriculture Organization 2008).  
I argue that conceiving hunger as an access issue is guided by two specific 
ontological orientations: a) A conventional political ontology (described below) 
and b) a narrow food-focused orientation. Pettit (2005) argues that every politi-
cal theory aimed at bringing about larger political and social change, presuppos-
es a specific ontology. These typically include “an account of the relationships 
and structure in virtue of which individuals in a polity constitute a people, a na-
tion, and a state [or] a political ontology” (Pettit 2005: 157). In other words, 
commitments concerning the definitions of individuals and the relationships be-
tween individuals in society form the basic commitments necessary for identify-
ing key changes and visioning a new future. Distributive justice frameworks, at 
their most basic level, conceive of the State as an entity that recognizes certain 
basic rights of citizens (dependent of the national context), as well as certain re-
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sponsibilities or duties to perform some action for citizens, such as the duty to 
protect personal property or the body of the citizen from harm. In the context of 
food-focused programs, providing a safety-net or ensuring that aid is provided 
during a famine or another emergency fall within this category. Recognizing 
basic human rights can be included here, as well (Wonicki et al. 2016). Although, 
it should be noted that various other entities recognize the right to food, from 
individuals to community organizations. With this being said, concerning the 
state, the above ontological orientation can be understood as a conventional po-
litical ontology, as defined by Rosenthal (2019) above.  
Additionally, there is a food-focused ontological orientation that holds for 
local food movements guided by distributive justice frameworks. Werkheiser 
and Noll (2014) separated local movements into three distinct sub-movements, 
each with unique ontological commitments. The most common sub-movement, 
the locavore trend, is built on the idea that individuals can change food systems 
primarily by altering personal behavior. In other words, we can change larger 
social structures one meal and one choice at a time. This sub-movement is built 
on specific ontological commitments, including the following: (1) food is a 
product that is purchased or that can be replaced by other products with similar 
nutritional content (i.e. canned salmon can substitute for another protein); (2) 
people are individual consumers of food; and (3) social change happens at the 
individual level. Here food is conceived as a product separate from the produc-
tion methods that produced it, the environment, the communities that devel-
oped this foodstuff, and the personal identity of the growers and eaters. It is 
simply a commodity that can be exchanged for another commodity in the larger 
market. Similarly, in this orientation, the rich and complex understandings of 
what it means to be human is also distilled down into a single understanding—
People are consumers of food.  
Local food programs that adopt a distributive justice framework tend to ac-
cept at least two of these three commitments. For example, conceptualizing 
hunger as largely an issue of access to foodstuffs presupposes key ontological 
commitments concerning the concepts of food and people. In this view, food is 
a commodity that can be interchanged with other similar projects. Thus, a fail-
ure of rice crops in Indonesia, for example, could be replaced with emergency 
aid in the form of another grain, such as wheat, oats, corn, or barely. Access, 
availability, stability of supply, and utilization all presuppose the view that food 
is interchangeable and can be replaced by other similar products. Additionally, 
this framing conceptualizes people as individual consumers of these products 
who need to meet their minimum caloric intake. The point of increasing access 
to foodstuffs is to provide “food,” an exchangeable commodity, to people who 
consume food to survive. When connected to the distributive justice framework 
above, the “right” to food requires that food be provided—no more and no less. 
This constitutes a narrow food-focused ontology.  
 
4. Local Food as Food Sovereignty  
However, food movements are diverse and are concerned with several issues 
beyond the just distribution of foodstuffs. Local food is often conceptualized as 
providing “an alternative and challenge to the corporate-led, industrialized, 
global food system by reconnecting food with environmental health and sus-
tainability, social justice concerns, and the importance of place” (Noll and 
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Werkheiser 2014: 112-13; Levoke 2011). Industrial food-systems enable corpo-
rations and governments to exercise increasing control over food choices, as 
they influence what food is available and reduce the wide range of choices down 
to shallow choices concerning brands on the supermarket shelves (DeLind2011). 
This removal of communities from the daily tasks associated with the produc-
tion and processing of foodstuffs helps to ensure that people lose agriculture and 
food related knowledge. It also masks the larger environmental (Dalberg 1993), 
animal welfare (Rollin 1990), and social impacts of these systems (DeLind 2011; 
Singer and Mason 2007). Some local food initiatives are actively pushing back 
against this trend, as it “has been suggested [that one way] to address these is-
sues is creating alternative food systems, such as those that focus on local pro-
duction and distribution, those that utilize a shorter supply chain, or those that 
emphasize community control” (Noll and Werkheiser 2014: 113). In this way, 
local food is driven by critiques of corporate control and market-based strategies 
and connects food with other socially-relevant concerns.  
While some local food programs focus on increasing “food security,” others 
embrace the above critique. These typically recognize a broader suite of rights 
claims, such as increasing local control of agricultural production, improving 
long-term sustainability, and providing for future generations. This variety is not 
surprising, as local food movements can be placed into various categories, each 
guided by distinct justice frameworks (Noll and Murdock 2020) and ontological 
commitments (Werkheiser and Noll 2014). In addition to the “locavore” trend, 
another prominent orientation for local food projects is food sovereignty or food 
justice. According to Clendenning et al. (2016: 166), “while many organizations 
do not use the language of food sovereignty explicitly, the motives behind urban 
food activism are similar across movements as local actors draw on elements of 
each in practice”. Initiatives guided by food sovereignty frameworks largely accept 
a more holistic justice paradigm that includes a plethora of social concerns. For 
example, the Declaration of Nyéléni (drafted by over 182 organizations from 81 
countries) defines “food sovereignty” in the following way:  
 
Food sovereignty is the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate 
food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their 
right to define their own food and agriculture systems. It puts the aspirations and 
needs of those who produce, distribute and consume food at the heart of food 
systems and policies rather than the demands of markets and corporations […] It 
ensures that the rights to use and manage our lands, territories, waters, seeds, 
livestock and biodiversity are in the hands of those of us who produce food. 
Food sovereignty implies new social relations free of oppression and inequality 
between men and women, peoples, racial groups, social classes and generations 
(Via Campesina 2006: n.p.).  
 
This definition connects food systems to a plethora of human rights and justice 
concerns (Noll and Werkheiser 2017; Flora 2011). Here defining agricultural 
policy and food systems is reframed as a right of local communities. Organizing 
food production according to the needs of specific communities, rather than 
global markets, is given priority (Schanbacher 2010). While access and distribu-
tion concerns are still recognized, a host of other issues beyond these are includ-
ed, such as environmental sustainability, equal participation, land access, and 
gender equality. In short, food sovereignty attempts to capture the many ways 
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that food systems and eating are connected to human identity and the self-
actualization of communities. 
Like local food projects grounded in distributive justice, food sovereignty fo-
cused initiatives are also guided by two specific ontological orientations: a) An 
expansive political ontology and b) a co-constitutive food-focused orientation. The 
expansive nature of the above justice concerns can at least partially be attributed 
to food sovereignty’s broadened conception of “ethical patient” to include ecosys-
tems, future generations, and biotic communities. According to Noll and Mur-
dock (2020: 5) “in contrast to food security initiatives, that are careful to limit pos-
itive rights claims to food access, food sovereignty places a wide range of social 
justice concerns under the umbrella of food justice and mandates that change be 
made at both the local and systems level”. The political ontology accepted by food 
sovereignty is more expansive and thus the rights claims have expanded to align 
with the different presuppositions guiding justice claims.  
This orientation also presupposes an account of the relationship between 
individuals and a polity (Pettit 2005). While conventional orientations conceive 
of the state as an entity that recognizes certain basic rights of citizens and duties 
to these citizens, food sovereignty places more emphasis on community respon-
sibility. This framework also empowers local communities to make key deci-
sions that determine the structure and goals of food systems. As such, while the 
state is still called to recognize certain rights, food sovereignty pushes a) indi-
vidual communities to help ensure that these rights are met and b) demands that 
communities be a part of food-related decision-making processes. In short, they 
recognize the importance of improving a community’s ability to make food 
choices and to determine the structure of their food systems, and such decisions 
are necessarily connected to the personal, social, and community levels (Werk-
heiser and Noll 2014; Pimbert 2008; Desmarais et al. 2010). This ontological 
orientation demands that political structures be expanded to accommodate this 
process, if they do not already have the necessary infrastructure in place. As will 
be argued below, the ontological commitments guiding food sovereignty require 
that communities push back against institutions.  
Due to this focus on community, one could argue that the political orienta-
tion guiding food sovereignty is at least partially communitarian, as it empha-
sizes the important role that community plays when determining what should 
be valued (Etzioni 2003).This makes sense, as communitarian ideals have a ro-
bust history, as they are found in diverse civilizations around the world and con-
stitute elements of many historical and modern political systems (Etzioni 2014). 
As food sovereignty has grown out of peasant movements around the world, it 
is not surprising that these elements could have been incorporated into this ori-
entation. For communitarian scholars, such as Michael Sandel and Charles Tay-
lor, the liberal emphasis on the individual undermines the important role that 
social context and tradition play in political and ethical reasoning, the creation 
of the self, and how we value communities (Bell 2020). To this end, Sandel ar-
gues the following: 
 
To imagine a person incapable of constitutive attachments [...] is not to conceive 
an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine a person wholly without char-
acter, without moral depth. For to have character is to know that I move in a his-
tory that I neither summon nor command, which carries consequences nonethe-
less for my choices and conduct (Sandel 1984: 90-91).  
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Food sovereignty projects are committed to a robust conception of community 
that emphasizes the important role that they play in the social orientation of in-
dividuals, the formation and reinforcement of food-ways, and in determining 
goals what should be pursued. As such, communitarian ideals form part of this 
framework’s account of the relationship between individuals and a polity. How-
ever, with this being said, it is important to note that food sovereignty move-
ments are not fully communitarian. Food sovereignty projects emphasize the 
importance of local control of food systems but do not necessarily accept the 
wholesale adoption of communitarian political commitments and structures be-
yond this limited scope. As food sovereignty initiatives are diverse and empha-
size democratic self-governance, it is entirely possible for communities to adopt 
non-communitarian frameworks (Bonotti 2018). For example, Bonotti (2018) ar-
gues that we should adopt a republican conception of food sovereignty, where it 
is understood as “the freedom of people to make choices related to food produc-
tion, distribution and consumption in a non-dominated way, that is, without be-
ing subject to the arbitrary or uncontrolled interference of governments, interna-
tional bodies and multinational corporations” (Bonotti 2018: 390). Thus, while 
some commitments are community focused, conceiving of food sovereignty as a 
type of communitarianism would be a mistake. 
With this being said, similarly to communitarianism, food sovereignty 
largely accepts a conception of the self that is connected to social context. The 
acceptance of such expanded ontological commitments critically aligns these 
projects (Rose 2014) and expand their justice commitments. While those guided 
by distributive justice largely conceptualize food as an interchangeable commod-
ity and people as autonomous consumers who either do or do not have access to 
these foodstuffs, food sovereignty paradigms are directly critical of myopic defi-
nitions of foodstuffs, as interchangeable products, and individuals, as entities 
that are distinct from the social contexts and communities. In contrast to the 
locavore trend, food sovereignty guided local food programs accept the follow-
ing basic conceptions:  
 
(1) food is an essential part of culture and is co-constitutive of community and 
personal identity; (2) people are members of their community, co-constituted 
with their community and its practices, particularly those around food; and (3) 
change happens when communities resist larger institutions oppressing them and 
build alternatives to those institutions through solidarity and mutual aid with 
other individuals and communities (Noll and Werkheiser 2014: 127). 
 
In contrast to local food programs driven by a distributive justice framework, the 
above basic commitments expand conceptions of food and people. Rather than 
viewing food as an interchangeable product, it is a concept that is interconnect-
ed with communities and the personal identities of eaters. Likewise, people are 
connected to their communities and food-practices. In this context, local food 
programs committed to supporting local food traditions and passing these on to 
future generations gain special significance. Connecting food-ways to personal 
identity and cultural histories also come to the forefront. When faced with food 
scarcities, different products with similar nutritional value cannot be equally 
substituted. Something important is lost when traditional foods are replaced by 
those not connected to the local community practices and traditions. This posi-
tion pushes back against the view that food is interchangeable and can be re-
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placed by other similar products and that access, availability, stability of supply, 
and utilization should drive food-related projects. It also runs counter to the 
myopic understanding of people as consumers of food.  
 
5. Co-Constitutive Food Ontologies as Transformation 
If you accept this ontological orientation, the rich and complex understandings 
of what it means to be human and the role that food plays reinforcing personal 
and community identity come to the forefront. Here food is more than just a 
commodity that we need to increase access to—food is intertwined with identi-
ty, culture, place, and political action. In addition, these concepts are not static 
or independent, but are co-constitutive. This means that personal identity, food-
ways, and community are essential to the existence of each other. They mutual-
ly constitute each other, and change in one can influence the others in funda-
mental ways. The above expansive political ontology coupled with a food-
focused ontological orientation that is co-constitutive requires a more holistic 
justice paradigm. First, this orientation pushes communities to recognize a 
broadened conception of “ethical patient” to include ecosystems, future genera-
tions, and human communities (Noll and Murdock 2020). When personal iden-
tity is bound up with culture, place, and food-ways, this expanded definition of 
what constitutes an ethical patient makes sense. Individuals will be irreconcila-
bly changed by impacts to community, place, and food-ways. If food co-
constitutes identity and community, it is not something that can be separated 
from environmental sustainability, participation and recognition, land access, 
and even racial and gender equality. 
Turning again to the Declaration of Nyéléni (Via Campesina 2006), food 
sovereignty rights claims include the following: The right to healthy and cultur-
ally appropriate food; ecologically safe & sustainable agriculture; a healthy and 
biodiverse environment; participation in food decision-making; the right to use 
& manage lands, waters, seeds, livestock, and biodiversity; and social relations 
free of oppression and inequality, based on gender, race, class, and age. Accord-
ing to Miller (2017), justice at the most basic level can be understood as “the 
constant and perpetual will to render to each [their] due” (n.p.). As such, the on-
tological orientation guiding food sovereignty requires us to recognize what is 
due to ourselves and others in a multiplicity of ways. Specifically, the above 
rights claims utilize several justice frameworks: a) distributive justice, b) envi-
ronmental justice; c) social justice; d) participatory or justice as recognition, e) 
intergenerational justice, and f) restorative justice.  
In this way the expanded ontological frameworks employed by food sover-
eignty projects supply an alternative ontological orientation—one that is de-
signed to form the foundation from which to build alternative food systems. 
These commitments not only help to critically align social justice movements 
(Rose 2014), but they constitute a new ontological framework that pushes back 
against the conventional political ontology and food-focused orientation guiding 
food security. However, it should be noted that food security is also not without 
its strengths. Food security’s ontological orientation enables these projects to 
easily work within industrial food-systems and liberal governmental structures. 
In contrast, however, food sovereignty’s framework runs counterpoint to domi-
nant paradigms and thus may have difficulty working within current systems.  
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A common critique of food sovereignty movements highlights this weak-
ness, as well as the strengths of food security. Specifically, one could argue that 
this ontological orientation is problematic precisely because it pushes us to ac-
cept an expanded justice framework—one that is too inclusive. Framing a mul-
tiplicity of social issues as justice concerns makes it difficult to identify specific 
issues that should be addressed or to determine which should be prioritized. It 
also asks more of those involved and, by pushing back against established social 
structures, makes these goals more difficult to achieve. As Werkheiser and Noll 
(2017: 130) argue, “including such a wide array of issues under the umbrella of 
food sovereignty often make it difficult to determine exactly what specific 
changes need to be made to the existing food structure beyond its dismantling”. 
This is a concern, especially when food sovereignty frameworks are compared 
to food security projects, which are grounded in conventional political ontolo-
gies. If this critique is accepted, then one could argue that local food movements 
should adopt food security orientations, as the potential weaknesses of food 
sovereignty could harm initiatives on the ground.  
However, in defense of this approach, one could argue that the point of de-
veloping alternative ontologies is to help critically align social justice move-
ments (Rose 2014) and to form the foundation for alternative social and political 
structures. Due to its expansive ontological orientation, food sovereignty pushes 
eaters to re-conceive food systems, reconceptualize the connection between 
place and citizens, and fundamentally change a community’s ability to shape 
itself and its future. In short, this framework pushes us to rethink our relation-
ship with food, society, and ourselves. Pushing back against established social 
and political structures can be understood as a strength, as food sovereignty pro-
vides us with a vision of new possibilities for the future. Additionally, as food 
sovereignty is also an international movement made up of organizations around 
the world, one could argue that it has a track-record of successfully critically 
aligning social justice movements. The Us Food Sovereignty Alliance alone in-
cludes more than 600 organizations in 90 countries (USFSA.org). However, de-
pending on their goals and commitments, local food projects may be guided by 
either food security or food sovereignty orientations, as they work to bring about 
different social visions.  
However, there is still the question of how policymakers should proceed 
when there are different approaches available. The answer to this question large-
ly depends on the individual context and needs of the community, as well as the 
model of change adopted by the project—i.e. whether the food project is com-
mitted to top-down or bottom-up change. However, very broadly, local ordi-
nance and policy changes in the United States could be used as a potential blue-
print for answering this question. Urban based local food initiatives in the U.S. 
largely emerged in a policy vacuum that resulted in their unlawful operation 
(Meenar et al. 2017), as several state and municipal regulations made food pro-
duction illegal in cities (Heckler 2012). This issue is being addressed by local 
governments, as they utilize their broad powers to create new laws (Witt 2013) 
that sets parameters for land to be used for agricultural purposes. These changes 
have made it easier for a wide range of local food initiatives, committed to dif-
ferent goals, to take root in neighborhoods. Here policy makers are not remain-
ing neutral on the question of whether local food production is valuable or 
good. The reason why they are creating new laws and changing ordinances is to 
nurture food production in cities. However, they are often careful to not endorse 
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particular types of operations. In this way, the changes create spaces for local 
communities to democratically determine the structure, goals, and operation of 
the individual projects. In short, self-governance has been made acceptable with-
in specific parameters. These changes have been beneficial for both food security 
and food sovereignty grounded operations. With this being said, more research 
needs to be done on the policy and governmental implications of food move-
ments guided by different ontological assumptions.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Local food movements are steadily becoming a part of contemporary food sys-
tems and take on many forms. These projects are typically analyzed from an 
ethical or a social and political standpoint. This stance is largely due to the 
structure and strategies of these initiative. Local food can be understood as a 
strategy for bringing about ethical change in food systems and, as such, ethics 
play an important role. But local food is also a social movement and, thus social 
and political theories provide unique insights during analysis. This paper argued 
that ontology should play a more prominent role in the analysis of local food 
movements, as it could provide unique insights into basic commitments guiding 
these initiatives. In this vein, the paper presented the argument that ontological 
analyses are imperative for fully understanding the revolutionary promise of lo-
cal food movements. It went on to provide a detailed overview of the justice 
frameworks and ontological orientations that guide two dominant types of local 
food projects. In particular, food security focused projects tend to be guided by 
distributive justice frameworks, while food sovereignty groups accept more expan-
sive justice frameworks. And each of these justice frameworks are guided by spe-
cific ontological presuppositions. When placed in this context, the revolutionary 
nature of food sovereignty become clear. This is not only because they challenge 
us to change industrial food practices, but because they are built on a radical new 
a) political ontology and b) co-constitutive food-focused orientation—orientations 
that form the foundation for alternative social and political structures. In short, 
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In this paper, I attempt to offer a new metaphysical account of recipes and to make 
sense of their relations with the authenticity of dishes. In doing so, I first show the 
untenability of any Platonistic characterisation of recipes, according to which reci-
pes are universals instantiated by dishes. I do this by showing that recipes play a 
critical explanatory role for the sharing of culinary properties between dishes. That 
is, there are certain grounding relations between recipes and dishes that would not 
hold if recipes were Platonic universals. Then, by developing some of Andrea Bor-
ghini’s constructivist insights, I offer a different account that identifies recipes with 
abstract cultural artefacts, which are tracked down through their history and re-
cordings. According to this view, which draws on Kaplan’s account of the meta-
physics of words, recipes come into existence through a mental or written down 
introductory stage. Recipes are then shared and handed to future generations 
through new, mental or written down, stages. Recordings are stages of a particular 
recipe when they are historically connected to the introductory stage of the recipe 
in a proper way, and the dish they encode satisfies the authenticity judgment, as 
well as certain other underlying conditions. Finally, I discuss whether recipes 
should be identified with documents or artefacts and suggest that they are better 
suited to the latter. 
 






When talking about food, we use many culinary terms, and largely interchangea-
bly. Of course, because the goal of the present paper is to settle a precise meta-
physical characterisation of recipes, the language must be regimented in order to 
avoid ambiguities and adequately show the relations between recipes and other 
entities. Following Borghini we can distinguish between dishes and recipes:  
 
In a nutshell, a dish is the stuff, a recipe is the idea. More precisely, a dish is a 
specific concoction of (typically perishable) edible stuff, such as those specific ac-
tions that led to this slice of pizza sitting on my kitchen counter. On the other 




of a dish whose replication would deliver a dish of the same sort (Borghini 2015: 
721). 
 
As well as stating what recipes consist of, Borghini states that recipes are ideas, 
yet the notion of ‘idea’remains utterly ambiguous. An idea can be identified with 
either a psychological entity or, more generally, with some sort of abstract entity. 
In the first case, an idea would be identical with a mental state or a kind of mental 
state. However, this cannot be the meaning we require, since it is evident that a 
recipe can be written on a book or a website. Hence, recipes must be identified 
with some sort of abstract entity. When it comes to the nature of recipes and the 
relation between them and dishes, there are different theories in the literature 
(Borghini 2015: 723 ff.). In what follows, I will restrict the discussion to Platonism 
and constructivism. While the former will be my polemical target, the latter pro-
vides many insights that can be developed and integrated into the new theoretical 
position I defend. 
As an account of recipes, Platonism can be inferred from Boorstin’s (1964: 
ch. 3) work, which regards cultures, and bits thereof, as essentially static, and thus 
definable in terms of universal properties.1 Recipes are characterised as eternal 
types, essentially defined by a list of ingredients and procedures, and they are con-
sidered to exist independently of the corresponding dishes.2 Given their static and 
abstract nature, recipes are identified with universals,3 that is, entities having in-
stances (van Inwagen 2014: 30) and thus being repeatable (Loux & Crisp 2017). 
Platonism is a prima facie compelling theoretical position in accounting for recipes 
with an ‘algorithmic’ structure, such as cocktails, pastries, and some industrial 
foods. Moreover, the Platonistic identification of recipes with universals is con-
sistent with the fact that one and the same recipe can be followed more than once, 
at different times and places, in the same way in which a book can be printed 
more than once, at different times and places. In other words, Platonism straight-
forwardly accounts for recipes being wholly present in distinct dishes. Lastly, it is 
associated with a strong form of instantiation-realism, in that a dish D instantiates 
a recipe R if and only if D has been prepared with the (kinds of) ingredients and 
procedures specified by R. That is, no entity distinct from those ingredients and 
procedures plays a role in the relation of instantiation. 
 
1 For a critical discussion of Boorstin’s understanding of cultures and their authenticity, see 
(Sims 2009: 324-26). 
2 Actually, Platonism also comes in a milder version, according to which, despite the pos-
sibility for a recipe to change all of its ingredients and procedures through time, there is 
still an essential core of ingredients and procedures for every version of the recipe (Borghini 
2015: 724). I do not need to discuss the two strains of Platonism separately, since the ar-
gument I bring in the next section aims to undermine their shared trait of considering rec-
ipes, fine-grained as they like, as Platonic universals.   
3 I do not need to endorse any metaphysical view about the distinction between properties 
and universals. I will state that (i) there are perfectly natural properties (Lewis 1986a, 
1986b), (ii) naturalness comes in degree, so that a property F is more natural than a prop-
erty G iff the definition of F in terms of perfectly natural properties is simpler than the 
definition of G (Lewis 1986b: 61), (iii) natural kinds are universals identical with perfectly 
natural properties and some relatively natural property. Specifically, the relatively natural 
properties that are identical with natural kinds are all those whose naturalness is useful to 
the sciences which study and make use of them. I will thus use the terms interchangeably 
if not otherwise specified. 




A competing approach is constructivism, according to which recipes are “the 
outcome of a selection process ultimately guided by human fiat” (Borghini 2015: 
724). Although there are different sketches of it in the literature (e.g. Heldke 2012, 
Jackson 1999, Sims 2009), constructivism, as a metaphysical account of recipes, 
has been mainly developed by Borghini (2015). According to Borghini’s construc-
tivism, recipes are socially-dependent entities, constitutively dependent on speech 
acts for their existence (2015: 727). In this respect, then, constructivism critically 
differs from Platonism. A further difference concerns the relation of instantiation: 
according to Borghini’s constructivism, a necessary condition for a dish to instan-
tiate a recipe is that the author performs a speech act, consisting in a declaration 
of intention to replicate that recipe. Hence, not only recipes but also dishes are 
understood as socially-dependent entities. Moreover, recipes are characterised, in 
an Aristotelian fashion, as ontologically dependent on dishes: recipes do not ex-
istentially precede dishes, as in the Platonist framework, but they come into ex-
istence, and evolve, together with them (2015: 731). Lastly, the instantiation of 
the same recipe by any two distinct dishes depends on appropriate relations of 
imitation. The ‘felicity conditions’ of these relations of imitation require a cook’s 
expertise, the (contextual) authenticity of dishes, and also the open-endedness of 
the recipe (2015: 732-36). 
There are at least three desiderata for a proper metaphysical account of reci-
pes. First, it should characterise recipes in such a way as to allow them to be kinds 
of entities which can bear the appropriate relation to dishes in order to perform 
specific theoretical tasks. Second, it should make sense of recipes as human cul-
tural products, thus ontologically dependent on human minds. Third, it should be 
compatible with the persistence of recipes through time, change, and variations.  
In what follows, I aim to fulfil these theoretical desiderata by developing a 
metaphysical account which sides with Borghini’s constructivism, but, at the 
same time, seriously considers inscriptions of recipes and their role in accounting 
for the production of dishes. The result is a nominalistic view of recipes which, 
by foregoing any instantiation relation, qualifies as anti-Platonistic in the most 
robust sense. To this end, I first develop a case against Platonism arguing, in sec-
tion 1, that, insofar as they are considered as Platonic universals, recipes cannot 
be characterised as performing the specific theoretical tasks they should be capa-
ble of carrying out. Moreover, Platonism would undermine the explanatory role 
of imitation for the sharing of properties between dishes. In section 2, I argue for 
a metaphysical account which does without universals by claiming that recipes 
are continuants made up of concrete recordings that encode dishes. As will be-
come clear, such an account sides with Borghini’s constructivism, since it charac-
terises recipes as cultural items: more precisely, as abstract artefacts. Lastly, in 
section 3, I consider and reject a characterisation of recipes as social documents 
in favour of artifactualism. 
 
1. Recipes Are Not Platonic Universals 
A first difficulty with the identification of recipes with universals concerns the 
feature of open-endedness. The concept of open-endedness has its pedigree in the 
philosophy of art:  
 
A concept is open if its conditions of application are emendable and corrigible; i.e. 




decision on our part to extend the use of the concept to cover this, or to close the 
concept and invent a new one to deal with the new case and its new property 
(Weitz 1956: 31).  
 
It depends on a social decision for the concept PIZZA to cover pineapple pizza 
dishes. To say that recipes are open-ended means that extending them to cover 
some dish variation or not is dependent on a social decision. However, this char-
acterisation does not entirely capture the open-endedness of recipes. Borghini also 
characterises recipes by their evolvability through time: “for each recipe, the pos-
sible trajectories of evolution are countless” (2015: 736). All in all, then, recipes 
are open-ended in that they admit variation, both horizontally and vertically. 
However, it is not clear how to characterise universals in such a way as to 
account for the right kind of evolvability. Universals are generally considered to 
be abstract entities, while evolution seems to imply variation across time and 
space. Consider the analogous problem of the evolution of biological species. Bi-
ological species are natural kinds, thus abstract entities, but they undergo evolu-
tion.4 One of the main solutions to this conundrum has been the development of 
a weaker conception of natural kinds, namely homeostatic property cluster kinds 
(Boyd 1991, 1999), according to which biological species are natural kinds whose 
associated clusters of properties are robustly instantiated by the respective in-
stances due to causal homeostatic mechanisms.5 Such a solution, however, does 
not seem to be available in the case of recipes. The main problem is that, differ-
ently from the case of biological species, the choice of the homeostatically clus-
tered properties is fatally subjected to arbitrariness.6 Consider the recipe for pesto: 
a property it necessarily seems seems to have is the prescription of the use of basil 
leaves in preparation. However, there are many varieties of basil, whose leaves 
significantly differ with respect to flavour, scent, and also colour (e.g. there are 
purple cultivars of basil). Hence, the property ‘prescribing to prepare the corre-
sponding dish with basil leaves’ is too coarse-grained for being one of the proper-
ties among the supposed cluster associated with the recipe for pesto. Which prop-
erty should be chosen? There is a bewildering variety: for example, ‘being pre-
pared with leaves of Ocimum basilicum cultivar ‘Classic Italian’’, ‘being prepared 
with leaves of Ocimum basilicum grown up in Genoa Pra’’, ‘being prepared with 
leaves of Ocimum basilicum picked when the plant has just four little leaves’, and 
so forth. The choice among one of the candidate properties would be utterly arbi-
trary: in a slogan, there is no non-conventional way to carve the culinary world 
at its joint. 
However, there is a more significant flaw in any proposal of identifying rec-
ipes with Platonic universals, i.e. eternal types. The main problem with Platonism 
lies in its incompatibility with a tenet of any metaphysical characterisation of uni-
versals. Such an incompatibility arises given the existence of certain relations 
 
4 To be sure, “evolution” has different meanings in culinary and biological usage. Anyway, 
what is at stake philosophically is that a universal admits instances that can vary relevantly 
(sometimes in a directional way) through time. 
5 Causal homeostatic mechanisms are mechanisms underlying a kind and such that they 
causally maintain the co-occurrence of the properties typically instantiated by the members 
of the kind. 
6 Another difficulty with such an account, on which I do not want to expand here, consists 
in identifying the proper homeostatic mechanism and explaining how such homeostasis 
works. 




between recipes and dishes, and it relies only on the commitment to two generally 
accepted features of universals. The first is mind-independency: universals can 
not only be predicated of distinct objects, but such a predication is independent of 
the existence of minds (Carmichael 2010). In other words, it is legitimate to talk 
about dishes instantiating universals-recipes without further qualifications. The 
second is their metaphysical role: since Plato, universals have been used to ac-
count for the commonality of properties between distinct objects. Armstrong puts 
this nicely: 
 
The problem of universals is the problem of how different particulars can never-
theless have the very same properties and relations. It is the problem of generic 
identity. The Platonic Theory of Forms is intended to solve this problem (Arm-
strong 1978: 64). 
 
Any Platonistic account should recognise and accept both of these trivial features 
of universals. 
A further, metatheoretical, notion I need is the difference between account-
ing for a fact and metaphysically explaining it. Metaphysical explanation, as a 
kind of explanation, must exhibit different formal properties, such as irreflexivity, 
non-monotonicity, transitivity, asymmetry, and relevance constraints (see, e.g., 
Baron & Norton forthcoming, Schaffer 2017, Thompson 2016). Accountability, 
as I conceive it, must not. Consider the following example: there is a chair C in 
the room at time t1. Suppose now the truth of composition as identity, namely the 
thesis stating that mereologically complex objects are plurally identical to their 
composing objects.7 The fact that each of the proper parts at time t1 of C is in the 
room will thus account for the fact that a chair C is in the room at t1, but it will not 
explain it. This is because it would otherwise be a case of symmetric metaphysical 
explanation, given the truth of composition as identity.8 Suppose, instead, that 
composition as identity is false: that a chair C is in the room at t1 is now explained 
by the fact that each of the proper parts of C are in the room at time t1, since, at 
the very least, the fact of the former is grounded in the fact of the latter (Cameron 
2014). Note that grounding, inasmuch as it is an hyperintensional notion, is suf-
ficient to furnish a metaphysical explanation of this kind. 
Given this distinction, universals are such that they can account for, but not 
explain, the commonality of properties between entities. The reason, as given by 
van Inwagen (2016), is the following. Universals are supposed to explain facts 
such that both Fido and Lucky instantiate the property ‘being a dog’. However, 
what would explain such a fact is the conjunction of (i) a theoretical identity or a 
conceptual analysis of ‘being a dog’, furnishing necessary and sufficient condi-
tions to instantiate such a property, and (ii) the fact that both Fido and Lucky 
satisfy those conditions. Suppose that the natural kind property ‘being a member 
of Canis familiaris’ is theoretically identified with ‘belonging to the clade having as 
last common ancestor the particular organism O': the fact that both Fido and 
Lucky belong to such a clade explain why they are dogs. The problem with 
 
7 I will not discuss composition as identity further. The thesis enjoys both supporters and 
critics. Among the first, there are, e.g., Bohn (2019), Lewis (1991, ch. 3.6), Loss (2019); 
among the second, Calosi (2018), Carrara & Lando (2017), Yi (2018).  
8 This does not mean that identity statements cannot furnish any information at all: it suf-




universals here is that (i) can never be an ontological analysis of properties such 
as ‘being a dog’ and, thus, universals simply cannot play a role in the supposed 
explanation. Hence, universals can account for the sharing (and not sharing) of 
properties between entities, but they can never explain it. Of course, a particular 
theory of universals should also be motivated by arguments and be consistent with 
other theories that could potentially be endorsed. 
However, it is the case that recipes have not only an accountability role but 
also an explanatory role with regard to the sharing of properties between dishes. 
This role can be shown by employing the notion of grounding, which is very inti-
mately bound to the notion of metaphysical explanation. Consider the case of a 
dish D1 prepared by an author A1: 
(i)  The fact that a particular dish D1 made by an author A1 has certain culinary 
features is (at least partially) grounded in the fact that A1 acted in specific 
ways to prepare it. 
(ii) The fact that A1 acted in specific ways to prepare D1 is (at least partially) 
grounded in the fact that the recipe R requires to act in specific ways. 
These two statements are trivial. However, since the relation of grounding is tran-
sitive (Fine 2012, Schnieder 2011), from (i) and (ii) it follows that 
(iii) The fact that a particular dish D1 made by an author A1 has certain culinary 
features is (at least partially) grounded in the fact that the recipe R requires 
to act in specific ways. 
Since pointing to what grounds a particular fact provides an excellent metaphys-
ical explanation for its subsistence, it follows, by generalisation, that recipes ex-
plain certain culinary features of dishes. This conclusion is enough to undermine 
standard Platonism: recipes perform a theoretical task that would be precluded to 
them if they were eternal types. Moreover, through the same pattern of grounding 
relations between facts, it is possible to show that recipes also explain the sharing 
of culinary properties between dishes.  
A related problem concerns the inconsistency of Platonism with the possibil-
ity of explaining the sharing of certain culinary features of dishes through a rela-
tion of imitation, as often seems to be the case. The most appropriate way to char-
acterise imitation here is as a relation involving two agents, e.g. a cook and an 
apprentice, and that it results in the resemblance between the dishes. Hence, cor-
rectly, imitation implies resemblance (Armstrong 1978: 66). Let us suppose that 
A2 imitated A1 and produced a dish D2 resembling D1 with respect to the salient 
culinary features. In any case of imitation, the following facts hold:  
(iv) The fact that D1 and D2, made respectively by A1 and A2, share certain cul-
inary features f1, f2, …, fn is grounded in the facts that (i) D1 has f1, f2, …, 
fn, and (ii) D2 has f1, f2, …, fn. 
(v) The fact that D2 made by A2 has certain culinary features is (partially) 
grounded in the fact that A1 acted in specific ways.  
The first statement can be considered as a straightforward conceptual analysis of 
what property sharing is meant to be. The second statement establishes a ground-
ing relation between the instantiation of culinary properties by the imitator’s dish 
and specific actions of the master. From (ii), (v), and the transitivity of grounding, 
it follows that 
(vi) The fact that D2 made by A2 has certain culinary features is partially 
grounded in the fact that the recipe R prescribed to act in specific ways.  




Lastly, from (iv), (vi), and the transitivity of ground, it follows that  
(vii) The fact that D1 and D2, made respectively by A1 and A2, share certain 
culinary features is grounded in the facts that (i) D1 has certain culinary 
features, and (ii) R requires to act in specific ways.  
Hence, by (vii) and subsumption of grounding (Fine 2012), 
(viii) The fact that D1 and D2, made respectively by A1 and A2, share certain 
culinary features is partially grounded in the fact that R requires to act 
in specific ways.  
From the grounding relation between these facts, we get a metaphysical explana-
tion. As we saw above, however, facts concerning universals cannot provide any 
metaphysical explanation of the sharing of properties between entities. However, 
(viii), by establishing a partial grounding relation between the sharing of culinary 
features between dishes and a fact concerning a recipe, furnishes exactly such an 
explanation, although partial. Again, it follows that, since they have some explan-
atory role for the sharing of properties between dishes, recipes are not Platonic 
universals.9  
If this argument succeeds, the Platonistic account of recipes cannot be cor-
rect. Recipes are not eternal types or repeatable universals having dishes as in-
stances. What are they, then? In what follows, I suggest that recipes should be 
considered as particulars. It seems in fact that any Platonistic characterisation of 
recipes as universals instantiated by dishes relies on a categorical error: recipes are 
followed by the author of a dish, not instantiated by the dish. Dishes do not instan-
tiate recipes, in the same way that model aeroplanes do not instantiate the instruc-
tions for their construction. If recipes are accurately followed, the result of a plu-
rality of events involving the cook and the proper kind of ingredients is the dish 
the recipe encodes. Thus, recipes are particular entities, which someway enter 
into causal relations with other particular entities, namely agents and dishes. Con-
sider that people systematically memorise recipes, modify them following their 
own tastes, pass them through generations, present them in tv shows, and often 
misinterpret them, too. 
If recipes are particulars, are they abstract or concrete? If they are concrete, 
where are they? A first idea suggests looking at the physical supports of their in-
scriptions: sheets of papers, cookbooks, digital documents. In the next section, I 
offer a metaphysical account which can straightforwardly explain many of these 
features of recipes. 
 
2. Recipes as Abstract Particulars 
There is a metaphysical account to which we can appeal that does not identify 
recipes with universals and is compatible with their social nature. This is the 
stage/continuant account, which was famously proposed by Kaplan as the correct 
metaphysical account of words (Kaplan 1990, 2011).10 According to this account, 
 
9 A rejoinder: recipes have no explanatory role in such cases because they are not that 
relevant. Maybe what is more relevant in the former scenario is how accurately the appren-
tice imitates its master. However, relevance comes in degree. So maybe recipes are not 
totally relevant in the former scenario. However, universals can never be relevant, neither 
partially, in such cases. 
10 I will not say anything more on the topic of the metaphysics of words. For a valuable 




a recipe is a continuant made up11 of the proper stages recorded in, for example, 
cookbooks, grandmothers’ minds, on scraps of paper and so forth.12 Recipes are 
thus cultural objects, extended through space and time. Hence, from a metaphys-
ical point of view, they are very similar to words: “They live in the world, not in 
Plato’s heaven. They are cultural artefacts, created by us, transmitted by us, stored 
by us” (Kaplan 1990: 111).  
The stage/continuant account delivers straightforward explanations of some 
of the most notable features of foods and recordings of recipes. Consider two in-
dependently invented, yet procedurally identical recipes:13 the intuition is that 
they are two distinct recipes. It suffices to consider a world in which the first recipe 
is invented, but its doppelganger is not: this is a clearly metaphysically possible 
scenario, but it would not be if the two recipes were one and the same recipe. 
Anyway, since they have different introductory stages and are made up of unre-
lated, distinct stages, the stage/continuant account can easily explain the distinct-
ness of the two recipes in historical and compositional terms.14 For the same his-
torical reasons, it is possible to distinguish virtually identical recipes such as cecina 
and farinata, on the grounds of having developed in distinct Italian milieus (Bor-
ghini 2019: 240). Alternatively, consider two dishes resulting from different inter-
pretations or versions of the same recipe, such as tiramisu made with mascarpone 
cheese and tiramisu made with cream. According to the stage/continuant ac-
count, there is in principle no problem in stating that the two dishes are different 
 
example, words are clustered in languages and are made up of letters from an alphabet. 
The claim here is just that recipes and words have a remarkably similar metaphysics.  
11 I am agnostic about the proper notion of composition (e.g., mereological or non-mereo-
logical) in this case.   
12 The content of such supports consists of sets of propositions. However, according to 
Borghini (2015: 729 ff.), such sets of propositions would merely be incomplete representa-
tions of recipes. For example, recordings do not express the implicit residual of recipes. As 
it will get clear, a necessary condition for a recording to be a stage of a recipe is that it is 
recognized as such by an authenticity judgment, whose accuracy requires the expertise of 
the cook following the content of the recording. Hence, according to the present account, 
stages are complete representations as they are, but their status as such ultimately depends 
on a social decision. 
13 Although it is more of a philosophical case, Krondl suggests that something similar could 
have happened to the recipe for the strudel dough, which would have been developed in-
dependently in Turkey and central Europe (Krondl 2011: 82). 
14 I assume the existence of an introductory stage of recipes, and thus the existence of its 
inventor. However, this is a controversial assumption: “Indeed, most times recipes do not 
have an inventor—who invented prosciutto, or mozzarella, or jambalaja?” (Borghini 2011: 
96). I agree that recipes can have no single inventor: of course, a plurality of persons may 
introduce the first stage of a recipe. However, this does not imply that recipes do not have 
an origin, that is, an introductory stage. Recipes are cultural items, and as such, they have 
a temporal location: hence, a beginning in time for their existence. In the ideal case, the 
introductory stage of a recipe is intentionally produced and, at the same time, recognized 
as such by its inventor. In the vast majority of cases, though, the introductory stage should 
be identified with the first recording followed by an agent having the intention to produce 
a specific final food. Different cultural products seem to enjoy the same introductory pat-
tern. Consider a musical genre, e.g., rockabilly. Its birth should be temporally located at 
the instant in which someone held certain propositional attitudes towards particular sound 
patterns. Among the propositional attitudes, there is the recognition that a specific kind of 
music is produced by reproducing those sound patterns. To be sure, it will be called ‘rock-
abilly’ and recognized as such only later. 




interpretations of the same recipe since they are dishes resulting from the execu-
tion of two different stages of the same continuant.15 Recipes admit ‘forks’, that 
is, stages remarkably different one from the other. In this respect, recipes are like 
words, which admit inscriptions and utterances that deviate far from the stand-
ard.16 
Another feature of recipes that is captured by the stage/continuant account 
is their existence in space and time. Recipes have a history, and people modify 
some of their procedures or ingredients through time. Some modifications are 
brought about by technological progress (e.g., many cookbooks now prescribe to 
whisk eggs and sugar with the help of a kitchen aid), but many are introduced by 
people so that dishes are best suited for their own tastes. Consider that, on the one 
hand, it is quite evident that an expression such as ‘the recipe for strawberry ice 
cream’ is just an improper definite description, since there are countless different 
recipes for strawberry ice cream. However, on the other hand, there must be 
something in common between two different recipes for strawberry ice cream. 
Both facts have an elegant explanation when the focus is shifted from particular 
recipes to their stages, that is, physical objects which record them. Different re-
cordings of the same recipe will often encode different dishes belonging, never-
theless, to the same kind of dishes. 
The stage/continuant account, though, relies on the answer to the following 
crucial question: when are different recordings of recipes stages of the same rec-
ipe? To be sure, a simple vertical model, according to which it is necessary and 
sufficient for two recordings of recipes to share a common origin to be stages of 
the same recipe, cannot be adequate. It suffices to consider the following case in 
the history of desserts. The sponge cake that is known in Italy as Pan di Spagna 
was initially invented by the Ligurian pastry chef Giovan Battista Cabona at the 
Spanish court, around the 16th century (Coxall 2018: 48). Later, the recipe was 
substantially modified by French pastry cooks, who added butter to the prepara-
tion and increased the amount of sugar and eggs. The resulting dessert is now 
known as génoise (Krondl 2011: 152). Génoise and Pan di Spagna are certainly dif-
ferent dishes, even if the former was born as a slight alteration of the latter. Nev-
ertheless, the corresponding recipes are now certainly distinct: a fork in the meta-
physical structure of Pan di Spagna as it became a new entity. Recipes can change: 
subsequent recordings can encode quite distinct resulting dishes, but they cannot 
persist through any kind of change. As it is the case with biological species, a 
criterion must be found for segmenting lineages through time. 
In this respect, however, recipes are very different from other kinds of entities 
that typically persist through change, namely organisms. The difference lies in the 
naturalness of the entities. Limits to the kinds and degree of change organisms 
can bear without ceasing to exist as their biological nature determines them.17 
 
15 As I stated above, stages can be simply recorded in one’s mind. 
16 Within limits, of course: “recipes are not infinitely flexible” (Heldke 1988: 24). The con-
cept of tolerance has already been investigated in the debate on the metaphysics of words. 
Consider: how much can two utterances or inscriptions of the same word vary? (see, e.g., 
Hawthorne & Lepore 2011, Kaplan 2011). 
17 In the usual cases, an organism persists as such through all the changes that do not cause 
its death. However, there are more exotic cases in which an organism x can persist through 
change as numerically the same entity x, but not as an organism. Consider the males of 
many seadevil species, which parasitize a female by sticking to her belly thanks to modified 




Recipes, though, are cultural artefacts rather than natural objects. According to 
the stage/continuant account, recipes persist through time by having stages at dif-
ferent times. Their persistence conditions are thus identified with the necessary 
and sufficient conditions that a recording must satisfy to be the stage of a particu-
lar recipe. These conditions are largely socially determined:18 which recordings 
should be considered stages of a particular recipe is up to a social, and often col-
lective, judgement. Such a judgement declare the authenticity of recordings. 
When it comes to dishes, Borghini offers two notions to capture the condi-
tions for their authenticity: fit and approval rating. The fit of a dish is defined as 
“the ratio of two factors: resemblance and context” (Borghini 2015: 733). A 
poorly risen pizza easily fits a college party, but not Gino Sorbillo’s pizzeria. The 
approval rating, on the other hand, points to the fact that “it is typically up to a 
collectivity of people to assess whether a dish authentically produces a recipe” 
(734). These two notions capture the authenticity of dishes given the satisfaction 
of two conditions, namely the implicit residual of a recipe and the expertise. The 
implicit residual of a recipe is the set of (kinds of) procedures that are not encoded 
by the recipe but that the cook must know to prepare the corresponding dish ade-
quately (732). How and how much to knead dough is an implicit residual of a 
recipe for focaccia. On implicit residual, Borghini builds up the notion of exper-
tise: “in order to deliver a dish that instantiates a given recipe, then, a cook must 
possess expertise in the relevant abilities required to prepare the dish” (732).  
Borghini’s remarks on the authenticity of dishes can be mostly maintained 
in the stage/continuant account of recipes and used as criteria for their persistence 
through time. Recipe-recordings are stages of a particular recipe that depend on 
authenticity judgments, and the positivity of authenticity judgments depends on 
the fit and the approval rating of the encoded dish. Some form of expertise is nec-
essary in order to respect the instructions encoded on a stage of a recipe and pro-
duce the corresponding dish.19 The implicit residual and expertise are, thus, nec-
essary in order to guarantee the accuracy of authenticity judgements. If the cook 
is not an expert, she would not be able to follow the instructions on the recording 
adequately, and the authenticity judgments would perhaps be diverted. The rela-
tion between a recipe and an authentic dish, then, is indirect and grounded in the 
relation between a recipe-recording and the dish itself. Between a recipe-recording 
and the dish an expert can produce by following the content of the recipe-
 
freely swimming organisms into sperm-producing organs of the mate (Fairbairn 2013: 125-
126). 
18 I say ‘largely’ because a necessary condition for the persistence of recipes is some causal 
connection between the recorded stage. Such a connection does not imply that recipes ad-
mit no gaps, that is, periods in which there are no available recordings of it. Consider the 
case of a cook discovering an inscription and reviving a long-gone recipe (Borghini 2015: 
736). Furthermore, it should be noticed that the causal condition follows from the nature 
of recipes, not from the stage/continuant account. There are kinds of entities, such as per-
sons, which do not respect that condition (see Patrone 2017 on the problem of defining 
such a relation between stages of persons). Lastly, it is interesting that social factors play a 
considerable role in identity judgments concerning other culinary categories, e.g., wine 
(see Borghini 2012). 
19 It should be noted that if respecting the instruction encoded on a stage of a recipe requires 
expertise, expertise cannot always require an apprenticeship, contra Borghini’s suggestion 
(2015: 732). Otherwise, any case of the introduction of a recipe is a counterexample to such 
a suggestion. 




recording, there is a causal dependence relation, in which the intentional actions 
of an agent play an ineliminable role, as well as the satisfaction of a social authen-
ticity judgement. 
To be sure, there must be some tolerance in the evaluation of the authenticity 
of a dish and, thus, of a recording. Intuitively, recipes can be placed on a contin-
uum between low-standard and high-standard recipes. Such a continuum can be 
superimposed on the tolerance spectrum, that is, the degree of variation tolerated 
in authentic dishes of a given kind. On the low-standard side, there are everyday 
recipes such as the recipe for pasta with tomato sauce or fruit salad. On the high-
standard side, there are autographic recipes, for example Massimo Bottura’s 
Chicken chicken chicken… where are you?, and traditional recipes associated with 
particular milieus (Borghini 2011: 96 ff.). There is a link between the tolerance for 
variation and the open-endedness of recipes: if a recipe has a high degree of open-
endedness, it has a high degree of tolerance for variation too and vice versa. High-
standard recipes typically have a low degree of open-endedness, and thus a low 
degree of tolerance for variation; whereas, low-standard recipes exhibit a higher 
degree of open-endedness and tolerance for variation. However, again, the degree 
of variation tolerated by a recipe is up to the social judgement of authorities. The 
difference between the persistence conditions of low-standard and high-standard 
recipes is not metaphysical, but only epistemic: as far as low-standard recipes are 
concerned, it is more likely that the judgements of experts and non-experts are in 
agreement.  
To sum up, the role of experts in determining the persistence conditions of 
recipes characterises recipes as social objects in at least two different ways. First 
and foremost, it is up to the authenticity judgments of experts to cut segments of 
causally connected recordings into distinct recipes. Second, such authenticity 
judgements depend on the proper execution of a recording, which requires that 
the cook possesses the expertise and can satisfy the implicit residual of the record-
ing. Hence, the construction of recipes from recordings is socially influenced in 
two ways: it is up to experts, whose judgement cannot be considered trustworthy 
unless the cook can guarantee proper execution of the instructions in the record-
ing, that is, adequate production of the encoded dish.  
All in all, then, according to the reasons presented in this section, a recipe-
recording is a stage of a particular recipe if and only if (i) it is its introductory stage 
or it is historically connected to such a stage, and (ii) the encoded dish is appro-
priately evaluated as authentic. ‘Appropriately evaluated’ means that the implicit 
residual and the expertise are verified, and the evaluation has been given (or con-
firmed) by experts. 
 
3. Recipes as Artefacts 
One last issue requires attention. I have claimed that the existence of recipes de-
pends on human activities in specific ways. Among the philosophically relevant 
categories of entities, there are two suitable candidates with which to identify rec-
ipes. 
The first is documents, a category of social objects which have recently been 
pointed to as the very bricks of the social reality (Ferraris 2015, Ferraris & Tor-
rengo 2014). According to the documentality view, documents are identified as 
the supports of the content of social acts, and which are considered the entities 




2014: 18). Such supports can be external, such as sheets of paper and digital doc-
uments, but also ‘internal’, such as the shared witness of a social act, e.g. a prom-
ise.  
These seem to be features of recipe-recordings too: as we said in the previous 
section, recipe-recordings partially ground the existence of particular dishes, and 
particular dishes are characteristic of human cultures and so a fortiori of social 
reality. Recipes are always recorded on external supports, such as cookbooks or 
sheets of paper, but also internal ‘mental supports’, such as grandmothers’ minds. 
However, two conditions must be satisfied for something to be a social object 
(Ferraris 2015: 425): (i) being the result of a social act, and (ii) being recorded on 
some external or internal support. Recipes satisfy (ii) since they are usually re-
peatedly recorded in such a way. Whether they satisfy (i) or not depends on our 
definition of social acts. Generally, social acts are considered as essentially lin-
guistic acts, which must be addressed to someone and thus grasped in order to 
display their performative powers (Mulligan 2016: 19). But then, recipes are not 
the result of social acts. Consider that social acts, insofar as they are essentially 
linguistic, are different from individual intentional acts and, insofar as they are 
always directed to someone, require interactions among individuals (Ferraris & 
Torrengo 2014: 12). Recipes differ in this respect. The establishment of a recipe’s 
persistence conditions requires interactions among individuals, that is, an agree-
ment on the authenticity of a recording among experts. However, there seems to 
be no meaningful sense in which such an establishment can be characterised as 
essentially linguistic. Hence, recipes are not documents.   
The second category of human-dependent objects I want to consider is the 
category of artefacts. Artefacts are usually identified with objects satisfying the 
following three conditions (Preston 2018): (i) being intentionally produced, (ii) 
involving modification of materials, (iii) being produced for a purpose. Recipes 
satisfy (iii): the purpose of a recipe is to encode a dish in an accurate manner 
(modulo its implicit residual). Concerning the satisfaction of (i), the following 
counterexample could be raised. The Negroni Sbagliato was invented in Milan in 
1972 as a consequence of a mistake. The bartender Mirko Stocchetto was prepar-
ing a Negroni, but he confused prosecco with gin. Hence, the recipe for Negroni 
Sbagliato was not intentionally produced, and so recipes do not generally satisfy 
(i). However, such an objection misfires because it misidentifies the time of the 
introduction of the recipe. It is not the case that Negroni Sbagliato was invented 
the precise instant Stocchetto mixed prosecco instead that gin with the other 
proper ingredients: for a recipe to be invented, it is necessary that it is recognised 
as a particular procedure for a specific product. This is the rationale behind Bor-
ghini’s claim that recipes must contain a performative utterance: for something to 
be recognised as a (recording of a) recipe, it must contain an identifying speech 
act of the form ‘this is a (recording of a) recipe for Negroni Sbagliato’ (Borghini 
2015: 727). The introductory stage of Negroni Sbagliato, then, is Stocchetto’s in-
ternal recording, which he purposely produced once he noticed the appreciation 
of his former error. The constitutive presence of such an identifying speech act 
into a recipe-recording implies it is intentionally produced. Therefore, recipes sat-
isfy (i).  
What about (ii)? The condition is intended to capture the idea that artefacts 
come into existence through human transformative actions, and merely using nat-
ural objects for specific purposes is not enough: to use the position of the North 
Star in the sky while navigating is not to create a compass. Prima facie, then, this 




condition seems to imply the concreteness of artefacts, and objects such as statues, 
hammers, and smartphones easily fit the condition. Recipes are clearly not ana-
logues to these standard artefacts in this respect. However, the condition of con-
creteness for artefacts is too strong. First, in order to avoid counterexamples such 
as the stone-hammer one, it is enough to state that for an object to be an artefact 
it must ontologically depend on human minds. This condition seems sufficient to 
imply that the hammer-stone, the very concrete object, is not an artefact. Second, 
many philosophers identify abstract, contingently existing objects of different cul-
tural kinds with legitimate artefacts. In the words of Kaplan: 
 
These are objects that are natural, that were created in nature, by a (perhaps) human 
creator, at a time, in a place, and that live their lives in nature and can change over 
time—as we do, though we are not abstract objects—and that can, under certain 
natural conditions, cease to exist. (Kaplan 2011: 506).  
 
Abstract, contingently existing objects such as words (Kaplan 1990, 2011), fic-
tional characters (Evnine 2016, Kripke 2013, Thomasson 1998), musical works 
(Evnine 2016, Levinson 2013, Friedell 2020), languages (Evnine 2016, Frigerio 
2018) are now widely recognized as artefacts. Recipes should be regarded as ob-
jects of the same kind. They are abstract, at least more abstract than recipe-record-
ings, in the same way words are more abstract than mere morphological shapes 
(Kaplan 2011: 506). They exist contingently: if Mirko Stocchetto had been more 
careful, Negroni Sbagliato would have never seen the light. Any procedurally 
identical recipe with a different history would just be a doppelganger. Lastly, rec-
ipes extend through space and time and can bear a certain kind of change, via the 
concreteness and causal connectedness of their recordings.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Recipes are cultural objects which inhabit the world and causally interact with 
people through their recordings. A Platonistic metaphysics struggles with preserv-
ing the right grounding relations between facts concerning recipes and dishes, 
and, ultimately, it appears to rest on a categorical error. For these reasons, it 
should be rejected and replaced with a particularist metaphysics. According to the 
stage/continuant view, recipes come into existence through an introductory 
stage, that is, a mental or written down recording. Such a recording is pointed out 
as the introductory stage, spawned by a speech act. Recipes, then, extend through 
space and time and can be tracked down by their constituting recording. Which 
recordings constitute a recipe is ultimately a matter of expert judgement. It is, 
thus, clear that recipes are strongly social objects because their very persistence 
conditions are the result of social judgements. Therefore, the present stage/con-
tinuant account should be regarded as a constructivist theory of recipes. 
Recipes are particular objects, extended through space and time, and de-
pendent for their existence and persistence on human minds. Which kind of ob-
jects are they? Their identification with artefacts seems correct. Philosophers have 
recently broadened the notion of artefact in order to include entities such as 
words, languages, and musical compositions. 
I have not focused much on the abstractness of recipes. I suspect the topic 





First, how should the line between abstractness and concreteness be drawn? 
This question has been around since its discussion by Lewis (1986b: 82 ff.). In a 
nutshell, there are many non-equivalent ways to draw the line. According to some 
of these, recipes turn out to be concrete; according to others, they turn out to be 
abstract. Without independent reasons supporting a specific way of drawing the 
line, the question of abstractness or concreteness of recipes is mostly a termino-
logical issue. 
The distinction between abstract and concrete entities is intimately con-
nected with the second question, concerning the compositional nature of recipes. 
Throughout the paper, I have been careful in stating that recipes are “made up” 
of recipes-recordings, without further qualifying the compositional relation be-
tween them. Again, the choice of a compositional relation over another should be 
independently motivated and considered in the light of other principles and no-
tions. Consider, for example., the principle of the location of the whole (Costa 
2018: 113), according to which, if x is part of y and x occupies a spatiotemporal 
region, then y occupies a spatiotemporal region too. If the relation between recipe-
recordings and recipes is the parthood relation, then the principle of the location 
of the whole implies that recipes occupy spatiotemporal regions. According to the 
Lewisian Negative Way, being abstract amounts to not having a spatiotemporal 
location (Lewis 1986b: 83). It would then follow that recipes are not abstract. 
Nevertheless, a fruitful discussion of these and similar topics needs much more 
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Distinguishing between food, food substitutes and supplements is common in eve-
ryday life and academic work. The aim of this paper is to analyze this distinction. 
The question is approached from the point of view of functions. The hypothesis 
reads as follows: “Food has several nutritional, culinary, social, cultural, aesthetic 
and other functions. These functions are necessary and sufficient for something to 
be food. Food substitutes and supplements, serve some, but not many, functions of 
food. Thus, food substitutes and supplements are not food”. The contemplations 
of the paper speak against accepting the hypothesis. This negative view is reached 
by defining the central terms, discussing the differences between eating and swal-
lowing, analyzing the different meanings of the term ‘edible’ and a throughout anal-
ysis of functions of food, substitutes and supplements. As a part of the discussion 
an idea of origin based functions is developed. If the hypothesis is false (as argued), 
then the distinction between food and other edible entities must be based on some-
thing else than differences in functions. Alternatively the distinction may lack met-
aphysical justification. The view following this latter alternative is developed for 
the purpose of further studies. 
 







Distinguishing between food, food substitutes and food supplements is common 
in everyday life and also in academic work (see e.g. Fox et al. 2016; Pajor et al. 
2017; Siegrist and Harmann 2019). The aim of this paper is to analyze this dis-
tinction and, thus, also shed some light to the very fundamental question of phi-
losophy of food: What distinguishes food from other edible substances, and vice 
versa? The question is philosophically fascinating. Understanding regarding the 
issue contributes, not only to philosophical theorizations, but also to food science, 
food product development and food policy related decision-making. 
The question is approached from the point of view of functions. It is generally 
accepted in academic literature that food serves several functions in human life. 
It is a source of energy and nutrients. Food provides pleasure through culinary 
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experiences. Eating food also relieves uncomfortable sensations and feelings in-
cluding, but not limited to, the sensation of hunger. Food has various social func-
tions related to sharing, caring and hospitality but it is also used for showing off 
and expressing social status. Moreover, people communicate their culture, iden-
tity and group membership through food and eating. (Henschke 2014; Pascalev 
2003; Murdock and Noll 2015; Ternikar 2014.) The hypothesis of this study was 
inspired by this kind of understanding of food. The hypothesis reads as follows:  
Food has several nutritional, culinary, social, cultural, aesthetic and other 
functions. These functions are necessary and sufficient for something to be 
food. Food substitutes and supplements, serve some, but not many, functions 
of food. Thus, food substitutes and supplements are not food.  
According to the hypothesis, x is food, if and only if x fulfills various functions of 
food. Edible substances that fulfill only few functions of food are not food. Thus, 
hamburgers, for example, are food. They are sources of nutrition and hamburger 
eating can be an occasion full of social, aesthetic and cultural functions. Vitamin 
D pills, on the other hand, do not count as food since they do not serve the nu-
merous functions food has in human life.  
Few clarifications need to be made. First, the hypothesis concerns types of 
food—not food tokens such a particular hamburger eaten by someone at some 
time. A case of someone eating a hamburger just in order to receive nutrition, 
thus, does not form a counter-example to the hypothesis. Neither does a case of a 
lousy tasting meal of a hermit. Second, the hypothesis does not imply that some-
thing can be food only if it fulfills all functions food can have. Certainly some 
types of food serve higher number of functions than others. Thanksgiving turkey, 
for example, has symbolic functions that a lunch sandwich lacks. Still both are 
food. Third, the hypothesis does not rest on the assumption that the status of ed-
ible substances is stable. Rather, the hypothesis allows that something that is not 
food today may become food in future. Vice versa, something that is food today, 
may not be taken as food in future.  
A possible criticism towards the hypothesis is that it is far too unspecific. The 
hypothesis does not state how many functions an edible substance must fulfill in 
order to be food. Thus, it cannot offer a practical tool for distinguishing between 
food and other edible substances. However, for the purposes of this paper, the 
hypothesis is specific enough for the following reason: In what follows it will be 
argued that the hypothesis presented is false. Not just food but also food supple-
ments and food substitutes serve multitude of functions. Moreover, they serve 
very similar types of functions than the ones that food is serving. Since the con-
siderations presented in what follows will not support the hypothesis, the conclu-
sion and results of the study can be described as negative ones. Negative results 
are often found less interesting and important than the positive ones (Matosin et 
al. 2014). Yet, these negative results raise some interesting questions. If supple-
ments and substitutes do not differ from food with respect to their functions, how 
do they differ? Can the distinction between the three be philosophically justified 
in some other way? The study contributes to developing a new hypothesis (which 
may be studied in another paper in future) according to which the distinction be-
tween food, substitutes and supplements actually lacks metaphysical justification. 
Rather the common distinction between food, substitutes and supplements is 
quite arbitrary and reflects common habits and customs. From the point of view 
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of functions, it is appropriate to understand food substitutes and supplements to 
be food or one instance of food among many others.  
The terms of the study will be described and defined in section two. Section 
three consists of a closer look on a similarity between food, substitutes and sup-
plements: They are all edible. The functions of food, supplements and substitutes 
are compared in section four. Functions related to origin of edible entities are 
analyzed in section five. The conclusions are discussed at section six. 
 
2. Central Terms 
2.1. Food and Its Functions 
In order to discuss the distinction between food, substitutes and supplements 
some understanding regarding the three have to be adopted. Philosophers have 
had very little interest in defining food supplements and substitutes. However, 
some discussion on understandings regarding food can be found (see e.g. Kaplan 
2012; Borghini 2014; Szymanski 2017; Eskine 2017). Even though there is no 
consensus among philosophers about the conception of food, there is an agree-
ment that a good philosophical understanding of food has to be in line with what 
people eat and identify as food. A simple account of metaphysics of food can be 
formed by relying on these lay understandings and by defining food to be what 
people eat. This simple understanding of food, however, is problematic as it ig-
nores the cultural differences on what is taken as food as well as the multiple 
functions food plays in human life (Szymanski 2017). What is actually eaten and 
identified as food differs from one society to another. Moreover, in all societies, 
food plays multitude of functions. Multitude of functions of food means that it is 
used for various purposes. Food eaten for maintaining life and bodily function 
and enhancing well-being. It is also used for expressing our social status and iden-
tity. Food has symbolic and religious functions. It can also be an object of ex-
change (economic good) and source of pleasure. Sometimes food is a way of ex-
pressing artistic visions. (Kaplan 2012; Gold 2015; Eskine 2017.)  
The term ‘food’ can be understood in a narrow and wide sense. In its narrow 
sense term ‘food’ refers merely to the physical stuff that is eaten (or meant to be 
eaten). It its wider sense ‘food’ refers also to events—such as cooking—that led to 
the existence of that stuff. These wider understandings can differ with respect to 
their extensions—that is with respect to what are the limits for the events that 
should be included in the understanding of food. This kind of wider understand-
ing of food allows seeing food as a multidirectional network. (Borghini 2014; Szy-
manski 2017.) In this study, the term ‘food’ is understood quite widely as the focus 
is, following the hypothesis, on various functions of food. Food is understood 
teleologically through its intended use and goals of stakeholders involved. Food, 
then, becomes understandable by recognizing the reasons and outcomes of con-
sumption (Henschke 2014). This is not to say that everyone involved is always ac-
tively aware of all functions that food is serving on that particular occasion. How-
ever, if asked, at least some of the stakeholders could identify some of them. 
 
2.2. Supplements 
Food supplements are products meant to deliver nutrients that an individual is 
not receiving adequate quantities from his or her food. Food supplements may 
contain, for example, vitamins, fatty acids, minerals and proteins in the forms of 
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pills, capsules, powders, drinks and bars. Examples include protein powders for 
body builders and other athletes, multi-nutrient drinks for elderly people, B12-
vitamin pills for vegans and folic acid supplements for pregnant women. The food 
supplements may be necessary because of increased need (e.g. through pregnancy 
or extensive training) or inability for sufficient nutrient intake (e.g. through illness, 
inability or non-willingness regarding eating). However, it is not uncommon to 
consume food supplements without particular physical need. People eat, for ex-
ample, multivitamin supplements out of habit or just in case. Yet, even when food 
supplements do not really benefit the person consuming them, the consumption 
is usually motivated by a possible benefit. (McCann 2005; Pajor 2017.) As a result, 
food supplements are tightly connected to nutritional functions of food. This does 
not imply that food supplements lack other functions or that they are eaten merely 
to gain the nutritional benefits.  
Understanding the food supplements in the described sense has interesting 
implications regarding the hypothesis. Support for the hypothesis requires spelling 
out differences in functions of food and food supplements. This may be challeng-
ing as the motives behind food supplement usage may also explain many food 
choices (e.g. choice of a protein rich dish). If such differences cannot be found, 
there are two options. Either the distinction between the two have to be justified 
in some other way or one has to give up the distinction and accept that food sup-
plements actually are instances of food. 
 
2.3. Substitutes 
Generally speaking the term ‘substitute’ refers to an entity that is used for certain 
function instead of an entity which is usually or normally serving that function 
(Ryall 2008). A historical example of a food substitute is an inner bark bread. 
Inner bark of pine was used as a substitute of flours in bread at Nordic countries 
during food shortages (such as the ones at Finland at 1860’s). The bread was 
beaked by replacing (part of) flours with inner bark of pine. The inner bark bread 
keeps hunger away, but the taste is poor and the bread is low in nutrients (alt-
hough in contains a lot of fiber). When food is plenty, food substitutes are con-
sumed instead of a type of food that someone is, for some reason, unwilling or 
unable to eat. One instance of food substitutes are meal replacement products 
used in energy-restricted diets for weight reduction. They provide little energy but 
contain many necessary nutrients and keep the unpleasant feeling of hunger 
away. Further examples include plant based substitutes for cheese, yoghurt, eggs 
and meat. These substitutes are usually made to taste and look like the substituted 
animal based product. They often differ nutritiously from the substituted prod-
ucts. They may, for example, contain less fat and protein but more fiber than the 
animal based product they are substituting. Yet, contrary to meal replacements 
used for weight control, they are not designed to be particularly low in energy or 
high on nutrients. Rather they provide desired food products and related aesthetic 
and culinary experiences to consumers who are willing to go vegan.  
A philosophically interesting questions regarding substitutes concern their 
relation to the foods they are substituting. What are the criteria for something to 
be a substitute? How do substitutes of x differ from other stuffs one could choose 
instead of x? As consumers we are often in situations where there are plenty of 
alternatives available and we have to choose between them. Most restaurant, for 
example, have various dishes to choose from and there may be dozens of breads 
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available at a bakery. Usually there is no reason name some of these alternatives 
‘substitutes’. The issue of substitutes arises only when the entity that is usually or 
normally serving some function becomes unavailable or someone, for some rea-
son, does not want to use it. When making a vegan pizza, for example, on needs 
to find substitutes for cheese and when making a gluten free pizza one needs a 
substitute for wheat flours. The vegan “cheese resembling product” and gluten 
free flours are substitutes, since cheese and wheat flours are customary compo-
nents of pizza. However, not all cases of replacing x with y concern substitutes. 
My choice to top my pizza with mushrooms today does not render various other 
alternative pizza toppings as substitutes. Substitutes differ from mere alternatives 
and spare entities in ways which are described in what follows.  
As the above examples indicate, nothing is a substitute as such but only in 
relation to something it is substituting. Substitutes are always substitutes of some-
thing and strongly dependent on the idea of something else being real or authentic 
something. (Siipi 2014: 92; on similar ideas regarding copies see Carrara and 
Soavi 2010: 421, 423.) An almond drink, for example, is not a milk substitute as 
such, but only after someone finds is possible to use it instead of milk or creates it 
to be used instead of milk. Because of this close connection between authentic 
entities and substitutes, understanding authenticity contributes to understanding 
substitutes. The term ‘authentic’ is ambiguous and it is possible to distinguish be-
tween the quality meaning and identity meaning of the term ‘authentic’. The qual-
ity meaning of authenticity refers to value and typicality of entities. Authenticity 
in this sense is a matter of degree. Members of a class or type can be more or less 
perfect and, thus, more or less authentic members of that class or type. American 
cheese cakes, for example, can be more or less authentic American cheese cakes 
in this sense. According to quality meaning of authenticity, the claim that some-
thing is not authentic x means that it is lousy x—but x nevertheless. (Siipi 2014: 
78.) The second sense of authenticity is called identity meaning: 
 
According to the identity meaning, if something is not an authentic x, then it is 
not x at all, but merely something else that more or less resembles x. […] The 
identity meaning of ‘authentic’ makes a distinction between being an not-being 
something. […] Authenticity is then seen as an either-or distinction that corre-
sponds to class membership: if something is not authentic x, then it fails to be x. 
(Siipi 2014: 77.) 
 
Substitutes relate to the identity meaning of authenticity. Meat substitutes, for 
example, are not low quality meat but plant based products. In similar lines, meal 
replacements used for weight loss or to enhance efficiency in time-pressured life 
styles are not low quality meals but not meals at all (even though they are often 
marketed as ones). This is not to say that raw materials of substitutes always differ 
from the ones of the authentic product. Suppose someone is always having and 
would prefer to have a banana yoghurt of brand x for the breakfast. Sadly, it is 
not available and the person settles for a banana yoghurt of brand y. The yoghurt 
of brand y may then well be seen as a substitute for the yoghurt of brand x—even 
though their raw materials may be the same. Yet, also in this case authenticity 
and being a substitute are a matter if identity: brand y yoghurt cannot be fairly 
described as a low quality yoghurt of brand x but a different product which fails 
to be an instance of authentic brand x yoghurt.  
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In order for something y to be used instead of something x—more strictly 
speaking, in order for y to substitute of x—y must share some of its qualities with 
x. Yet, substitutes never share all of their qualities with the entities they are sub-
stituting. Otherwise, they would instances of it. Thus, in a sense, substitutes are 
imperfect in comparison to the authentic entities (Bergin 2009: 260). Even though 
an almond drink may be tasty, healthy and able to serve many functions milk is 
used for, it still lacks some qualities of milk and cannot be identified as milk. In 
similar lines, the banana yoghurt of brand y can be substitute of the yoghurt of 
brand x only because it differs from it at least in one respect: it lacks the desired 
brand. This is also a sense in which substitutes differ from spare entities. Contrary 
to substitutes spare entities may be qualitatively similar to the actual choice (e.g. 
when taking a spare sandwich to a picnic). Thus, spare entities also lack the above 
described connection to the authentic entities.  
None of the above mentioned should be taken to imply that the distinction 
between substitutes and authentic entities is static and similar in all contexts. 
What is authentic food within a culinary domain can be considered a substitute 
in another, and vice versa. Different people may also have different views of 
whether something is an alternative product or a substitute. Furthermore, whether 
something is a substitute or alterative product may change over time. A perfect 
example of this are butter and margarine. Margarine was first developed as a sub-
stitute to butter as butter was expensive and challenging to store (Deelstra et al. 
2014). Nowadays, some consumers still see margarine as a substitute for butter 
but many take them as alternative products.  
The understanding presented should not be taken to mean that authentic en-
tities should always be favored to their substitutes. Quite contrary, there are often 
many good reasons to favor meat substitutes to authentic meat, for example, and 
a busy person has good reasons for choosing a meal replacement product instead 
of a time consuming proper meal. Even though substitutes are somehow imper-
fect in comparison to authentic entities, they may also carry qualities that speak 
in their favor. In the modern western world of easily accessible food, the imper-
fection of food substitutes usually carries with it an extra value which may provide 
a reason for favoring a substitute to the authentic entity.  
The above considerations regarding substitutes are relevant for discussing the 
hypothesis for two reasons. First, obviously, in order to analyze whether substi-
tutes differ from food with respect to their functions, one needs to define what is 
meant by substitutes. The second reason is more complicated and relates to the 
understanding of substitutes presented. As stated earlier “substitutes are always 
substitutes of something and strongly dependent on the idea of something else 
being real or authentic something” (Siipi 2014: 92). This real or authentic some-
thing can be a type of food (e.g. meat or dairy) or food in general. In the first case, 
the term ‘food substitute’ refers to products that are used instead of some more 
traditional or more commonly used food stuff type. Examples include soy burgers 
as substitutes for meat burgers and oat yoghurt as a substitute for dairy based yo-
ghurt. Soy burgers and oat yoghurt are commonly understood as food and, strictly 
speaking, they are not substitutes for food, but rather substitutes for types of food 
(e.g. meat or dairy). In the second case, the term ‘food substitute’ designates sub-
stances that are consumed instead of food—not just some kind of food, but food 
in general. Inner bark may be example of such food substitute. A modern example 
are medical nutrient solutions, which are given to patients who are unable obtain 
necessary nutrients otherwise. Medical nutrient solutions may be taken orally. To 
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seriously sick individuals who are unable to swallow they are given via nasogas-
tric tube.1 A meat or dairy substitute can sometimes be food substitute also in this 
second sense of the term. However, importantly, meat and dairy substitutes do 
not have to be food substitutes in this second sense. The two understanding imply 
it possible to judge that a particular product (e.g. a soy burger) is a meat substitute 
but not a food substitute. In other words, it is a substitute for meat, but not a 
substitute for food in general.  
The distinction between substitutes of food in general and substitutes of a 
type of food is important for analyzing the hypothesis for the following reason. 
Suppose, it turns out that practically all substitutes discussed in the food context 
are actually substitutes for a type of food, but not substitutes for food in general. 
Then, it becomes possible that these products are food. And if that is the case, 
their functions, of course, would not (and by definition could not) differ from the 
functions of food. As a result, the hypothesis would be falsified. 
 
3. Something in Common: Eating and Edibility? 
At first sight it seems that food, supplements and substitutes have at least some-
thing in common. They are all edible and they are all eaten. One might then sug-
gest, following the simple account of metaphysics of food (Kaplan 2012), that 
since food substitutes and supplements are edible and eaten, they are actually in-
stances of food. But what does being edible mean? And how does eating differ 
from closely related terms such as swallowing? Can other entities besides food be 
eaten? 
The term ‘eat’ is sometimes used as a synonym of the term ‘swallowing’. 
However, the term ‘eat’ also seems to have a narrower meaning. Some instances 
of swallowing are not instances of eating in its narrow sense. Some drug smug-
glers, for example, swallow tiny balloons containing cocaine or heroin. Moreover, 
medical devices (e.g. capsule endoscopy devices) are swallowed by patients in 
medical care. Thus, a question raises: Does the distinction between eating and 
swallowing follow the distinction between food and other edible entities? Is only 
food eaten and other entities—including food supplements and substitutes—
merely swallowed? Two issues are worth noting regarding this idea. First, the dif-
ference between eating and swallowing does not rest on chewing. Chewing is nei-
ther sufficient nor necessary for eating. A bubblegum is chewed but not eaten and 
many jellies, puddings and soups can be eaten without chewing. Second, the sug-
gestion does not imply that food is always eaten. One may well merely swallow 
food for example in an extreme hurry or when one is taste deprived (e.g. due to a 
flu). The suggestion is that only food is eaten. In what follows the suggestion is 
evaluated by analyzing the term ‘edible’. 
Eating something presupposes that it is edible. There is no general agreement 
on what counts as edible (Fuster 2014). At least the following four senses can be 
distinguished. First, the expression ‘x is non-edible’ may be taken to indicate that 
swallowing x is physically impossible. Large stones, for example, are non-edible 
in this sense. Accordingly, anything one can swallow is edible for her in this 
sense—including medical devices, drug balloons, food supplements, food and 
 
1 Someone might argue that inner bark and nutrient solutions are food. That kind of wider 
understanding of food is compatible with the general argument of the paper, and thus, their 
status is not further discussed here. 
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small stones. Thus, this sense of ‘edible’ corresponds to eating widely understood 
and does shed any light on the distinction between eating and swallowing. As the 
examples indicate, not just food but also many other entities can be edible in this 
sense. Thus, edibility in this sense does not offer a tool for distinguishing between 
food and other entities. Yet, edibility in the presented sense is certainly necessary 
for something to be food, food supplement or a substitute.  
 Second, the term ‘non-edible’ is used of poisonous or otherwise harmful sub-
stances such as fungus Amanita phalloides (also known as death cap) or food that 
has gone bad (see e.g. Gjerris and Gaiani 2014). Drug balloons may come close 
to being non-edible in this sense as swallowing them is very risky. Peanuts and 
fish are edible to most people in this sense. However, they are non-edible for in-
dividuals who are seriously allergic to them. Thus, edibility in this sense is not 
only about properties of a substance but also a relation between a substance and 
its potential eater. Also this sense of ‘edible’ fails to distinguish between eating 
and mere swallowing. Food poisoning results from eating spoiled (non-edible) 
food. On the other side of the coin, capsule endoscopy devices are safe and, thus, 
edible in this respect. Analogously to the first sense of ‘edible’, also this second 
sense is useless for telling food apart from other entities. Many non-foods are ed-
ible in this sense. This kind of edibility is not even necessary for something to be 
food. Spoiled food (or food one is allergic to) is still food. As a result, food can be 
non-edible in this sense. 
Third, the terms ‘edible’ and ‘non-edible’ refer to religious, ideological and 
moral restrictions regarding food (Fuster 2014; Grumett 2014). Pork, for example, 
is in this sense non-edible for vegans, Muslims and Jewish people. Edibility is 
then very much a question about cultural, moral and religious conventions. This 
sense of edibility is irrelevant to the distinction between eating and swallowing. 
Of course, the moral, cultural and religious restrictions concern also swallowing, 
not just eating. Moreover, substances may count as food when they are found 
non-edible (by some people) in this sense of the term. Vegan, Muslims and Jewish 
people may understand pork as food. It is just a kind of food that they should not 
eat—non-edible food, for short. Thus, this sense of edibility does not distinguish 
between food and other entities. 
Finally, something may be non-edible for aesthetic reasons (Kaplan 2012). It 
is not rare that an individual dislikes some food stuff—such as mushrooms, mus-
sels or onion—to the extent of refusing to eat them. Sometimes food stuffs are 
found yucky (or too bad tasting, spicy, rough or slimy) to the extent that eating 
them becomes impossible or at least very difficult. This sense of edibility does not 
distinguish between food and other entities. A person disliking the taste of cheese 
to the extent of not being able to eat it may still understand cheese as food. It is 
just the kind of food he or she does not want to eat. As an outcome, edibility in 
this fourth sense is not necessary for something to be food. Yet, this sense on 
‘edible’ succeeds in pointing towards differences between eating and mere swal-
lowing. Suppose someone dislike the taste of garlic to the extent of being unable 
to eat it or foods containing it. This individual still might be able to swallow a 
glove of garlic (very fast and with a lot of water) in order to win a bet, for example. 
Moreover, she may be happy to swallow garlic capsules for health reasons. If this 
is the case, then eating in its narrow consist of swallowing but also of something 
else. In short, eating is more than mere swallowing. Might it be, that the multitude 
functions of food also concern eating and distinguish it from mere swallowing?  
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Eating and swallowing share a goal of digesting something—that is placing 
something inside one’s stomach. Eating in its narrow differs from mere swallow-
ing in serving numerous functions that go beyond nutritional or medical values of 
the substances digested. Eating gives pleasure and relieves unpleasant sensations. 
Eating has numerous social, cultural and religious functions. Moreover, eating is 
a complex and composed practice which involves many elements relating for ex-
ample to places and tools used for eating. (Scruton 2012; Henschke 2014; Mur-
dock and Noll 2015.) Are these differences between the functions and goals of 
mere swallowing and eating somehow analogical to differences between food, 
food substitutes and food supplements? Are food substitutes and supplement 
merely swallowed or also eaten?  
 
4. Functions of Food, Substitutes and Supplements 
If the above distinction between eating and mere swallowing is accepted, it seems 
that some food supplements are merely swallowed but others are eaten. Vitamin 
pills are usually merely swallowed, whereas supplements such as protein bars are 
eaten. Protein bars are usually quite tasty and many outdoor sport enthusiasts, for 
example, use them as provisions during or between their sport activities. In similar 
lines, some substitutes are eaten and others merely swallowed. A soya burgers and 
oat yoghurt, for example, are most certainly eaten. Medical nutrient solutions—
which are not only substituting a type of food but food in general—are merely swal-
lowed. However, one might still claim that functions of food are wider than the 
ones of supplements and substitutes. It will be shown in what follows that this is not 
the case.  
A central function of food is to provide energy and important nutrients. Some 
substitutes, such as baby milk substitutes, are designed to fulfill these nutritional 
functions very similarly to the stuff they are substituting. The more nutritiously sim-
ilar to mother’s milk a product is, the more suitable it is of being used as a baby milk 
substitute (even though in order to work as a substitute it also has to fulfill some 
requirements regarding taste and preservability). A stuff nutritiously very different 
to mother’s milk cannot be sensibly be taken as a baby milk substitute.  
However, even though some substitutes have to be nutritiously similar to the 
entities they are substituting, this is not always the case. Nutritious similarity is 
not necessary for something y to be a substitute for something else x. Meat and 
dairy substitutes, for example, are often nutritiously quite different from meat and 
dairy. In their case, the focus is in substitute’s ability to serve the culinary and 
social functions of the authentic product. Meat and dairy substitutes enable ve-
gans (and other unwilling to consume animal based products) to enjoy food that 
is overtly similar to more conventional food. With the help of these substitutes 
individuals can have culinary experiences, follow traditions of their culture (to 
some extent) and realize social functions of food. Becoming a vegan, thus, does 
not need to imply giving up cappuccino drinking or eating hamburgers both of 
which have various social, culinary and cultural functions. Sometimes, as in the 
case of low calorie meal replacements used for weight control, nutritious differ-
ences between a food item and its substitute are not only tolerated but actually 
required. Meal replacements are very low in calories but serve some functions of 
food they are substituting. They, for example, remove the unpleasant feeling of 
hunger.  
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The multitude of functions of substitutes relate to the criteria for good substi-
tutes. Not any entity can be a geed substitute for any other entity. A suggestion to 
use slices of cucumber as substitute of beef in a classical cheese burger is, at its 
best, humorous. In somehow similar lines, a restaurant that used to serve a single 
lettuce leaf as a substitute of bread to its gluten intolerant customers received a 
mass of negative attention at social media and had to change its practice.2 What 
distinguishes a good substitute of x from all other entities that are not x, is that 
good (or at least decent) substitutes of x can serve several functions of x. A good 
substitute of something x is capable of fulfilling many functions of x. (Ryall 2008: 
59; Siipi 2014: 92; on similar ideas regarding copies see Carrara and Soavi 2010: 
423.) Since a lettuce leaf is unlikely to serve culinary, social and nutritious func-
tions of bread, it is not a good substitute of it. 
The functions of food supplements vary less than the functions of food sub-
stitutes. All food supplements are meant to enhance the well-being or perfor-
mance of an individual through serving some nutritional needs. However, con-
trary to food and food substitutes they are not meant to cover all energy or nutrient 
intake of an individual. At first sight it may seem that supplements focus mostly 
on fulfilling some nutritional needs whereas substitutes can substitute any func-
tions of food. Yet, the nutritious functions people give to food and food supple-
ment are various. Food is not only about receiving right amount of calories and 
nutrients necessary for avoiding deficiencies and related sickness. Rather people 
believe the right nutrition to contribute to their general well-being, including their 
looks (O’Neill and Silver 2016) and harmony of mind (Siró et al. 2008: 457; Sirico 
et al. 2018). Certain ways of eating as well as usage of certain food supplements 
may be central for a life style chosen (Sirico et al. 2018). In similar lines avoiding 
food supplements may be important for other ways of living a good life—for ex-
ample, following the ideal of being self-subsistent. Thus, food supplements may, 
in addition to providing nutrients and energy serve many social and cultural func-
tions of food. By them people can, for example, communicate group membership 
(or non-membership). One obvious example is (hobby) athletes all leaving the 
gym while sipping their protein supplement drink from a similar plastic container. 
They fulfill their high need for protein but also sign of belonging to the group of 
“hard training ones”. In similar lines, usage of certain vitamin supplements may 
indicate belonging to the groups of “caring parents” or “committed students”, for 
example.  
To conclude, food substitutes and supplements serve many of the functions 
food is serving including the social, cultural and symbolic functions of food. As a 
result, the hypothesis presented in the beginning seems false. Yet, one might still 
try to save a somehow modified version of it by stating that food has a specific 
function (or functions) that substitutes and supplements cannot serve. This sug-
gestion is discussed in the next section. The idea behind the contemplation is the 
following. Substitutes and supplements differ from the authentic entities with re-
spect to their origin. Dairy and meat have their origin in animals whereas their 
substitutes are plant based. The banana yoghurt of brand x comes from the factory 
of brand x whereas its substitute has a different history. Thus, we need to ask: 
Does food have functions related to its origin? If yes, can food substitutes and 
supplements serve also those functions? 
 
 
2 https://www.iltalehti.fi/uutiset/a/2016030121199078  
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5. Origin Related Functions 
If substitutes and supplements serve many functions of the authentic food, why 
are they substitutes and supplements rather than alternatives or spare entities? A 
soya ice cream, for example, is nutritiously equal (or even superior) to ordinary 
dairy ice cream. From culinary perspective it may be just as delicious as the dairy 
ice cream (it may actually be difficult to tell them apart by the mere taste). The 
soya ice cream can fulfill the social functions of ice cream eating. Yet, most take 
it a substitute for authentic ice cream. Why is that? 
One suggestion is that authenticity of a food item partly follows from its his-
tory—that is from where it originates and how it came into being. Some functions 
of food also relate to its origin. In other words, food has origin related functions. 
These functions and their connection to the relation between authentic entities 
and substitutes can be illustrated by an example of in vitro meat. In vitro meat is 
produced in a cell culture of animal cells. It is not on the sale for consumers yet, 
but serious development work is going on. It has basically same nutrients and 
amount of energy as ordinary meat originating from slaughtered animals. More-
over, in biological and physical sense, it is not only similar to ordinary meat, but 
consists of the exactly same matter and substance as it. When further developed 
it will be able to serve same culinary functions as ordinary meat. It will taste, feel 
and look like the ordinary meat. Yet, as it does not originate from slaughtered 
animals, some consumers omit to take it as authentic meat. Rather they describe 
it as a meat substitute or even as fake meat (Bryant and Barnett 2018: 12). The 
view is shared by some researchers. Jean-Francois Hocquette (2016), for example, 
describes in vitro meat as one of the meat substitutes and takes it to be “artificial 
meat”. He explicitly states several times that in vitro meat is not meat. (For similar 
views or terminology see also see also Stephens 2010: 400; Bryant and Barnett 
2018.) Why is in vitro meat not accepted as (authentic) meat? Does meat serve 
some functions that depend on its originating from slaughtered animals? 
Not only meat and dairy food offers but also their production at farms at 
countryside is something that matters to people in cultural, social and aesthetic 
respects. Dowsett et al. (2018), for example, point out that a meat lamb related 
agriculture has a special role in national identity at Australia. In similar lines, 
turkeys play an important cultural role in the American Thanksgiving Day and 
cows at a mountain pasture are an integral part of a Swiss cultural landscape. In 
vitro meat and the plant based meat substitutes are unable to fulfill these functions 
which are strongly connected to the living animals as sources of food. Dowsett et 
al. (2018) further point out that meat may have other functions related to its ani-
mal origin. According to them, meat is sometimes consumed as a sign of one’s 
dominance, power and superiority over animals (and other people). If that is the 
case, then, of course, plant based substitutes as well as in vitro meat necessarily 
fail to serve these functions of meat eating.  
Is it fair to say that only authentic food serves origin related functions? Do 
substitutes fail to serve origin related functions? This does not seem to be the case. 
Quite contrary, meat substitutes, for example, have social functions that relate to 
their non-animal origin. By consuming plant based meat substitutes instead of 
meat individuals can signal their kindness (towards animals and other people) and 
environment friendly attitudes and life style. Moreover, they can communicate 
certain group memberships (or non-memberships). These origin based functions 
of meat substitutes, of course, are not the same than the ones of meat. As a matter 
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of fact, some of them may be quite contrary to the origin based functions of meat. 
Yet, they are still origin based functions and, thus, the difference between authen-
tic food items and their substitutes does not rest on serving origin based functions.  
To sum it up, food has functions related to its origin and history. However, 
food substitutes can also serve very similar kinds of functions. Thus, the hypoth-
esis (even in its modified form) is false. Food does not differ from its substitutes 
and supplements with respect to its functions. Thus, either there the distinction 
between food, substitutes and supplements is based on something else, or the dis-
tinction is metaphysically unjustified.  
 
6. Conclusion and Discussion 
The above discussions indicate that the hypothesis presented in the beginning of 
the paper is false. Food substitutes and supplements serve the same (or almost 
same) functions as food. However, some food substitutes fail to serve origin re-
lated functions of the corresponding authentic products. Meat substitutes (includ-
ing in vitro meat), for example, do not serve those origin related functions of meat 
which relate to meat coming from slaughtered animals. Yet, meat substitutes 
serve other origin related functions. 
If the hypothesis is false (as argued above), then supplements and substitutes 
must differ from food in some other respect than their functions. Alternatively, it 
might be argued that the distinction between food, substitutes and supplements 
lacks metaphysical justification. If it lacks metaphysical justification, what is it all 
about? The question is pressing since the above considerations fail to answer a 
fundamental question: Why are substitutes and supplements taken as substitutes 
and supplements rather than alternative products?  
One possible answer might be that the distinction between authentic food 
products and their substitutes reflects our cultural habits and customs. Since ice 
cream was first made of milk and the soya ice cream only become later, and since 
the two differ with respect to their main ingredients and origin, it is fair to say that 
the soya ice cream is a substitute. Dairy based ice cream is what people are used 
to. If consumers see milk as a fundamental ingredient of an authentic ice cream, 
and if this main ingredient is replaced by something else, the outcome can, at its 
best, be a substitute. Thus, the question about substitutes and supplements is not 
about functions. It is (at least partly) about consumer experiences regarding es-
sences of food stuffs. It may well be that people see the right essences to pretty 
much depend on having the right raw materials and ingredients. Only when a 
product has right ingredients—the ones that people judge to belong to the type of 
food under discussion—it is an authentic instance of that food product.  
The suggested understanding regarding distinction between food, substitutes 
and supplement requires further philosophical analysis. The central terms need to 
be clarified and illustrative examples and counter-examples developed. The sug-
gested understanding might also be interesting from the point of view of empirical 
studies. There are numerous studies on what people see as authentic food (see e.g. 
Tsai and Lu 2012; Sukalakamala Boyce 2007), but much less on what reasons 
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Experiments in Visual Perspective:  
Size Experience 
 
Brentyn J. Ramm 






Phenomenal objectivism explains perceptual phenomenal character by reducing it 
to an awareness of mind-independent objects, properties, and relations. A challenge 
for this view is that there is a sense in which a distant tree looks smaller than a 
closer tree even when they are the same objective size (perceptual size variation). 
The dual content view is a popular objectivist account in which such experiences 
are explained by my objective spatial relation to the tree, in particular visual angle 
(perspectival size). I describe a series of first-person experiments for investigating 
size experience. I use a ruler as a first-person method for operationalising perspec-
tival size (Experiment 1). I use the corridor illusion (Experiment 2), outlining one’s 
head in the mirror (Experiment 3), and outlining the size of objects on glass (Ex-
periment 4) to show a phenomenal difference in size for items in different depth 
contexts, despite being identical in visual angle. These finding demonstrate that 
visual angle cannot account for these spatial experiences. Psychological evidence 
provides further support for the thesis that subjects do not experience visual angle 
when depth information is present. Together this evidence supports the hypothesis 
that perceptual size variation cannot be accounted for by visual angle, hence un-
dermining a plausible version of the dual content theory. This outcome, combined 
with problems raised by alternative objectivist accounts of size variation, provides 
support for a subjectivist account of size experience. 
 
Keywords: Size Experience, Perspective, Perceptual Relativity, Subjectivism, Objec-







There is something it is like for me to smell a vanilla scented candle, and to see a 
red door. The experiences have a unique phenomenal character. The bugbear to 
physicalism is providing a plausible explanation of the phenomenal character of 
experience within a physicalist framework (Chalmers 1996; Foster 1982; Jackson 
1982; Levine 1983; Nagel 1974; Strawson 1994). Phenomenal objectivists’ master 
move in this regard is in promising to close the phenomenal-non-phenomenal gap 
by “kicking the phenomenal character downstairs, into the external world” 
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(Shoemaker 2003: 256). When I smell vanilla, the phenomenal property I am aware 
of is a property of molecules given off by the candle. When I look at a red door the 
phenomenal character of redness is my awareness of the door’s redness and the phe-
nomenal character of rectangularity is my awareness of the door’s rectangularity.  
Phenomenal objectivism is the thesis that the phenomenal character of expe-
rience just is an awareness of mind-independent objects, properties, and rela-
tions.1 Phenomenal subjectivism is the denial of this thesis.2 Phenomenal objec-
tivism has an intuitive appeal in that it is consistent with ordinary experience that 
smells, colours, and shapes are apparently properties of physical objects, not ap-
parently mind-dependent properties or objects in the mind. This “transparency of 
experience” (Harman 1990; Moore 1903; Tye 1995)3 is the main the intuitive 
force behind the two main versions of phenomenal objectivism: for strong repre-
sentationalists, phenomenal character is identical with represented mind-inde-
pendent objects, properties, and relations (Dretske 1995; Lycan 1996, 2001; Tye 
2000, 2014). For direct realists, phenomenal character is a non-representational 
relation between a subject and mind-independent objects, properties, and rela-
tions (Brewer 2008; Campbell in Campbell & Cassam 2014, chapters 1-4; Fish 
2009; Kennedy 2009; Martin 2002; Smith 2002). 
Of course, from the fact that I seem to experience mind-independent proper-
ties it does not follow that these properties are in fact mind-independent (Hatfield 
2009: 328-29, 348-49). However, we can grant that the observation, if phenome-
nologically accurate, does at least provide a prima facie case for objectivism.4 This 
 
1 “Mind-independent” can be roughly understood as anything that does not metaphysically 
depend for its existence upon a subject’s awareness, beliefs, concepts, and linguistic prac-
tices (Miller 2016; Tahko & Lowe 2016). 
2 The terms “internalism” and “externalism” are often used to indicate that certain prop-
erties such as meaning and phenomenal properties are located in the head (internalism) or 
outside of the head (externalism). However, Descartes who was a paradigm internalist is 
not included in this category. Since Descartes held that the mind was an unextended sub-
stance with no spatial location, phenomenal properties were not literally located inside the 
head. Where phenomenal qualities are spatially located is orthogonal to the question of 
whether the properties presented in experience are mind-independent or not (see Farkas 
2003). As I use the term, Descartes and Berkeley would count as subjectivists. Phenomenal 
subjectivists may also hold that experience is relational in that it is the subject’s awareness 
of mind-dependent properties or objects (i.e., sense data). Both phenomenal subjectivism 
and phenomenal objectivism are compatible with the view that phenomenal character is a 
property of an experiential state or a subject (Chalmers 2010: 342). Phenomenal subjectiv-
ism as I understand it is also compatible with weak representationalism, the thesis that all 
experiences have representational content (Chalmers 2010: 344). Peacocke (1983) is a phe-
nomenal subjectivist about some experiences who rejects weak representationalism. 
3 Perhaps the earliest statement of transparency comes from G.E. Moore (1903: 450): “the 
moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see what, distinctly, it is, it 
seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness. When we try to intro-
spect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were 
diaphanous. Yet it can be distinguished if we look attentively enough”. This last sentence, 
from the historical source of transparency, is worth highlighting. That “consciousness” 
(which Moore uses interchangeably with “awareness”) is distinguishable according to 
Moore, contradicts the contemporary usage of transparency to show that consciousness is 
totally inaccessible to introspection (Ramm 2019). 
4 The claim that there is a property of “mind-independence” to visual experience has been 
challenged by Spener 2012. I agree with Spener that visual experience is silent on the 
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kind of argument does not provide an a priori argument for objectivism, rather it 
provides an empirical and hence defeasible motivation. If for example, we cannot 
identify plausible objective properties or relations to account for particular per-
ceptual experiences, then this initial defeasible motivation for objectivism is un-
dermined. My goal will be to show that this is the case for size perception.  
A puzzle for objectivists is that the stars look smaller than the moon, even 
though according to scientists the stars are actually much vaster in size than the 
moon. A distant tree also looks smaller than a closer tree in some sense despite 
being the same objective size. These are examples of how the experience of size 
differs from the sizes that common sense and science says they actually have.5  
Christopher Peacocke (1983) describes the visual experience of viewing an 
avenue of trees as follows: 
 
Taking your experience at face value you would judge that the trees are roughly 
the same physical size […] Yet there is also some sense in which the nearer tree 
occupies more of your visual field than the more distant tree. This is as much a 
feature of your experience itself as its representing the trees as being the same 
height (Peacocke 1983: 12). 
 
Such size experiences have also been described in terms of the portion things 
take up in the visual field by Irvin Rock (1975: 36-39). Earlier still, Douglas Har-
ding observed that: 
 
As children, some of us used to play the game of guessing how large the moon is—
how large, that is to say, in terms of a halfpenny held at various distances from the 
eye—but we gave up the game before we had learned its astonishing lesson. My 
objects are presented in what I call my field of view, and their ‘size’ is primarily 
the proportion which they fill of that field (Harding 1952/2011: 428). 
 
Such “size variation” (as a contrast with “size constancy”)6 is ubiquitous in visual 
perception and hence on the face of it is a part of a normal and accurate visual 
perceptual experience. Hence size variation can be distinguished from inaccurate 
perceptual experiences such as the moon looking larger at the horizon (illusions) 
and seeming to be aware of a red door that is not there (hallucinations). The goal 
of the objectivist is hence to find objective properties or relations in the physical 
environment such that the experience counts as veridical rather than illusory or 
hallucinatory. 
How do we account for such perceptual experiences? According to Peacocke 
(1983) the trees in the avenue look the same size in some sense, so objective 
 
metaphysical nature of presented objects and properties, however, I do not pursue this 
topic here. 
5 Doubts about phenomenal objectivism, usually in the context of criticising a strong rep-
resentationalist account, also arise for reductively explaining the phenomenology of atten-
tion (Block 2010), blurry vision (Boghossian & Velleman 1989; Pace 2007), double vision 
(Boghossian & Velleman 1989), afterimages (Block 1996), and perceptual grouping (Pea-
cocke 1983).  
6 Size constancy is when things look to remain the same size despite variability in the area 
they take up in the visual field as the distance between the perceiver and the object changes. 
An example is when an approaching car looks to remain the same size as it approaches. 
For recent discussions of perceptual constancy, see Allen 2018, Cohen 2013, Hatfield 2009: 
chapter 6, Matthen 2010, Overgaard 2010, Siewert 2006.   
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properties show up in visual experience. However, there is also a sensation of size 
which accounts for the sense of different sizes between the trees. The property of 
largeness of the closer tree belongs to visual sensational space (as distinct from 
public physical space).7 It is a non-representational property that is intrinsic to 
experience. He argues that size variation is non-representational because veridical 
experience cannot represent a tree as being both larger than another tree and the 
same size (Peacocke 1983: 12). 
The main objectivist account of size variation is the dual content view which 
is a popular theory amongst contemporary philosophers (Brewer 2011; Jagnow 
2012; Kelly 2008; Noë 2004; Tye 2000). The strategy of this account is to identify 
mind-independent properties or relations in the environment which can account 
for such experiences. Tye, for example, holds that “the nearer tree looks the same 
objective size as the tree further away while also looking larger from the given 
viewing position” (Tye 2000: 78). He agrees with Peacocke that the trees look to 
have the same size, there are perspective independent properties in the experience, 
but there is also an objective property of how large the nearer tree looks from here 
in the experience. He proposes that this viewpoint relative relation is the visual 
angle of the objects. Visual angle is an objective geometric relation in the environ-
ment. It can be pictured by imagining two strings stretching from the centre of the 
eye to the extremities of a distant object. The angle formed by the strings is the 
visual angle. According to Tye, the visual angle is represented in the visual system 
by the number of cells that are triggered on the retina by the object. The nearer 
tree takes up more of the visual array than the further tree which allows the visual 
system to represent (track) the different visual angles of the objects (ibid.: 78). 
Thus, size variation is also representational—it’s not a sensational property. Alva 
Noë (2004: 166) refers to such objective viewpoint relative relations as “perspec-
tival properties”. 
The dual content view answers Peacocke’s challenge by positing that visual 
experience represents objective relations between the viewer and objects as well 
as objective size (for a defence of Peacocke, see Millar 2010). Peacocke’s (1983) 
response was that properties and relations can only be represented if one possesses 
these concepts. As the average person does not have the concept of visual angle, 
they cannot represent it. An opponent however can plausibly deny this assump-
tion (e.g., Tye 2000: 78-79). In fact, Peacocke himself not only changed his mind 
in favour of a non-conceptual account of perceptual content, but became a cham-
pion for this view (e.g., Peacocke 1992, 1998, 2001). 
A more promising strategy for refuting the objectivist response is to show 
that visual angle cannot account for size variation (Hatfield 2003, 2009, 2012; 
Millar 2010). Gary Hatfield (2003, 2009, 2012) holds that the geometry of visual 
space contracts with distance.8 This can be experienced by looking down a long 
corridor, path or road. The objectively parallel lines apparently converge. Hatfield 
 
7 Peacocke (1983: 52-53) points out that we need to sharply distinguish between public 
physical space and sensational space. This way we can avoid the confusions sense data 
theorists got into such as asking “‘Are sense data surfaces of material objects?’ and ‘Do we 
perceive sense data?’” (ibid.: 53, Footnote 22). By restricting his talk to subjective proper-
ties, Peacocke also avoids the need to posit sense data. 
8 “Visual space” refers to the spatial structures visually experienced by a subject. This phe-
nomenological notion is to be distinguished from the “physical space” as investigated by 
physicists. Visual space as so defined may or may not be identical to a portion of subject-
independent physical space. 
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further holds that this contraction is not identical with visual angle as represented 
in a two-dimensional perspective picture. Rather, as the lines of the corridor con-
verge in depth, the contraction is less steep than would be represented in a per-
spective picture. Hatfield and a colleague estimated the phenomenal convergence 
of a corridor to be between 80 and 85 degrees, while the angle in a perspective 
picture would be between 35 and 40 degrees (Hatfield 2012: 42). They also ad-
justed a calliper as an aid to making these judgements, so their observations could 
be counted as a kind of first-person experiment. Their judgements suggest that the 
convergence in visual space is intermediate between linear perspective and full 
constancy (parallel), though closer to constancy than linear perspective. The pre-
diction of this account is that in the context of depth cues things in the distance 
will look larger than their angle subtended at the eye. This is exactly the situation 
that occurs in the Müller-Lyer illusion when the line intersecting with inward 
pointing arrows (a visual indication of spatial remoteness) appears longer than a 
line intersecting with outwards pointing arrows (a visual indication of spatial 
closeness) despite the fact that they take up the same visual angle. 
In the spirit of the experiment reported by Hatfield, I propose that the objectiv-
ist account of size experience can be tested empirically by designing a first-person 
experiment in which the apparent size of a close object is contrasted with that of a 
distant object that takes up the same visual angle. This set up would hold fixed vis-
ual angle, while manipulating depth cues. If apparent size is determined solely by 
visual angle then the distant object should seem the same apparent size as the close 
object. This would support the objectivist account of size variation. If, on the other 
hand, due to the influence of depth cues the distant object appears larger, this would 
undermine this theory. This type of experiment would be a three-dimensional 
equivalent of the Müller-Lyer illusion. In viewing the Müller-Lyer diagram subjects 
do not need to estimate the apparent size of each line, but merely make a simple 
judgement about whether there is a phenomenal difference in size between them.  
In section 2, I use first-person experiments to show that there is a phenome-
nal difference in size experience between items that are identical in visual angle, 
hence providing evidence that visual angle does not account for size variation. In 
section 3, I review psychological evidence which also supports the view that size 
variation does not reduce to visual angle. I outline some issues raised by alterna-
tive objectivist accounts of size variation in section 4, hence providing a motiva-
tion for subjectivism about size experience. 
 
2. Experiments in the Perspective of Size 
In this section I use first-person experiments to show that variation in size experi-
ence is not typically reducible to visual angle. Rather than “just looking”, in first-
person experiments a subject’s experience is manipulated (often with the aid of 
apparatus) to hold fixed extraneous factors (Ramm 2018), typically with the goal 
to produce a salient phenomenal contrast (Siegel 2007). This assists one in isolat-
ing an experience of interest and reducing common introspective errors (Ramm 
2018). The current methodology follows in the tradition of experimental phenom-
enology originating with Carl Stumpf (Albertazzi 2013; Ihde 2012; Ramm 2018; 
Verstegen 2005; Vicario 1993). The first experiment provides a means of measur-
ing perspectival size properties. The second, third and fourth experiments provide 
evidence that variation in size experience is not the same as perspectival proper-
ties, in particular visual angle. 
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Is there a first-person means of operationalising perspectival size? Alva Noë 
defines the “perspectival size” of a thing as “the size of patch that one must fill in 
a given plane perpendicular to the line of sight in order to perfectly occlude an 
object from view” (Noë 2004: 82). My own suggestion is to use a ruler. 
 
2.1 Experiment 1: Measuring Perspectival Size 
Hold out a ruler at the same distance as your hand. I find that my hand measures 
17 cm from the bottom of the palm to the top of the middle finger. Maintain the 
ruler at the same distance and align it with the appearance of your foot. I find that 




Figure 1. Measuring Perspectival Size. Holding a ruler fixed at the same distance 
as my hand, my foot measured as a third of the perspectival size of my hand on 
the ruler. 
 
If this procedure accurately measures visual area, then my hand currently 
takes up more than three times the visual area of my foot (I will be arguing that 
this method does not typically measure visual area). Why hold the ruler close to 
the hand rather than closer to the foot? Where you hold the ruler does not make 
an important difference because whilst the units will change the ratio remains 
constant. Perhaps my foot will be measured as 10 cm, while my hand will then be 
measured as 30 cm. My foot will continue to be measured as a third the size of 
my hand, where ever I hold the ruler, unless of course I change the distance be-
tween my hand and my foot, or the relative position of the ruler. This method 
abstracts away from depth and thus provides a first-person means of measuring 
perspectival size on the vertical and horizontal axes. 
The same method can be used for measuring perspectival shape. For exam-
ple, upon measuring the shape of an obliquely viewed plate I found that it took 
up less area on the vertical axis than the horizontal axis which is consistent with 
an ellipse. A plate viewed straight on however was measured as the same area on 
both axes consistent with a circle.9  
 
9 An objection is that using a ruler introduces another thing into the visual experience 
which may interfere with it. To test this, one can take a photo and measure the size of the 
images on the photo. I find that the ratio of the images is the same as measured by the 
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While perhaps a useful approximation of how things look, it turns out that 
in many circumstances apparent size and shape does not coincide with perspec-
tival size and shape as measured by a ruler. The Müller-Lyer illusion in particular 
shows that perceptual size variation is not always identical with perspectival prop-
erties such as visual angle. The lines look different in size in the context of inter-
secting lines, despite the fact that they take up the same visual angle. As another 
example, the moon looks larger when it is close to the horizon than when it is at 
its zenith (the “moon illusion”). 
 
2.2 Experiment 2: The Corridor Illusion 
That size variation cannot always be explained by visual angle is illustrated in 
figure 2. In A, block ii looks smaller than block i. There is a phenomenal differ-
ence in size between the blocks. However, block ii looks larger than block iii even 
though they are identical in visual angle. In B, block v looks larger than block iv, 
however they are in actual fact identical in visual angle. 
The phenomenal difference between ii and iii, and iv and v demonstrates that 
not all size variation is identical with such view-point relative properties. In the 
context of depth information there is a phenomenal difference between the expe-
rienced size of a thing and its visual angle. By contrast, we are relatively accurate 
in judging the size difference between block i and block iii, in particular in judging 
that block iii is one third the size of block i. In this case, when depth information 
is the same for both targets, we are sensitive to relative perspectival sizes. 
 
                 
Figure 2. The Corridor Illusion. Adapted from Palmer 1999. There is a phenomenal 
difference in size between ii and iii and iv and v despite these items being identi-
cal in visual angle. 
 
One criticism of this methodology is that it involves contradictory depth 
cues. The image is viewed from a distance, and the image itself also presents depth 
cues. Hence the example could be dismissed as involving a non-standard percep-
tual experience. 
 
original ruler, and it remains the same both with and without the ruler, hence I conclude 
that there is no interference occurring in the experiment. 
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2.3 Experiment 3: How Large Does your Head Look in the Mirror? 
Another experiment is looking at your head in the mirror and trying to judge how 
large it looks in comparison to the size of the image in the mirror. Gombrich 
(1960: 5) has pointed out that people are unaware that the image is half the objec-
tive size of their head as is seen by tracing its size on a steamed-up mirror. Below, 
I extend the experiment as reported by Gombrich. 
The experiment is as follows: stand in front of a mirror and use a ruler to 
position your head 30 cm from the mirror. Now trace around the outline of your 
head in the mirror with a whiteboard marker. For me the image traced measured 
only 11 cm high and 8 cm in width. That the image was so small was a highly 
surprising result. Now step to one side, and use the ruler to again stand 30 cm 
from the mirror. Now compare the size your head looks with the outline. I find 
that my head looks significantly larger (perhaps a third larger) than the outline 
next to it. To be even more precise, next to this outline, you can also draw the 
objective size of your head on the mirror. Again, position your head 30 cm from 
the mirror. I find that the head in the mirror looks smaller than the outline of its 
objective size, but not as small as the image outline. That is, the experienced size 
is intermediate between the image and its objective size. This experiment shows 
that my head looks bigger than the outline on the glass (when the image and the 
marking are not lined up) despite the fact that they are the same visual angle. This 
again provides evidence contrary to the dual content theory. 
Noë (2004: 165) briefly considers Gombrich’s experiment as showing that 
we do not usually experience perspectival properties, but then dismisses it as being 
due to the “puzzling character of reflections” (ibid.: 166).10 As with experiment 2, 
mirrors are examples of non-standard perceptual experience. It again has conflict-
ing depth cues which may have been confounding the experiment. The mirror is 
at a distance from me and the image it reflects also has depth information (it seems 
to be projected beyond the glass). A means of overcoming this problem is to repeat 
the experiment with non-reflective glass. Leonardo da Vinci in fact traced scenes 
on glass as a technique for translating three-dimensions to two-dimensions. In the 
following experiment, I extended da Vinci’s method by using it to distinguish be-
tween the visual angle of objects and their apparent size in the context of depth 
information.11  
 
10 One of the counter-intuitive properties of mirrors is that the image of your head is always 
half the objective size of your head independently of the distance you stand from the mir-
ror. This is because the glass is always half of the distance between you and your virtual 
self in the mirror (Bertamini & Parks 2005: 86). I confirmed this startling effect by drawing 
the outline of my face on the mirror and walking backwards. I found that the image did 
indeed stay the same size as the outline. 
11 In his notebooks Leonardo da Vinci describes the method as follows: “In order to put 
into practice this perspective of the variation and loss or diminution of the essential char-
acter of colours, observe at every hundred braccia some objects standing in the landscape, 
such as trees, houses, men and particular places. Then in front of the first tree have a very 
steady plate of glass and keep your eye very steady, and then, on this plate of glass, draw 
a tree, tracing it over the form of that tree. Then move it on one side so far as that the real 
tree is close by the side of the tree you have drawn; then colour your drawing in such a 
way as that in colour and form the two may be alike, and both, if you close one eye, seem 
to be painted on the glass and at the same distance. Then, by the same method, represent 
a second tree, and a third, with a distance of a hundred braccia between each. And these 
will serve as a standard and guide whenever you work on your own pictures, wherever 
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2.4 Experiment 4: Tracing Objects on Glass 
View the scene out of a window and choose an object in the distance. Use a white-
board marker to outline the size of the image on the glass. I outlined the image of 
a window of a distant building, and again stepped to one side using a ruler to keep 
my head 30 cm from the glass. As with my head in the mirror, the distant window 
looked larger than the outline on the glass. This was only the case with binocular 
vision. With one eye closed both the window and the image on the glass looked 
the same size. The phenomenal difference between binocular and monocular vi-
sion can hence be experienced by opening and closing one eye.  
This outcome confirmed the original finding without the possible confounds 
of using a reflective surface and without conflicting depth cues which was a po-
tential problem with experiments 2 and 3. The size of the image on the glass and 
the distant door both take up the same visual angle. That they appear different 
sizes (with binocular vision) again demonstrates that size variation is not ac-
counted for by visual angle. Rather size variation is partly determined by depth 
information. 
Furthermore, recall that one means of operationalising perspectival size is 
the area that something would take up if it was projected upon a plane perpendic-
ular to the line of sight. In viewing my head in the mirror and images on windows 
I am literally viewing a plane perpendicular to the line of sight. If size variation 
was explained by its perspectival size then it should look to take up the same size 
as the image on the glass. The fact that they diverge demonstrates a failure of 
perspectival size to explain size variation. That this effect is found in many differ-
ent contexts as seen in experiments 2-4 suggests that it is a robust effect. 
 
3. Psychological Evidence 
In section 2, I presented phenomenological demonstrations that size variation is 
not explained by visual angle. In this section, I discuss how psychological studies 
also suggest that this generalises to typical cases of perceptual size variation.  
In a classic study, Thouless (1931) presented subjects with two white discs of 
different sizes at varying distances. The distance of the smaller (closer) disc was 
varied until subjects reported when it looked the same size as the larger (further) 
disc. It was found that subjects did not adjust the closer disc such that it took up 
the same the size as the further the disc on the retina, but rather to a size interme-
diate between the retinal size and objective size. Thus,  
 
as the distance of an object changes, its phenomenal size changes, whether the 
object be far or near. It changes, however, less rapidly than does the size of the 
retinal image. The tendency to constancy is shown by the amount of change being 
a compromise between the changing size of the peripheral stimulus and the un-
changing ‘real’ size of the object (Thouless 1931: 353). 
 
Thouless (1931) also found that same for shape. Subjects tended to choose an 
ellipse for a tilted circle, but it was an ellipse that was in between that of the shape 
projected on the retina and its objective shape. Furthermore, many studies have 
shown that when subjects are asked to estimate the projective size of an item, or 
 
they may apply, and will enable you to give due distance in those works” (da Vinci 1970: 
158). 
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the amount it takes up in the visual field (ignoring depth), the results produce 
underconstancy, but the size selected is larger than retinal size (Carlson 1960; 
Gilinsky 1955; Singer 1952).12  
Perdreau and Cavanagh (2011) have also presented evidence that artists are 
not better at judging the perspectival size of images in the context of depth infor-
mation than non-artists. Artists, art students and non-artists were given images of 
cylinders in the context of depth cues (similar to the images in Figure 2) or in no 
context (with a grid as background). They were then asked to adjust a comparison 
cylinder such that it was the same objective size as the test cylinder (ignoring con-
text). They were effectively being asked to adjust the comparison so that it took 
up the same visual angle. All groups’ judgements significantly overestimated the 
size of the test cylinders when they were in the context of depth cues. There was 
no difference between groups in ignoring context therefore suggesting that artists 
do not have superior perceptual access to visual angle.  
It is also noteworthy that one technique used by painters to produce a per-
spective picture is to hold up their brush against things. This recalls the ruler ex-
periment, and suggests that even painters do not directly experience perspectival 
size—or at least not without the assistance of tools. The history of art also shows 
the use and development of sophisticated artist techniques for capturing perspec-
tive and the discovery and the use of geometric principles such as contraction to 
a vanishing point. Many of these techniques were only developed in the Renais-
sance (Edgerton 1978, 2009; Kemp 1990; Kubovy 1986). This again suggests that 
two-dimensional linear perspective is at best difficult to access in experience, if 
not an invention by artists in an effort to translate three-dimensional visual space 
to two dimensions (Schwitzgebel 2006). That is, visual experience is not the same 
as drawn in a perspective picture. 
This being said, it is likely that in some situations when depth cues are min-
imal that perspectival size and apparent size coincide, such as when we see the 
moon at its zenith. Also, when the visible terrain is eliminated by viewing the 
moon through a tube the moon illusion is eliminated and the apparent size of the 
moon is the same as its retinal size (Rock & Kaufman 1962). Similarly, when 
depth cues are eliminated by viewing objects through a tube then apparent size 
reduces towards that of the size of the image on the retina (Holway and Boring 
1941). Thouless (1931) found the same result when visual cues were eliminated. 
We can then be aware of the perspectival size, but only in contexts where depth 
information is minimized. 
The evidence presented here backs up the phenomenological findings that 
the angle subtended at the eye only approximates the experience. The experience 
of the tree does not directly track these objective properties in the environment. If 
experience does represent objective perspective-dependent properties these are 
systematically misrepresented. Tye and Noë cannot reduce the experience to re-
lations in the environment (except in restricted cases). Hence, they can at best 
treat most size experiences as on par with illusions, awareness of uninstantiated 
properties, rather than in terms of actual objective properties. Perhaps the objec-
tivist can identify a different relation in the environment other than visual angle 
or retinal images which could plausibly account for visual area. It is difficult to 
 
12 For further discussion of how empirical results support a view in which size experience 
is intermediate between visual angle and full constancy see Hatfield (2009: 182-83) and 
Hill and Bennett (2008). 
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know what this could be. The burden here is on the objectivist to supply a plausi-
ble candidate relation or property. 
 
4. Alternative Objectivist Accounts 
The dual content theory is a popular account of perceptual size variation. In this 
paper, I argued that distant things looking smaller cannot be accounted for by 
their visual angle. In particular, I used first-person experiments to show that in 
the context of depth cues, distant objects are experienced as larger than their vis-
ual angle. Hence these perspectival properties cannot explain typical size experi-
ence. This paper hence shows that a plausible version of the dual content theory 
is false. I will conclude by outlining some issues raised by alternative objectivist 
accounts of size variation. 
A major objectivist alternative is to treat size variation as illusory, in partic-
ular to explain it as an awareness of uninstantiated mind-independent properties. 
As an example, representationalism can account for the experience of a red after-
image by the visual system misrepresenting the presence of a red square with size, 
colour and shape properties. These properties do not need to be instantiated, just 
as I can mistakenly believe that there is a dragon outside without there being any 
actual dragon. The case of size variation can hence be treated as on par with illu-
sions such as afterimages. But what are these uninstantiated properties of which 
I am aware? As I cannot be aware of non-existent properties, a common account 
is that they are platonic universals (Dretske 2003; Forrest 2005; Johnston 2004; 
Tye 2000). There are independent reasons for thinking that universals do in fact 
exist (Armstrong 1989), so if they can be put to work in explaining illusions and 
hallucinations this is a theoretical virtue. Furthermore, as universals (purportedly) 
exist independently of my awareness of them, they are objective properties.  
Despite these appeals, this theory has some counter-intuitive consequences. 
Particularly, the phenomenal character of these ordinary spatial experiences 
would no longer be kicked downstairs into the external world (as quipped by 
Shoemaker 2003: 256), but out of the world entirely. When the moon looks larger 
near the horizon than at its zenith, I certainly do not seem to be aware of some-
thing abstract like universals which exist outside of space and time. The moon’s 
size is apparently equally instantiated in both cases in the same visual space. Con-
versely, then, this provides a prima facie case for subjectivism which holds that 
variant size properties (and all sizes, shapes and colours) are all equally instanti-
ated in my visual field (a mind-dependent field of visible properties). 
The objectivist account also raises thorny metaphysical issues about whether 
uninstantiated properties can account for phenomenal character (Pautz 2007: 
517; Thompson 2008). For example, it is not clear how I can be sensorially aware 
of universals given their lack of spatial and temporal properties, any more than I 
can sensorially experience unextended spacetime points or abstract objects (Pautz 
2007: 517). Thompson (2008: 398) points out, that if my doctor told me that I do 
not need pain killers for my phantom limb pain because it is illusory, I would be 
justifiably irate. This is because the phenomenal character of painfulness self-evi-
dently exists and is instantiated in the here and now. Another problem is mental 
causation. Given that universals lack causal powers, how can phantom limb pain 
cause me to wince if it is grounded in universals? (ibid.: 404). These questions 
may well have solutions. My point here is not that these questions do not have pos-
sible solutions (see Thompson 2008, for a discussion), but that these alternative 
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accounts of size experience lose the phenomenological appeal and explanatory sim-
plicity of the original objectivist motivations. 
Another objectivist response is to accept that visual angle alone does not de-
termine visual area, but rather visual experience represents a combination of vis-
ual angle and depth information (e.g., depth cues and binocular information). 
Since visual angle and depth information are objective properties, any inference 
to subjectivism would be blocked.13 The important question to ask here is: how is 
this property of visual angle + depth information instantiated in the environment? 
It is also not clear what this holistic combined property is. One possibility is that 
in some contexts the visual system represents objects as having a visual angle with 
a non-veridical depth. This is of course possible and if successful would neatly 
explain the experience of size variation. In fact, there are infinite mathematically 
definable spatial geometries that could be represented by the visual system. The 
main problem is that very few of these geometries are actually present in the phys-
ical world. By contrast, standard (veridical) visual angle is both precisely mathe-
matically definable and instantiated in the environment. In particular, it is the an-
gle that light strikes the eye from the extremities of a distant object. This angle is 
a property of the stream of light from the object to the eye, and hence a property 
of a concrete system that has causal effects. This is why visual angle would be an 
ideal explanation of size variation for the objectivist. On the other hand, it is not 
clear that conjunctive properties or alternative visual geometries are concretely 
instantiated in the external environment, let alone how they are causally relevant. 
Hence, the objectivist would need to make the case that these proposals do not 
collapse into the abstract uninstantiated property account with its attendant puz-
zles. 
In the absence of plausible instantiated or uninstantiated mind-independent 
properties for explaining apparent size, the objectivist is forced into less desirable 
positions such it being a mere cognitive illusion—hence denying that perceptual 
size variation is an aspect of sensory experience at all (Brewer 2008; Fish 2009: 
172-77). This is certainly a defensible position, but it is surely at odds with visual 
experience. A penny that is held out so that it takes up the same portion of the 
visual field as the moon, visually looks the same size (in some sense). To deny this 
arguably fails to acknowledge the sensory experience we were trying to explain in 
the first place (see Millar 2015). 
The main goal of this paper was to show that a popular version of the dual 
content theory is inadequate for accounting for size variation. The objectivist may 
still appeal to a theory of misrepresentation to account for size experience. How-
ever, the arguments presented here, when combined with criticisms of objectivist 
theories of illusion and hallucination (Millar 2015; Pautz 2007; Thompson 2008), 
provide reasons for rejecting these accounts, and consequently favour a subjectiv-
ist account of size experience.14 
 
 
13 Thank you to David Hilbert (2016) and an anonymous reviewer for raising this objection. 
John Campbell (Campbell and Cassam 2014: 88-90) makes a similar proposal for explain-
ing visual illusions. 
14 This paper was presented at the 2016 American Philosophical Association Central Meet-
ing. Thanks to David Hilbert for his insightful commentary and helpful comments by par-
ticipants. Thanks to David Chalmers, Frank Jackson, Boyd Millar, Eric Schwitzgebel, De-
clan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar for helpful comments on the manuscript. 
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Political Self-Deception by Anna Elisabetta Galeotti is a brilliant example of how 
crucial the category of self-deception is in our attempts to correctly describe, 
conceptualize, and explain a wide variety of predicaments that go well beyond 
the domain of our private lives. Most of the literature on self-deception has thus 
far provided examples of the phenomenon when it surfaces in more or less trou-
blesome events involving affective, emotional, and self-esteem related issues. 
Galeotti instead rightly takes self-deception to also have an impassable relevance 
for national and international political life: our tendency to self-deceiving is so 
pervasive in human psychology that nobody is immune to it, including political 
agents in the hands of whom is often the destiny of nations, the development of 
international relations, and even the future of our planet.  
Galeotti’s view of self-deception is framed by a widely defended paradigm 
of self-deception, long known as motivationalism: individuals are prone to self-
deception on the basis of a more or less significant motivational set which can 
lead them to believe what a dispassionate analysis of the available evidence, 
and/or a dispassionate search for easily accessible evidence, would instead show 
to be false, or at least unlikely. Far from conducting such a dispassionate analy-
sis of evidence and/or search for it, those agents do not operate an epistemically 
optimal treatment of evidence. Rather, they embrace false beliefs owing to the 
biasing effect of motivation over their rational cognition, so that they end up be-
lieving what they are independently interested in believing. Contrary evidence is 
thus avoided, discarded, misinterpreted, depending on the specific case. Interest-
ingly, however, Galeotti’s largely motivational theory is supplemented by at 
least two specifications: 
 (1) Motivation may not be per se decisive to leading to self-deception, unless 
suitably favorable circumstances are also in place (35); 
 (2) Defenders of motivationalism should be wary of embracing any “ram-
pant” anti-agency view, amounting to a purely causal picture of self-
deception, where an epistemic and practical agent proper is allegedly 
lacking—such a purely causal picture would also lead to the unpalatable 
consequence of making it difficult to attribute any sort of epistemic and 
practical responsibility to the agent who embarks on the self-deceptive 
maneuver (38).  
It is important to emphasize why Galeotti thinks that (1) and (2) are in order. As 
to (1), by adding favorable circumstances to the motivational set of self-deception, 
we would be in a better position to try to overcome a troublesome objection, 
long known as the “selectivity problem”. The “selectivity problem” objection 
roughly runs as follows:1 motivation may not be sufficient to cause self-
deception, as there may be people who do not end up self-deceiving, even when 
they are in the grip of a quite strong motivation to believe what they favor. If 
this is the case, as it seems it is, then self-deception is more selective than the 
mere presence of motivational factors predicts. In a word, we need additional 
conditions which can explain why motivation can casually go all the way down 
 
1 Bermùdez, J.L. 2000, “Self-Deception, Intentions and Contradictory Beliefs”, Analysis, 
60, 309-19. 
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to self-deception, when it does, and to diagnose what else is missing or present 
in the causal set of a subject when motivation is present, although self-deception 
does not happen. Thus, Galeotti argues (49) that motivation to believe what one 
favors is casually effective when the subject is also involved in a situation where 
there is a strong pressure to conclude that p is the case. Without such pressure, 
motivation might well remain inert.  
As to (2), Galeotti is interested in counterbalancing any purely causal pic-
tures of self-deception, because such views tend to conceive of the phenomenon 
as largely (if not entirely) passive, something that merely happens to us, and for 
which we couldn't be reasonably credited with any significant form of responsi-
bility (38-44). By reintroducing the epistemic and practical operations of a sub-
ject that is not an entirely passive victim of motivational events, the subject is 
now best seen as practically and epistemically active. In this way responsibility 
for self-deception gets back into the picture. It is to be clearly emphasized that 
Galeotti is not endorsing any crudely intentionalist views of self-deception, that 
is, views where agents act under the explicit and aware description of bringing it about 
their own self-deception, willingly, consciously and intentionally. For there is much 
that agents do not see about themselves—above all, they do not see the hidden, 
distorting working of motivation over their cognition, and also the causal effect 
of the pressure to which they are exposed.2 However, Galeotti is interested—and 
rightly so—in stressing that a subject is at work, and acts as an intentional agent 
does. For the subject assesses evidence, evaluates epistemic principles at hands, 
avoids or looks for new evidence, and so on. While failing to see that all of these 
epistemic endeavors are misled by the motivation towards a desired conclusion, 
and while also operating under an explicit description that does not include any 
attempts to deceive willingly him- or herself, the epistemic acts and the practical 
steps that he or she takes or avoids are nonetheless intentionally conducted. In 
other words, the subject works under the explicit description of wanting to take 
a certain step, assessing a certain piece of evidence, choosing to avoid another 
piece, and so forth.  
I have already addressed3 one first critical aspect regarding (2), and I now 
wish to cover one more point about (2). I start from discussing (2), and then I 
move on to an evaluation of (1).  
I have argued that it is unlikely that classic motivationalism, as put forward 
by Al Mele,4 for instance, can invariantly contain a genuine risk of being an an-
ti-agency view, where the term “anti-agency" is interpreted as denying the pres-
ence in self-deception of an epistemic and practical agent proper. My sense is 
that such conflation may be due to a more or less hidden fallacy of equivocation 
bearing on the term “agency” as it appears in the “anti-agency” phrase, other 
than being a truly genuine issue. Arguably, when Mele put forwards what he 
dubbed as his “anti-agency” view of self-deception, he made use of the phrase 
“anti-agency” in order to mark a substantial difference from Davidson’s inten-
 
2 Scott-Kakures, D. 2002, “At ‘Permanent Risk’: Reasoning and Self-Knowledge in Self-
Deception”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXV, 3, 576-603. 
3 Pedrini, P. 2020, “Autoinganno: con o senza agente? Sui rischi della fallacia di equivo-
cazione per la spiegazione causale”, Notizie di Politeia, XXVI, 137, 194-96. 




tionalism.5 According to Davidson, self-deception is the product of an agent 
who willingly and intentionally brings it about his or her own self-deception. By 
attacking Davidson’s intentionalism, Mele made use of the rhetoric of anti-
intentionalism and anti-agency in order to emphasize that on his view of self-
deception the subject is not someone who acts under the explicit and aware de-
scription of wanting to self-deceive. However, this does not imply that Mele 
leaves out of the picture any forms of intentional acts pursued by the agent un-
der different descriptions. This seems to be confirmed by the conditions that 
Mele judges to be jointly sufficient to fall prey to self-deception.6 They include a 
number of biased epistemic maneuvers that it is hard to consider as entirely pas-
sive. In all, if this reconstruction is correct, then any attempts to conflate classic 
motivationalism, even when rhetorically qualified as an “anti-agency” view, 
with the denial of any forms of agency, is perhaps due to a fallacy of equivoca-
tion on the term “agency” that might have somehow secretly operated over 
time. While in the heydays of Mele’s anti-intentionalism was perhaps more ob-
vious that the agency against which Mele’s view was directed was the agency of 
someone acting under the explicit and aware description of causing oneself to be 
deceived, in Galeotti’s theory the agency against which anti-intentionalism is 
directed is taken to risk to become a purely causal picture of self-deception, 
where the agent disappears. I am sympathetic with any views that emphasize 
the epistemic endeavors of agents when they self-deceive,7 and I also agree that 
Mele may not have done the best interest of his theory when he used the phrase 
“anti-agency”. Furthermore, it is a truly pointed issue to establish under what 
description then the agent acts, if he or she does not act under any explicit and 
aware description of bringing it about his or her self-deception. Nonetheless, I 
believe that it may be wrong to take the label “anti-agency view” to be invariant-
ly equated to a purely causal account with no agent in place at all. 
One second aspect regarding (2) that I briefly wish to touch upon has to do 
with the responsibility that attaches to a self-deceiver who actively works out his 
or her own self-deception, even if not with the explicit and aware view of caus-
ing his or her own self-deception. As said, Galeotti argues that self-deceivers in-
tentionally enter the biased reasoning that is conducive to self-deception, even if 
they are not aware that self-deception awaits them at the end of the process. 
That would suffice to attribute to them a certain accountability for what they do. 
It is less clear, however, how this view works in details. For one thing, the pro-
spect of this view dramatically changes if we start looking at it under the angle 
of the motivation that puts in motion the whole machine of the biased reason-
ing. If it turned out to be the case that self-deceivers are in fact caused to reason as 
they do by the motivation that alters their belief-formation cognitive process, 
would we be willing to attribute to them the responsibility for such reasoning? In 
other words, if we move back the focus of the theory from the form of their al-
tered, intentional reasoning as such to the cause of such reasoning, we immedi-
ately seem to have fewer reasons to take them to be accountable for such reason-
ing. This is a notorious line of attack against all of those views which take 
awareness and intentionality of first-order acts and mental states to be a suffi-
 
5 Davidson, D. 1985, “Deception and Division”, in LePore, E. and McLaughlin, B. (eds.), 
Actions and Events, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.  
6 Mele, A. 2001, Self-Deception Unmasked, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 50-51.  
7 Pedrini, P. 2013, L’autoinganno. Che cos’è e come funziona, Roma-Bari: Laterza.  
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cient ground of responsibility. For causing factors can end up making unac-
countable even fully aware and intentional first-order acts, if these causing fac-
tors are something on which the agent has ultimately no control or no other mar-
gins for correction and/or counteraction. 
More demanding theorists may even require that we establish whether 
causing factors create conditions that ultimately leave the agent unfree to reason 
otherwise. I set all of these much thrown-around questions on responsibility qua 
connected to control and/or freedom because, even if Galeotti argues that she is 
going beyond the control model (64), I am left with the sense that her basis for 
attributing responsibility to self-deceivers relies on much more than the mere first-
order intentional epistemic and practical operations of the subject who mislead-
ingly and prejudicially treats evidence. As far as I can see, the issue can begin to 
be settled by analyzing what other faculties Galeotti is in fact attaching to first-
order intentional epistemic and practical operations.  
For the sake of pumping intuitions, let us consider two scenarios. The first 
scenario has us to imagine a subject who is unaware of the very existence of self-
deception, of its working, and symptoms. At some point, this subject goes 
through the self-deceptive process. He or she might well be reasoning intention-
ally and consciously, as Galeotti diagnoses. However, by hypothesis, and for 
reasons to be explained, he or she has no tools to detect the phenomenon that is 
affecting and distorting his or her reasoning. In this case, it is hard to attribute 
full-blown responsibility to this agent.  
Another scenario has instead us to imagine a subject who is equally una-
ware of the distorting effect of motivation over his or her cognition; however, 
the theorist here may point out that this subject is in principle and as a matter of 
fact under certain conditions capable of detecting that something is going wrong in 
his or her reasoning. For being this reasoning conscious and intentional, the sub-
ject is in the position to reflect upon such form of reasoning, to compare it with 
other instances of reasoning, and possibly also to make an inference from an 
aware, or easily discoverable, motivation to its causal, distorting role over cogni-
tion.  
There are passages in the book which seem to confirm that Galeotti might 
have a preference for this second scenario (68). She seems to attach to the first-
order intentional operation a variety of other capabilities that the subject either 
directly enjoys, or can at least retrospectively learn (68). One might wonder, 
however, whether this second scenario can constitute a sound normative, as 
well as empirical, basis for attributing responsibility. At the very least, this view 
requires, and empirically predicts, a good amount of (ex ante or ex post) surveil-
lance over one’s mental states and processes that many would find excessively 
demanding. Be that as it may, if Galeotti’s view ultimately relies on the practice 
and/or the possible activation of these other faculties, then she might turn out to 
endorse a view where responsibility for self-deception is not merely based on the 
intentional first-order acts. Rather, her view seems to be ultimately based on 
some form of control, or possible activation of control, over one’s mental states and 
processes. 
Let me now turn back to (1). I have reasons to believe that (1) can hardly be 
a tenable solution to the “selectivity problem" as a problem of causation of self-
deception. I can only offer here an outline of an argument against the alleged 
success of the strategy Galeotti adopts when she explains how favorable circum-




tivity problem, favorable circumstances remain exposed to the reiteration of the 
selectivity problem against the causal compound made of motivation plus favor-
able conditions. That is to say, there may be people who do not self-deceive, 
even if they have the motivation and are also put in favorable circumstances. It 
may be true that the motivation to believe that p, coupled with circumstances of 
hard pressure, can increase the probability that one ends up self-deceiving. This 
may happen because pressure can erode the possible resistance that the subject, 
under less pressure, might still exert over the motivational thrust. If this is cor-
rect, then there must be something causally relevant in pressure, if a smaller 
number of motivated people resist against pressure. Yet, the addition of pressure 
as a means to making motivation stronger can’t hardly be the end of the causal 
story, given that selectivity is still looming. Resistance to motivation and pres-
sure thus seems to depend more on the psychological structure of the subject 
than on any other circumstances. Simply put, some people have a psychological 
structure that make them more resistant than others to various level of motiva-
tion and pressure. Even if we include the psychological structure of the subject 
in our causal analysis, it may be hard to adjudicate the question whether the 
psychology of the subject is causally decisive. Is the kind of psychological one 
has that is the ultimate determinant of self-deception? Or is it the vector comput-
ed by combining motivation and pressure with the psychological structure of the 
subject? This is a metaphysical topic for another, wider piece. But I think it is 
important to emphasize that there is a genuine issue here, which is urgent to ad-
judicate.   
In all, this is a beautifully written, and excellently argued, book that by all 
means should become a must-read for a wide audience, including (although not 
limited to) students and scholars interested in political philosophy, international 
relations, social and political sciences, philosophy of mind and psychology, eth-
ics, as well as all those who are active in policy making.  
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McCarroll, Christopher J., Remembering from the Outside: Personal Memory 
and the Perspectival Mind. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. xx + 220. 
 
The theme of observer memory might strike one who hasn’t read McCarroll’s 
book as somewhat narrow or specialized. Anyone who has read the book, how-
ever, will understand that it in fact intersects with a wide range of issues in the 
philosophy of memory and beyond. The book is thoroughly researched, rigor-
ously argued, and might be read with profit by philosophers working not only 
on memory but also on perception, imagination, and language. It might also 
profitably be read by psychologists working on any of these topics, for McCar-
roll both displays an impressive mastery of the relevant empirical literature and 
makes use of philosophical tools to shed considerable new light on the concep-
tual puzzles to which it gives rise. 
In field perspective memory (FPM), one remembers an event from the 
point of view from which one originally experienced it; in observer perspective 
memory (OPM), in contrast, one remembers an event from a point of view other 
than that from which one originally experienced it, seeing oneself in the remem-
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bered scene. The central question of the book is whether OPMs can be fully 
genuine or faithful to the past. McCarroll claims—in opposition to a claim 
found throughout the philosophical and psychological literatures—that it can 
be, and this in a very precise sense. We can distinguish between the truth of a 
retrieved memory and its authenticity (Bernecker 2008):1 a memory is true if it is 
accurate with respect to the remembered event; it is authentic if it is accurate 
with respect to the subject’s experience of the remembered event. What McCar-
roll claims is that OPMs can be both true and authentic. 
The claim that OPMs can be true is unproblematic: one’s memory of an 
event might clearly be accurate with respect to the event even if the point of 
view from which one remembers it differs from the point of view from which 
one experienced it. It is the claim—and McCarroll makes it clear that he does 
indeed mean to defend this claim—that OPMs can be authentic that is surpris-
ing. How, given that one did not see oneself while experiencing the event, might 
a memory in which one sees oneself be accurate with respect to one’s experience 
of the event? (Compare two photos, taken from different angles, of the same 
scene: they might both match the scene, but they will not match each other.) Af-
ter reviewing the literature on OPM in chapter 1, McCarroll develops, in chap-
ters 2 and 3, a two-part framework designed in part to answer this question. The 
framework combines a “constructive encoding” approach and a “reconstructive 
retrieval” approach. The basic idea behind the former is that constructive pro-
cesses occurring during encoding may shape the content of a stored memory. 
The basic idea behind the latter is that reconstructive processes occurring during 
retrieval may shape the content of a retrieved memory. Both of these ideas are 
empirically well-established, but the way in which McCarroll builds on them to 
defend the claim that OPMs can be authentic is highly original. 
According to the reconstructive retrieval approach, the new content that 
figures in an OPM—including a visual representation of the rememberer him-
self—is sometimes the product of reconstruction at retrieval. This approach thus 
does not by itself imply that OPMs can be authentic. According to the construc-
tive encoding approach, the apparently new content that figures in an OPM is 
sometimes the product of construction at encoding; the apparently new content 
may, in other words, not be new at all. This approach thus implies that OPMs 
can be authentic: the problematic components of the content of an OPM, in-
cluding, in particular, the visual representation of the rememberer himself, may, 
in some cases, have figured in the corresponding earlier experiences. In short, 
there is an important sense in which one does sometimes see oneself while expe-
riencing an event, a sense in which one sometimes has “observer perspective ex-
periences” (OPEs). 
The notion of an OPE is both the most provocative and the most problem-
atic element of McCarroll’s book. He emphasizes that he is not interested in 
what we might call literal OPEs, experiences in which one literally entertains a 
visual representation of oneself while experiencing an event (e.g., by visually 
imagining oneself from a hypothetical observer’s point of view). Thus his claim 
is not that an OPM might be authentic because the apparently new content that 
figures in it figured, in the same, visual form, in the corresponding OPE. It is, 
instead, that an OPM might be authentic because the apparently new content 
that figures in it figured, in a different, nonvisual form, in the OPE. This entails 
 




that the content of a nonliteral OPE can be equivalent to the content of a literal 
OPM, and McCarroll goes to considerable effort to show that this is the case, 
arguing that experience has a multimodal character and that information in one 
modality might be “translated” into another. When giving a public talk, for ex-
ample, one experiences the scene from one’s own visual point of view, but one 
might (say, if one is feeling self-conscious) also experience it from an emotional 
observer point of view; this emotional content can then be translated, during en-
coding, into a visual representation of one’s self. 
McCarroll’s strategy here is ingenuous. It does, however, face two obvious 
problems. First, the notion of an OPE is highly speculative. McCarroll borrows 
the notion from Nigro and Neisser’s foundational (1983) paper.2 Nigro and 
Neisser do not, however, provide any real evidence for the occurrence of OPEs, 
and the concept of an OPE has played no role in subsequent research on OPM. 
McCarroll does point to evidence from a variety of sources suggesting that the 
self may be present in experience in a variety of (nonvisual) ways, but this evi-
dence falls short of indicating that ordinary experiences may include content of 
the required sort. Second, the notion of translation is likewise highly speculative. 
The claim about authenticity presupposes not only that a nonvisual representa-
tion of the self may, via the translation process, give rise to a visual representa-
tion of the self, but also that it may do so without generating new content, for, if 
a retrieved memory includes content that was not included in the experience, it 
is by definition inauthentic. McCarroll does point to evidence suggesting that 
information in one modality can be translated into another modality; this evi-
dence does not, however, indicate that a nonvisual representation can be trans-
lated into a visual representation without the addition of new content. 
In order to surmount these problems, McCarroll might relax the standard of 
authenticity so as to allow a memory to be authentic as long as it includes at 
most a moderate amount of new content. Once the standard is relaxed, howev-
er, it becomes hard to see why we should care about it at all: if genuine memory 
is compatible with the addition of a moderate amount of new content, why 
think that it is incompatible with the addition of a large amount of new content? 
Two further moves suggest themselves. First, McCarroll might weaken the con-
cept of OPM: if the OPMs in which he is interested are not literal OPMs—i.e., if 
they do not include visual representations of the self but only, say, emotional 
representations of the self—the authenticity claim becomes much more plausi-
ble. Second, he might strengthen the concept of OPE: if the OPEs in which he is 
interested are literal OPEs—i.e., if they do include visual representations of the 
self—then the authenticity claim again becomes much more plausible. The cost 
of making either of these moves is, however, a significant reduction in the inter-
est of the authenticity claim. The claim that literal OPMs can be authentic with 
respect to literal OPEs and the claim that nonliteral OPMs can be authentic with 
respect to nonliteral OPEs are much less surprising than the claim that literal 
OPMs can be authentic with respect to nonliteral OPEs. 
There may, of course, be further moves that are open to McCarroll. The in-
tention of these remarks is not to show that his argument does not succeed but 
simply to show that there are ways of pushing back against it. And if it should 
eventually turn out that the argument does not succeed, McCarroll will never-
 
2 Nigro, G. and Neisser, U. 1983, “Point of  View in Personal Memories”, Cognitive Psy-
chology, 15, 4, 467-82. 
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theless have enabled us to learn a great deal about the nature and limits of 
memory’s faithfulness to the past; this alone is sufficient to ensure that his book 
will stand as a major contribution to the philosophy of memory. 
McCarroll’s argument for the authenticity claim will be of interest not only 
to philosophers of memory but also to philosophers of perception. Subsequent 
chapters will be of interest to philosophers working on topics including imagina-
tion and language. Chapters 4 and 5 engage critically with Vendler’s (1979)3 
claim that imagining “from the outside” is just a special case of imagining “from 
the inside”, arguing that Vendler goes wrong by overlooking the possibility of an 
unoccupied point of view in visual imagery. Chapter 6 engages critically with 
François Recanati’s work, arguing that Recanati’s (2007) framework4 can be 
modified so as to accommodate a form of implicit de se thought that is both first-
personal and from-the-outside. Chapter 7 of the book brings things to a conclu-
sion by drawing together the various threads of the overall argument. 
The quantity of published philosophical work on memory has increased 
rapidly over the past few years. Much of this work is of the highest quality. Even 
against this background, however, McCarroll’s book stands out as one of the 
most important contributions to the area in many years. The publication of the 
book is a major event in the philosophy of memory. I look forward to engaging 
with it in my own future work, and I have no doubt that many others will as 
well.5 
 
Centre for Philosophy of Memory  
Université Grenoble Alpes              KOURKEN MICHAELIAN 
 
 
3 Vendler, Z. 1979, “Vicarious Experience”, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 84, 2, 161-73. 
4 Recanati, F. 2007, Perspectival Thought: A Plea for (Moderate) Relativism, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
5 McCarroll is currently employed as a postdoc at the Centre for Philosophy of Memory, 
which I direct. I had read the book and agreed to write this review well before he was re-
cruited. This work is supported by the French National Research Agency in the frame-
work of the "Investissements d’avenir” program (ANR-15-IDEX-02). 
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What is the deep nature of intentionality? What is its source? What relation is 
there between intentionality and phenomenal consciousness? These are some of 
the main questions addressed by Angela Mendelovici in her recent, well written 
and original book The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality. Mendelovici’s proposal, 
as the title of her book clearly suggests, belongs to that family of theories that 
take a “consciousness-first” approach to intentionality. Such an approach is en-
dorsed by all the advocates of the so called “Phenomenal Intentionality Theory” 
(PIT) (people like Loar, Searle, Siewert, Strawson, Kriegel, Horgan, Tienson, 
Pitt, Farkas, Chalmers, Smithies, Montague, to mention just a few of them). For 
PIT’s friends, intentionality has an experiential-phenomenal nature and has its 
source in phenomenal consciousness. According to Mendelovici, this is so be-




ty is not merely a species of phenomenal consciousness (as most of PIT’s advo-
cates claim), but rather its only species and therefore truly identical with it. This 
peculiar way of accounting for the relationship between these two (at least con-
ceptually distinct) properties qualifies her proposal as a strong identity version of 
PIT, according to which phenomenal intentionality is the only kind of inten-
tionality (there is no non-phenomenal kind of intentionality) and it is identical to 
phenomenal consciousness. Other versions of PIT provide different accounts of 
the relationship between intentionality and consciousness, either in terms of 
grounding, or in terms of constitution, or of realization. According to Mendelo-
vici, strong identity PIT provides the clearest possible answer to the question re-
garding what kind of property intentionality is. By contrast, she claims, any non-
identity account leaves the nature of intentionality ultimately unexplained. 
Whether she is right or wrong in so claiming, her book is definitely worth-
reading, if only for the fact that it provides the most articulated and sophisticat-
ed presentation of an original theoretical proposal in the philosophical debate on 
the nature of intentionality. 
Before presenting my critical remarks, let me provide a sketchy presentation 
of the book’s overall structure and main claims. The book, which consists of six 
parts, can be taken to be organized into four main topic sections. In the first one 
Mendelovici presents the methodology that she adopts. This section deals with 
the following question: How can we fix reference on intentionality? In her view, 
the traditional answer according to which intentionality is the property that 
mental states originally possess of being about, being directed towards some-
thing (a property, a thing, a state of affairs) is too vague to constitute the starting 
point of the inquiry. Even though the notions of aboutness and directedness gesture 
towards the target property, they are, in her view, too fuzzy to provide a firm 
grip on it. In order to remedy such a lack of precision, she suggests to make use 
of an ostensive reference-fixing definition which characterizes intentionality as 
“that feature, whatever it is, that we at least sometimes notice in ourselves and 
are tempted to describe using representational terms like ‘aboutness’ and ‘direct-
edness’” (5). She criticizes other ways of fixing reference on intentionality (ways 
that make reference to some alleged roles that intentionality is supposed to play) 
because they do not individuate, in her view, intentionality, but different, albeit 
related, notions. This section is followed by a pars destruens whose aim is to as-
sess whether PIT’s main competitors (namely: tracking theories and functional 
role theories both in their short and in their long-arm version) are true and em-
pirically adequate. In order to show their empirical inadequacy, she makes use 
of what she labels the “mismatch problem” that she illustrates by presenting cas-
es in which the contents attributed by the competing theories do not match the 
contents we have “theory-independent reasons” to think we represent. In her 
view, the competing theories are guilty of two kinds of errors: an “error of 
commission” (in so far as they include in the representation’s content material 
that is not represented) and an “error of omission” (in so far as they do not in-
clude material that is represented). As to the faultiness of the competing theo-
ries, she presents what she labels the “Real Problem” according to which what is 
ultimately wrong with those theories is not so much that their alleged content-
conferring external relations sometimes “grab” the wrong content, but rather 
that they cannot “grab” anything at all, because genuine intentionality cannot 
arise from mere external relations with the world. What would then be the right 
source of genuine intentionality according to Mendelovici? This is the question 
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that she addresses in the third topic section of her book, in which she presents 
her positive proposal. According to it, intentionality cannot arise from anything 
different from phenomenal consciousness because only the latter has the right 
ingredient to give rise to intentionality. This is so, in her view, because inten-
tionality just is phenomenal consciousness (that is precisely what the identity 
account that she endorses amounts to). She then concludes by showing that her 
theory is also not clearly empirically inadequate in so far as it can accommodate 
all cases of intentionality, including those that are commonly thought to pose 
problems for PIT (these cases include thoughts, non-conscious mental states ei-
ther standing or occurrent, states representing rich descriptive contents or object-
involving contents or more generally broad contents).  
In my critical discussion of Mendelovici’s proposal I shall mainly focus on 
two issues. The first one has to do with the methodology that she adopts and 
recommends. My main question here is the following: Is she right in claiming 
that her suggested way of fixing reference on intentionality is theory-independent? 
This point is of the outmost importance in order to assess whether the starting 
point of the inquiry is neutral enough as not to compromise from the very be-
ginning its entire development. The second issue has to do with whether her 
phenomenally-based account of intentionality is ultimately able to provide a sat-
isfactory answer to what, according to many people, is the problem that any the-
ory of intentionality worthy of its name has to address, namely to account for 
how our mind succeeds in “getting in touch” with the world. The discussion of 
this point is preceded by an assessment of the criticisms she raises against PIT’s 
rival theories. Let me now address these issues starting from the first one. 
To begin with, it is important to stress that the ostensive definition that she 
introduces to fix reference on the property of intentionality does not ultimately 
dispense with the traditional characterization of it in terms of “aboutness” and 
“directedness”. Rather, it incorporates such a characterization together with the 
further condition according to which intentionality is a feature that we at least 
sometimes (i.e. in what she considers “paradigm cases” such as perceptual 
states, but also thoughts and judgments) notice in ourselves. She tries to mini-
mize the role that the traditional characterization plays in her picture by claim-
ing that the ostensive definition only mentions the aforementioned representa-
tional terms without using them. Actually, the role they play seems to be more 
substantive than that in so far as it is only by making use of them that it is possi-
ble to unify under a single label the huge variety of things we can introspectively 
notice, no matter how different they (phenomenally) appear from each other 
(compare a perceptual state with a judgment, for example). This said, let us con-
sider the other part of her suggested definition. As I have said, the definition of 
the subject matter of an inquiry should not be committed to any controversial 
way of conceiving it. Does Mendelovici’s definition satisfy this requirement? 
Well, as a matter of fact, in order for something to be introspectively noticeable 
it has to have an experiential-phenomenal nature and that intentionality does 
actually possess such a nature is a point that not everyone in the philosophical 
arena is ready to accept. Think for example of theorists like Fodor, Dretske and 
Millikan for whom intentionality is a property that can be studied by natural 
sciences by making use of their investigation methodologies. Any such theorist 
would find Mendelovici’s starting point question-begging and theory-laden. It 
has to be stressed that, according to Mendelovici, what introspection reveals is 




character. What she means by this somewhat vague expression is that introspec-
tion gives us knowledge of which contents our conscious occurrent mental states 
have. I want to make two critical remarks on this point. First. Even granting that 
we do have some sort of introspective access to the mental contents of (at least 
some of) our conscious occurrent mental states (but, as we will see in a moment, 
this is an issue that should not be taken for granted), it does not follow that we 
also have introspective access to intentionality, that is to the feature of our mental 
states in virtue of which they have the contents they have and a content at all. 
Mendelovici does not seem to be aware of this problem, for she says: “When we 
introspectively notice intentionality, we do so at least by introspectively noticing 
our contents. Indeed, it might be that there is nothing more to notice when we 
notice intentionality than those intentional contents” (note 7, p. 8). In any case, 
and this is my second remark, even assuming that the introspective noticeability 
of contents suffices for the introspective noticeability of intentionality, the fact 
remains that such a claim about mental contents presupposes an internalist met-
aphysical picture of their nature and individuating conditions that is anything 
but uncontroversial and non-committal. Mendelovici is well aware of the fact 
that if externalism were true, then her suggested methodology for finding out 
about our intentional states and their contents would prove ineffective. She dis-
cusses this point by observing that it is generally taken to be an objection to ex-
ternalism that its adoption makes it difficult, if not impossible, to account for the 
introspective accessibility of mental contents, which is why most advocates of 
externalism try to defend the claim that their metaphysical picture of the mind is 
compatible with a plausible account of self-knowledge. Her conclusion on this 
point is quite hasty: “If this attitude is correct [the so called “compatibilist atti-
tude” endorsed by most externalists], then if there is an incompatibility between 
the assumption underlying my methods and externalism, it is externalism that 
should be rejected” (66).  
Let me recap the main points of my critical assessment of the methodology 
that she adopts: a) the reference-fixing definition that she introduces seems to be 
no less fuzzy than the traditional one, in so far as it not only incorporates, but 
makes substantive use of it; b) the claim that intentionality is introspectively no-
ticeable is theory-laden, since it presupposes that intentionality is an experiential 
property; c) it is disputable that the introspective noticeability of content suffices 
for the introspective noticeability of intentionality; d) the claim that mental con-
tent is introspectively noticeable presupposes a non-neutral picture of mental 
content. In my view, these points provide strong, albeit non-conclusive, evi-
dence in support of the claim that the starting point of Mendelovici’s inquiry is 
not as theoretically neutral as it should be. This seems to me to be enough to put 
pressure on her claim that her recommended methodology is theory-independent.  
The issue of the theory-independency is relevant also for the second issue I 
want to address. As I said at the beginning, the non-neutrality of the starting 
point of an inquiry very often propagates to the inquiry itself. In my view, this is 
precisely what happens in Mendelovici’s case, in particular as regards the kind 
of arguments that she presents in support of the claim that PIT’s rival theories 
are both empirically inadequate and wrong because they do not have the right 
ingredients to account for how our minds succeed in getting in touch with the 
world. My main aim here is to assess, first, whether those arguments go through 
without assuming any controversial and theory-laden assumption and, second, 
whether strong identity PIT is ultimately able to properly account for that issue. 
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Let us start from the first point. As anticipated in the presentation of the 
book, Mendelovici ascribes to the competing theories two kinds of error that 
should falsify the theories’ predictions as to what a given mental state would or 
would not represent given the truth of those theories. The arguments she pre-
sents in support of her criticism have the following structure: “If theory T is true, 
then the representation R has the content C / Representation R does not have 
the content C / Therefore…” (as regards the error of commission) and “If theo-
ry T is true, then the representation R does not have the content C/ Representa-
tion R does have the content C / Therefore…” (as regards the error of omis-
sion). The problem I here see concerns the two arguments’ second premises. Do 
we have any theory-independent way of finding out which content a given men-
tal state has or does not have? Mendelovici thinks we do: introspection and con-
siderations of psychological role are precisely two such ways. Well, are they tru-
ly theory-independent as she claims? Let us consider the following point. As a 
moment’s reflection shows, neither argument could go through unless an implic-
it premise were in place, respectively: (i) a given representation cannot represent 
a content unless it is a content the subject “feels” she is entertaining (as for the 
argument in support of the error of commission) and (ii) a representation cannot 
avoid representing a given content if it is one the subject “feels” she is entertain-
ing (as for the argument in support of the error of omission). These two further 
premises hint at what she labels the “psychological involvement” of mental con-
tents, which ultimately amounts to the idea that which contents we entertain is 
wholly transparent to us, because we are the authors of those very contents. As 
before, this claim commits itself to a radically internalist picture and such a 
commitment, which is licensed by her suggested ways of finding out which con-
tents our mental states have, is anything but theory-independent. Or so I claim.  
The issue concerning the psychological involvement of mental content 
comes up again in the “Real problem” that she raises against the competing the-
ories: “theories relying on tracking relations not only fail to attribute psycholog-
ically involved content in mismatch cases but, worse, preclude the contents they 
attribute from being psychologically involved in the first place” (79). According 
to Mendelovici, what ultimately shows that the competing theories are wrong is 
their inability to account for how our minds can make psychological contact 
with the external world. As she says: “The Real Problem with the relation view 
is that it’s hard to see how any relation to distinctly existing items can make 
them entertained or otherwise intentionally represented […] No ordinary rela-
tion can allow us to literally entertain tables and chairs, to take hold of objects 
existing in the concrete world and bring them into our minds to make them 
available to our cognitive system” (204). I think that the way in which she 
frames the problem she is confronting with is strictly conditioned by her inter-
nalist picture of the mind. By assuming such a picture, the problem becomes 
that of accounting for how the gulf between mind and world can be bridged, so 
as to bring inside the mind what is outside of it. According to Mendelovici, no 
non-phenomenal theory of intentionality is able to solve this problem. Well, 
perhaps she is right (maybe because, once so framed, the problem becomes in-
tractable). But is her phenomenal intentionality theory able to account for the 
psychological involvement of the world after all? About this point I find the fol-
lowing passage very enlightening: “concretely existing objects, properties, and 
states of affairs exist distinctly and usually independently of us, our cognitive 




bear to these distinctly and independently existing items can make them psycho-
logically involved. So contents can’t be such items. Tables, chairs, and obtaining 
states of affairs are not thinkables, experienceables, entertainables, or, more generally, (in-
tentionally) representables. They are not the kinds of things that can play the role of inten-
tional contents” (205, emphasis mine). Well, is this a solution to the problem 
raised or just a capitulation? And, in the latter case, can a theory of intentionali-
ty worthy of its name be compatible with such a capitulation? In my view, even 
granting that Mendelovici is right in claiming that tracking and functional role 
theories of intentionality leave unexplained an issue that any adequate theory of 
intentionality ought to address, the fact remains that, on balance, not even her 
account seems able to explain how the world, the real world made of concretely 
existing objects like you and me and tables and chairs, can be psychologically 
involved.  
It ultimately turns out that her account of intentionality is highly revision-
ist. If she is right, intentionality does not possess most of the properties that we 
tend to ascribed to it, such as: being relatively abundant, externalistic, relational. 
All this can be accepted. But what about the trait according to which intention-
ality is the directedness of our mental states at something beyond themselves (or-
dinarily, concrete objects and properties) which could exist independently of be-
ing experienced? Is this a dispensable trait or is it rather a constitutive element of 
the very nature of intentionality, as most people (even within the PIT’s camp) 
claim? Personally, I am on the side of all those who take such a trait to be indis-
pensable. I therefore believe that in so far as Mendelovici’s picture gets rid of it, 
one can legitimately conclude that it gets rid of intentionality through and 
through. But if this is so, what is her theory ultimately a theory of? My suspicion 
is that her attempt at overcoming the fuzziness of the traditional characteriza-
tion of intentionality by trying to pin down the property by means of mainly ex-
perientally-based criteria ends up meeting the same fate as other attempts al-
ready made in the past, like for example Chisholm’s, namely that of individuat-
ing not intentionality, but a property that, albeit closely related to intentionality, 
does not ultimately coincide with it. My suspicious is that the property in ques-
tion is the presentationality that accompanies any conscious occurrent intentional 
state, that is the property that accounts for the fact that consciously representing 
something is always accompanied by a presentation to the subject of what she is 
thereby representing. It is a pity that the distinction between representation and 
presentation is rarely thematised within the PIT’s camp. I personally think that 
such a thematisation would highly improve the ongoing debate on intentionality. 
It has to be said that Mendelovici shows great awareness of all the problems 
that her proposal raises. Not only that. Actually she addresses them and, more 
often than not, provides interesting and plausible solutions. Regardless of 
whether one finds them satisfactory or not, one must allow her an uncommon 
capacity of making a radical and provocative position look eminently reasona-
ble. To conclude, let me say that Mendelovici’s book is to be warmly welcomed: 
if it contains much to disagree with, it also contains much to learn. 
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